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Case study: Why people commit fraud
Classic fraud theory explains the motivations for fraud as a triangle of perceived
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Fraud and corruption have been extremely prevalent in recent years and
fraudulent financial statements have been particularly common, as in the
cases of Parmalat in Europe and Enron in the US.
The cost of fraud is severe. When a company manipulates its financial
statements, the value of its stock can drop by as much as 500 times 
the value of the fraud.
Classic fraud theory explains the motivations for fraud as a triangle of
perceived opportunity, perceived pressure and rationalisation. Every
perpetrator of fraud faces some kind of pressure; it does not have to be
real, it simply has to seem real.
Perceived opportunity is the belief that the perpetrator can commit fraud
and get away with it. Thirdly, perpetrators need a way to rationalise their
actions. Common rationalisations are “it’s for the good of the company”,
“this scheme is only temporary”, “we've no other option”, and “we are
not hurting anyone”.
These three factors are essential to
every fraud, whether it is one that
benefits the perpetrators directly, such
as employee fraud, or one that
benefits the perpetrators’ organisation,
such as financial statement fraud.
Chief executives can feel extreme
pressure when the company’s success is directly linked to their
performance. In certain cases, attention shifts from managing the firm
to managing the stock price, which turns into fraudulently managing the
financials. When perpetrators believe that auditors and other monitoring
bodies are not likely to catch them, perceived opportunity increases.
Boards have a responsibility to oversee their firms’ high-level
policymakers.
Perceived rationalisations are people’s capacity to defend, explain or
make excuses for their actions. It is recognised that dishonest people
tend to rationalise more than honest people; they fake the facts of
reality. Dishonest people tend to have a “live for today, I’ve got to have
it now” attitude. Honest people do not try to beat the system. Hiring
honest people, who are more goal-oriented, greatly reduces fraud.
Greed is also a factor. It can erode a person’s ethics and make fraud
easier to rationalise. Our research found significant levels of greed
among executives and investment and commercial banks that carry out
lucrative transactions and benefit from the high profits of companies.
Some individuals are dishonest regardless of their circumstances, but
most are affected by those around them – their coworkers and
organisations – so having ethical policies in place is important.
Fraud and corruption are cancers that eat away at society’s productivity.
Firms need to learn from ethical lapses of their counterparts so that
they do not follow in their footsteps.
Adapted from Financial Fraud: the How and Why by Chad 
Albrecht, Conran C Albrecht and Simon Dolan, in European
Business Forum (Summer 2007), www.ebfonline.com
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 
 
Emerald Editors in the news 
 
New editorial team of Cross Cultural Management featured in The 
Times and European Business Forum 
 
A feature on financial fraud by the new editorial team of Cross Cultural 
Management, the UK’s leading source of research on multicultural 
management issues, has been published in the The Times and 
European Business Forum. 
 
The article, entitled “Financial Fraud: the How and Why” was written by 
Professor Simon Dolan and Chad Albrecht, both of the ESADE 
Business School in Spain, was published in the European Business 
Forum and further in The Times, 19th July 2007. 
 
The article examines the fraud triangle of perceived opportunity, 
perceived pressure and opportunity. Professor Simon Dolan comments, 
“Chad and I are delighted that our research has been so well received.  
Fraud and corruption are cancers that eat away at society’s productivity. 
Firms need to learn from ethical lapses of their counterparts so that they 
do not follow in their footsteps. 
 
“Moving forwards, we aim to use our academic expertise to further 
improve the quality of features in Emerald Group Publishing’s Cross 
Cultural Management and make it a ‘must have’ title for any manager 
looking to develop a cross cultural and assertive team.” 
 
Professors Dolan and Albrecht are currently on the lookout for authors 
who wish to provide contributions which address intracultural, 
intercultural and transcultural management issues. 
 
Professor Dolan comments, “We are actively seeking writers who can 
provide our readers with new and interesting insights into Cross Cultural 
Management.  If you’re an author, academic or have Cross Cultural 
Management experience that you’d like to share, we want to hear from 
you”. 
 
Cross Cultural Management: An International Journal is published 
by Emerald Group Publishing Limited, world-leader publisher of journals 
and databases in the fields of management, library and information 
services and engineering.  It seeks to be the leading source of research 
on multicultural management issues.  The journal addresses cross 
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It is almost impossible to open any newspaper today without reading headlines 
relating to fraud and other forms of corruption within organizations.  Enron, 
WorldCom, Waste Management, Xerox and Cendant are just a few examples of 
companies in the United States whose executives have participated in unethical 
actions.  However, financial *612.14*! 1(%! 2)0! 4/,/0%.! 0)! 0$%! a2/0%.! H010%*8!!
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The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) regularly conducts one 
of the most comprehensive fraud studies in the United States.  First conducted in 1996 
and then redone in 2002 and 2006, the ACFE study, called Report to the Nation on  
Occupational Fraud & Abuse, is based on actual fraud cases y certified fraud 
examiners who investigate the frauds.  The 2006 study estimates that within the 
United States, organizations lose 5 percent of their annual revenues to fraud of 
various forms.  Applied to the United States gross domestic product, this 5 percent 
figure would translate to approximately $652 billion in fraud losses.   
Because fraud affects how much we pay for goods and services, each of us 
pays not only a portion of the fraud bill but also for the detection and investigation of 
fraud. Most people believe that fraud is a growing problem.  Most researchers agree 
that the number of frauds committed seem to be increasing.  However, even more 
alarming than the increased amount of fraud cases is the size of discovered frauds.  
In earlier times, if a criminal wanted to steal from his or her employer, the 
perpetrator had to physically remove the assets from the business premise.  Because 
of fear of being caught with the goods, frauds tended to be small.  However, with the 
advent of the Internet, computers, and complex accounting systems, employees now 
need only to make a telephone call, misdirect purchase invoices, bribe a supplier, 
manipulate a computer program, or simply push a key on the keyboard to misplace 
company assets.  Because physical possession of stolen property is no longer required 
and because it is just as easy to program a computer to embezzle $1 million, as it is 
$1,000, the size and number of frauds have increased tremendously.  
The unethical actions of executives within each of these organizations have 
resulted in job losses, lawsuits, economic downturn, and a plethora of other negative 
! PQ!
consequences for individuals and society as a whole.* In my dissertation, I justify the 
subject of fraud examination because of the rampant and large frauds that take place 
in organizations throughout the world today.  It is my belief that financial frauds and 
other forms of organizational corruption have an immense impact on the world we 
live in.  As my own advisor, Simon Dolan, has suggested it is not enough to simply 
understand fraud and why it occurs, rather it is important to understand the strategies 
that are employed by individuals – in the case of this research – the strategies that are 
used to influence others to participate in fraud schemes. It is my hope that this 
research will aid in the prevention of future ethical lapses and be the basis for 
additional research to better understand fraud and corruption in cultures throughout 
the world. 
Previous research has suggested that a key element of fraud prevention is 
educating employees and others about the seriousness of fraud and informing them 
what to do if fraud is suspected.  Educating employees about fraud and providing 
fraud awareness training helps ensure that frauds that do occur are detected at early 
stages, thus limiting financial exposure to the corporation and minimizing the 
negative impact of fraud on the work environment. Education includes instructing 
employees, vendors, customers, and other stakeholders of what the organization’s 
expectations are. I further justify the subject of fraud as the theme for my dissertation 
because the dissertation is making a difference in the real world by providing fraud 
awareness, education, and training to managers throughout the world.  The research 
presented in this dissertation adds to the existing literature on fraud awareness and 
education.  As such, many of the principles discussed in the dissertation, will be the 
basis for further research within our academic field.  
! ]^!
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In recent years, it has been nearly 
impossible to open any business 
newspaper or magazine without 
seeing headlines relating to various 
types of corruption. One type of 
corruption has been especially 
prevalent – fraudulent financial 
statements. While Europe has 
experienced several financial 
statement frauds, including those 
of Parmalat, Royal Ahold and 
Vivendi, they have not been nearly 
as devastating as those in the  
US. Enron, WorldCom, Fannie Mae, 
Waste Management, Sunbeam, 
Qwest, Xerox, Adelphia, Tyco: 
these and many other recent 
financial statement frauds have 
shocked the business world. In  
this article, we present the classic 
model of fraud theory, and then 
discuss how this model can be 
expanded in a way that can help 
European firms. 
The cost of all frauds – 
especially financial statement fraud 
– is extremely high. For example, 
when a company manipulates its 
financial statements, the market 
value of that company’s stock 
usually drops considerably, 
sometimes by as much as 500 
times the amount of the fraud. Six 
of the top ten bankruptcies in US 
history occurred in 2002. A record 
186 companies, with a combined 
$369m in debt, filed for bankruptcy 
in that year. When a company such 
as WorldCom declares a $102bn 
bankruptcy, nearly every person 
who has a pension or owns mutual 
fund shares is hurt financially. 
Indeed, the cost of these financial 
statement frauds was borne by the 
entire country. When a financial 
statement fraud occurs, the decline 
in market value and lost revenue for 
a company can be astronomical. 
Why people commit fraud
Classic fraud theory explains the 
motivations for fraud as a triangle 
of perceived opportunity, perceived 
pressure and rationalisation, as 
shown in Figure 1 (see page 36). 
Every perpetrator of fraud faces 
some kind of pressure. Most 
pressures involve a financial need, 
although non-financial pressures, 
such as the need to report results 
better than actual performance, 
frustration with work, or even a 
challenge to beat the system, can 
also motivate fraud. Research has 
shown that these pressures do not 
 Financial 
 fraud:  
the how and why
By Chad Albrecht, Conan C Albrecht and Simon Dolan
Understanding the conditions 
in which fraud occurs is the key 
to its detection and prevention. 
Illustrations: Martin O’Neill
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have to be real, they simply have  
to seem real to the perpetrator.
The second element of the 
fraud triangle is perceived 
opportunity. The perpetrator must 
believe that he or she can commit 
the fraud and not get caught, or if 
he or she gets caught, nothing 
serious will happen. Like pressures, 
opportunities do not have to be 
real; they only must be perceived 
as real by the perpetrator.
Third, perpetrators need a way 
to rationalise their actions. Common 
rationalisations are: “it’s for the good 
of the company”, “the scheme is only 
temporary”, “we’ve no other option”, 
“we are not hurting anyone”, “it’s for 
a good purpose”, and so on. 
Perceived pressures, perceived 
opportunities, and rationalisations 
are essential to every fraud. 
Whether the fraud is one that 
benefits the perpetrators directly, 
such as employee fraud, or one 
that benefits the perpetrator’s 
organisation, such as financial 
statement fraud, the three elements 
are always present. In the case of 
financial statement fraud, for 
example, the pressure could  
be the need to meet analysts’ 
expectations or debt covenants, 
the opportunity could be a weak 
audit committee or poor internal 
controls, and the rationalisation 
could be “we’re only getting over  
a temporary slump in business”. 
To understand what motivates 
individuals to become involved in 
financial statement fraud, consider 
the case of the following two firms. 
Firm A has overall income 
increasing over time, but there are 
several slumps along the way. Firm 
B’s income increases consistently 
over time without slumps. Since 
Firm B’s earnings are more 
predictable, and since stock prices 
and market values are a function of 
both risk and return, Firm A’s more 
risky income stream will result in its 
stock price being significantly lower.
Executives understand this risk/
return trade-off. They also know the 
punishment that is meted out to 
firms with Firm A-type earnings 
streams. Accordingly, when Firm 
A’s earnings reach a temporary 
apex and appear to be decreasing 
for the next period, there is huge 
pressure to “cook the books”. This 
increases when the executives 
themselves hold shares and share 
options, for a decrease in price will 
hurt them as well as the company. 
Proposed fraud model
In this section, we propose a 
“propensity to commit fraud 
model”. This builds upon classical 
fraud theory by listing the various 
factors that contribute to pressure, 
opportunity and rationalisation. 
Perceived pressures: The traditional 
fraud model states that pressures 
(perceived or real) increase the 
likelihood that a person will commit 
fraud. Factors include corporate and 
personal position, compensation 






























































































Figure 2: Propensity to commit fraud model
Propensity to 
commit fraud
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A company’s financial position  
is largely a result of its performance 
and the level of growth it is trying to 
achieve. Most of the companies that 
committed financial statement fraud 
in the past few years had large 
amounts of debt and leverage. This 
placed tremendous financial pressure 
on executives, not only to have high 
earnings (to offset interest costs), 
but also to report earnings to meet 
debt and other covenants. Enron’s 
derivatives-related liabilities increased 
from $1.8bn to $10.5bn in 2000. 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, 
many of the problems at US 
companies were masked by the 
good economy. History has now 
shown that several of the frauds 
were actually being committed 
during the boom years, but the 
economy hid the behaviour. The 
boom also caused executives to 
believe their companies were more 
successful than they were. 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) 
found that extended periods  
of prosperity can reduce a firm’s 
motivation to comprehend the 
causes of success, raising the 
likelihood of faulty attributions.
Managers can also feel 
significant pressure when their 
personal financial status is at risk. 
For example, they may feel their job 
is in jeopardy if performance falls 
below a certain level. The fear of 
losing one’s job as a result of poor 
financial performance has 
contributed to various frauds 
throughout the past decade. 
A CEO, or any other employee, 
can feel significant pressure when 
company success is directly linked 
to his or her compensation plan. 
Indeed, many of the recent frauds 
exhibited signs of misplaced 
executive incentives. Executives of 
several fraudulent companies were 
endowed with hundreds of millions 
of dollars in share options and/or 
restricted shares that made it far 
more important to keep the stock 
price rising than to report financial 
results accurately. In many cases, 
this share-based compensation far 
exceeded executives’ salary-based 
compensation. The attention of 
many CEOs shifted from managing 
the firm to managing the stock 
price, and all too often this turned 
into fraudulently managing the 
financials. Compensation structure is 
one of the most prominent reasons 
for financial statement fraud.
Externally imposed expectations 
include any performance 
expectations placed on an 
individual or company by those 
outside their immediate 
environment: financial analysts, 
competition, and even family 
members. During the past decade, 
unachievable expectations by  
Wall Street analysts contributed to 
recent scandals. Company boards 
and management, generally lacking 
alternative performance metrics, 
used comparisons with the  
stock price of “similar” firms  
and attainment of analyst 
expectations as 
important de  
facto performance 
measures. Each 
quarter, the analysts 
forecasted what each 
company’s earnings per 
share would be. The forecasts 
alone drove price movements  
of the shares, imbedding the 
expectations in the price of a 
company’s shares. Executives 
knew that the penalty for missing 
the “street’s” estimate was severe: 
falling short of expectations by 
even a small amount would harm 
the company’s share price. 
Perceived opportunities: Increased 
opportunities lead to an increased 
propensity to commit fraud. Our 
model includes opportunities relating 
to external oversight and monitoring, 
internal monitoring and control, 
environmental complexity and the 
existence of related parties and lack 
of knowledge or education. 
External oversight includes  
audit firms, government agencies, 
or any other external monitoring  
a firm or individual may have (such 
as industry or regulatory oversight). 
During the past decade in the US, 
accounting firms have, in some 
cases, used audits as loss leaders 
to establish relationships so they 
could sell more lucrative consulting 
services. The rapid growth of the 
consulting practices of the “Big 5” 
accounting firms, which was much 
higher than the growth of other 
consulting firms, attested to the 
fact that it is much easier to sell 
consulting services to existing 
clients than to new ones. But the 
provision of consulting services 
caused some auditors – notably 
Arthur Andersen – to lose their 
focus and become business 
advisers rather than auditors. This 
affected these companies’ abilities 
In Brief
> Understanding why  
and how individuals 
commit fraud is the key  
to fraud prevention.
> Pressure to commit fraud 
combined with opportuni-
ties to do so have led to 
many financial statement 
frauds in recent years.
> Some people are also able 
to rationalise fraudulent 
actions by arguing that 
they will benefit themselves 
or their companies.
> To prevent fraud,  
it is necessary to reduce 
the pressures and 
opportunities, but also  
to hire people of sufficient 
integrity who will not 
rationalise fraud.
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to provide independent monitoring, 
and this helped to create conditions 
in which fraud could take place.
Internal monitoring and control 
includes oversight provided by 
boards, and audit and 
compensation committees. One of 
the purposes of boards of directors 
is to oversee the high-level 
policymakers of a company. The 
board is an important element  
of corporate control and is often 
perceived as the final control for 
shareholders. A board that fails to 
accept this responsibility dooms the 
corporate control process by letting 
executives operate unchecked, 
without proper feedback on 
corporate or personal performance. 
Within the board, the audit and 
compensation committees assume 
vital control responsibilities. The 
audit committee oversees the work 
of the external and internal auditors, 
and the risk assessment function 
within the corporation. The 
compensation committee oversees 
executive cash and equity 
compensation, loans and other 
forms of remuneration. Many of  
the companies involved in corporate 
wrongdoing had aggressive 
executives who ran roughshod  
over their boards, and audit and 
nominating committees. An 
important oversight control was 
missing and the control environment 
was decayed. Recently, the board 
members of WorldCom and Enron 
agreed to personally accept some 
responsibility for their companies’ 
wrongdoing and to make personal 
payments to victims.
The perceived opportunity to 
commit fraud is affected by the 
environmental complexity. Greater 
complexity makes it harder for 
auditors, boards and external 
bodies to understand the exact 
financial state of a company. 
Complex companies or divisions 
within companies provide CEOs 
and employees places to hide 
fraudulent activities. Related parties 
also make it possible to hide 
fraudulent transactions. Lincoln 
Savings and Loan was one 
company that used relationships  
to commit fraud. In Lincoln’s case, 
it structured sham transactions with 
certain straw buyers (related 
parties) to make its negative 
performance appear profitable. The 
management of ESM Government 
Securities hid a $400m financial 
statement fraud by creating a large 
receivable from a non-consolidated 
related entity. 
While relationships with all parties 
should be examined to determine  
if they present opportunities for or 
exposure to fraud, relationships with 
financial institutions, related 
organisations and individuals, 
external auditors, lawyers, investors 
and regulators should be 
considered especially carefully. 
Relationships with financial 
institutions and bond-
holders are important 
because they provide 
an indication of the 
extent to which the 
company is leveraged.
Sometimes people 
become victims of fraud 
because perpetrators know 
that such individuals may not 
have the capacity or knowledge to 
detect their illegal acts. Such people 
are easy to deceive. Perpetrators 
often target older, less educated  
or non-native-speaking people 
because they find them to be easier 
victims. When perpetrators believe 
that auditors and other monitoring 
bodies are not likely to catch them, 
perceived opportunity increases. 
Perceived rationalisations: These 
are measures of the ability people 
have to defend, explain or make 
excuses for their actions. Increased 
ability to rationalise increases the 
probability that people will commit 
fraud. It has long been recognised 
that people who are dishonest tend 
to rationalise more than people 
who are honest. One definition  
of honesty is “the virtue of refusing 
to fake the facts of reality” (Hsieh 
2005). When people are honest, 
there is no need to make excuses 
for faking reality. Researchers have 
found that fraud can be greatly 
reduced by hiring honest people, 
who tend to be more goal-oriented 
and are able to delay gratification. 
Dishonest people tend to have  
a “live for today, I’ve got to have  
it now” attitude. Honest people  
do not try to “beat the system”.
A less ethical person will have a 
greater propensity to commit fraud, 
given a constant level of 
opportunity and pressure. A 
mediating factor in personal ethics 
is the level of greed an individual 
has. Greed can decrease a 
person’s ethics and make  
fraud easier to rationalise. In the 
frauds researched for this article, 
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there was a 
significant level of 
greed on the part of 
executives, investment banks, 
commercial banks and investors. 
Each of these groups benefited 
from the strong economy, the high 
level of lucrative transactions and 
the apparently high profits of 
companies. None of them wanted 
to accept bad news. As a result, 
they sometimes ignored negative 
news and entered into bad 
transactions. In the Enron case, 
various commercial and investment 
banks made hundreds of millions 
from Enron’s investment banking 
transactions, on top of the tens  
of millions in loan interest and fees 
(McLean 2001). None of these 
firms alerted investors about its 
derivative or other underwriting 
problems. In October 2001, after 
several executives had abandoned 
Enron and negative news about 
Enron was reaching the public,  
16 of 17 security analysts covering 
Enron still rated the company  
a “strong buy” or “buy”. 
Enron’s outside law firms were 
also making high profits from its 
transactions. These firms failed to 
correct or disclose any problems 
related to the derivatives and special 
purpose entities, and helped draft 
the requisite legal documentation.
Finally, the three major credit 
rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard 
& Poor’s and Fitch/IBC – all receiving 
big fees from Enron – did nothing  
to alert investors of problems. Just 
weeks before Enron’s bankruptcy 
filing, after most of the bad news 
was known and Enron’s stock was 
trading for $3 
per share, all three 
still gave investment grade 
ratings to Enron’s debt.
While some individuals may  
be honest or dishonest regardless 
of the circumstances, most people 
are affected by their co-workers 
and organisations. People’s ability 
to rationalise is affected by the 
ethics of those around them. 
Companies with strong codes  
of ethics that are supported by 
policies, ethical modelling at the 
top, and anonymous feedback 
measures provide strong ethical 
environments for their employees 
(Anand et al. 2004).
Additionally, psychology and 
organisational behaviour research 
explain that people have different 
achievement needs. Researchers 
have found that subjects with 
higher achievement needs set 
higher goals and perform better 
than those with lower achievement 
needs (Matsui et al. 1981). People 
who have a greater need to achieve 
consider their contribution and 
participation in success to be 
important, and they find it enjoyable 
to work hard, to be compared  
to a standard and to be challenged. 
They feel the need to establish 
themselves as experts and excel 
above others (Dunning et al. 1989; 
Deci and Ryan 1980). 
Individuals with a higher need  
to succeed will have a greater ability 
to rationalise fraud if given adequate 
opportunity and overpowering 
pressure. For example, these 
individuals will rationalise cheating on 
exams because they feel significant 
pressure to achieve high scores. In 
the financial world, individuals with  
a high need to succeed may 
rationalise fraud to make financial 
success appear possible.
A rationalisation specific to 
financial statement fraud is rule-
based accounting standards. In 
contrast to accounting practices  
in other countries in Europe, such 
as the UK, the US’s Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) are much more rule-based 
than principles-based. If a client 
chooses a questionable method of 
accounting, and that method is not 
specifically prohibited by GAAP, it is 
hard for auditors or others to argue 
that the client cannot use it; their 
actions are not “against the rules”. 
Professional judgment lapses as the 
general principles already contained 
within GAAP and SEC regulations 
are ignored or minimised. The result 
is rather than deferring to existing, 
more general rules, specific rules 
(or the lack of them) can be 
exploited for new, often complex 
financial arrangements. As an 
example, consider the case of 
Enron. Even if Andersen had 
argued that the accounting for 
Enron’s Special Purpose Entities 
(SPEs) was not appropriate, it 
would have been impossible for  
the auditors to make the case that 
Enron’s accounting violated  
specific rules. Even in the aftermath 
of Enron’s bankruptcy, it was not 
immediately clear whether any laws 
had actually been violated.
Conclusions
Fraud and corruption are  
cancers that eat away at society’s 
productivity. They reduce the 
effectiveness and efficiency of 
economies, and have very high 
costs for individuals and companies 
throughout the world. The model 
we have proposed provides insight 
into why financial statement fraud 
occurs, and it is a useful way for 
shareholders, board members and 
others to think about issues such 
as incentives for executives. By 
better understanding what caused 
major ethical lapses to occur in the 
US, Europe can prepare itself to 
avoid similar ethical breakdowns.  
In the end, we will learn from  
the mistakes of the US, instead  
of following in its footsteps.
While some people may be  
honest or dishonest regardless 
of circumstances, most people 
are affected by their co-workers
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 In this paper, we propose a model that describes the process by which 
individuals within organizations are recruited and become involved in financial 
statement fraud schemes.  A dyad reciprocal framework is developed, inspired by the 
classical French and Raven taxonomy of power. The model addresses the process of 
recruitment, wherein one individual influences another individual to participate in 
financial statement fraud.  It is proposed that this initial dyad effect is extended to 
multiple relationships throughout the organization and eventually leads to normative 
acceptance of other illegal or unethical acts. This in turn, has a negative effect on the 
organization as a whole.  
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Financial Statement Fraud 
 In recent years, corruption and other forms of unethical behavior in 
organizations have received significant attention in the management literature 
(Bandura, Barbaranaelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996), investment circles  (Pujas, 
2003), and regulator communities (Farber, 2005).  Scandals at Enron, WorldCom, 
Xerox, Quest, Tyco, HealthSouth, and other companies have created a loss of 
confidence in the integrity of the American business (Carson, 2003) and even caused 
the accounting profession in the United States to reevaluate and reestablish basic 
accounting procedures (Apostolon & Crumbley, 2005). In response to the Enron 
scandal, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued the following 
statement: 
 “Our profession enjoys a sacred public trust and for more than one hundred 
 years has served the public interest.  Yet, in a short period of time, the stain 
 from Enron’s collapse has eroded our most important asset: Public 
 Confidence.” (Castellano and Melancon, 2002, p. 1) 
 
 Financial scandals are not limited to the United States alone.  Organizations in 
Europe, Asia and other parts of the world have been involved in similar situations.  
Celebrated non-U.S. cases include: Parmalat (Italy), Harris Scarfe and HIH 
(Australia), SKGlobal (Korea), YGX (China), Livedoor Co. (Japan), Royal Ahold 
(Netherlands), and Vivendi (France).  The business community worldwide has 
experienced a syndrome of ethical breakdowns, including extremely costly financial 
statement frauds.   
 Financial statement fraud has been defined as an intentional misrepresentation 
of an organization’s financial statements (National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting, 1987).  An organization’s financial statements are the end 
product of the accounting cycle and provide a representation of a company’s financial 
position and periodic performance.   The accounting cycle includes the procedures for 
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analyzing, recording, classifying, summarizing, and reporting the transactions of a 
business or organization.  Financial statements are a legitimate part of good 
management practice in a wide variety of domains (Power, 2003).   
 Financial statements are prepared by, and are the responsibility of, company 
management (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1979).  Accounting is the 
process through which financial statements are prepared.  It is the epistemic 
consonance and rationale of economic science between government and the public via 
the mode of official reporting with auditors and accountants, thereby contributing to 
the discharge of government accountability and the obtaining of a consensus 
regarding possible future courses of economic management (Suzuki, 2003). Financial 
statements include presentations of financial data that are prepared in conformity with 
some comprehensive basic form of accounting.   Financial reporting, which comes in 
the form of financial statements, provides information for the purposes of investment 
and credit decisions, assessment of cash flow prospects, and the evaluation of 
enterprise resources, claims to those resources, and changes in them (Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, 1979). 
How and Why Financial Statement Fraud Occurs 
 Unfortunately, in recent years, various organizations have experienced 
massive financial statement frauds.  Because financial statements play such an 
important role in society, organizations, and the economy, it is important to 
understand how and why, in some organizations, financial statements are 
manipulated.  “How” and “why” financial statement frauds are committed in 
organizations represents two different and separate issues that are not yet fully 
understood.  “How” financial statement fraud is committed has been the subject of 
much scholarly debate in the accounting profession.  In fact, the recent Sarbanes-
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Oxley Act that was passed by the United States Congress in 2002 was an attempt to 
address the issues of “why” financial statement frauds are committed and to curb 
financial statement fraud within the United States,   
 The accounting research community has given considerable attention to the 
subject of how financial statement fraud is perpetrated and, those efforts, have led to 
substantial gains in the fight against fraud and other forms of corruption. However, 
“why” fraud is committed within organizations has received less attention.  Research 
that has addressed “why” fraud is committed has generally focused on various 
theories of management, especially that of agency theory (Albrecht, et al, 2004).   
 Agency theory, first proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), describes a 
principal-agent relationship between shareholders and management, where top 
managers act as agents whose personal interests do not naturally align with company 
and shareholder interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Agency theory stems from 
economic models that argue that most people are motivated by self-interest and self-
preservation.  Several researchers have applied agency theory to recent frauds in an 
attempt to explain why executives may have rationalized their involvement in various 
types of fraud, especially manipulating reported earnings.  These researchers have 
asserted that management committed fraud because it was in their personal, short-
term interest (Davis, Shoorman, Donaldson, 1997).  In an attempt to curb financial 
statement fraud and other deviant management behavior, researchers have suggested 
that organizations structure management incentives in ways that align management 
behavior with shareholder goals.  Furthermore, researchers have argued that 
organizations should create controls to limit the opportunities for executives to 
maximize their own utility at the expense of shareholder interest.  When the interest 
of top management is brought in line with the interest of shareholders, agency theory 
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argues that management will fulfill its duty to shareholders, not so much because of 
any moral sense of duty to the shareholders, but because doing what shareholders 
request also maximizes their own utility (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  Furthermore, 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggested that designing an optimal control mechanism between 
the principal and agent is in the principal’s best interests. 
 Agency theory is an effective tool to analyze recent financial statement frauds 
and continues to be a basis for research into the topic of corrupt organizations.  
However, because agency theory focuses primarily on why a manager (or multiple 
managers) would commit financial statement fraud to maximize their perceived self 
interest and not how they recruit other individuals into the schemes to assist them 
with the fraud, we do not use the context of agency theory in this paper.  Agency 
theory is excellent in understanding how financial statements get started; it is not so 
helpful in understanding how others in an organization, including those who often do 
not benefit personally from the frauds, are recruited as participants.    
 In the last few years, there has been an increased volume of research by 
scholars from the organizational community into the issues of fraud and other forms 
of corruption from a humanistic approach.  Recent research in this area has addressed 
circumstances that influence self-identity in relation to organizational ethics (Weaver, 
2006), collective corruption in the corporate world (Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 
2000), normalization and socialization, including the acceptance and perpetuation of 
corruption in organizations (Anand, Ashforth & Mahendra, 2004), the impact of rules 
on ethical behavior (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004), the mechanisms for disengaging 
moral control to safeguard social systems that uphold good behavior (Bandura, 1999), 
and moral stages (Kohlberg, 1984).  In addition to this work, there has been 
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substantial research over the last 25 years into the various aspects of whistle blowing 
in corrupt organizations (Dozier & Miceli, 1985; Near & Miceli, 1986).   
 While this research has increased our knowledge of corruption in 
organizations and sheds light on the issue of financial statement fraud, this research 
does not explain how one or more corrupt individual(s) persuades other individuals to 
become involved in dishonest acts.  Understanding the way that individuals, who 
would otherwise make ethical decisions, become recruited into a financial statement 
frauds would provide valuable knowledge that could help reduce the magnitude of 
financial statement frauds and lead to earlier detection of such frauds. 
Classical Fraud Theory 
 Classical fraud theory has long explained the reasons that an individual 
becomes involved in financial statement (or any type of) fraud. This theory suggests 
that individuals become involved as a result of the fraud triangle, explained as a 
perceived opportunity, perceived pressure, and rationalization (Cressey, 1953). These 
three elements are demonstrated in figure 1 below. 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 The first element of the fraud triangle is a perceived pressure.  Most pressures 
involve a financial need, although non-financial or perceived pressures, such as greed, 
the need to report better than actual performance, a challenge to beat the system, or 
even fear can motivate fraud.  These pressures do not have to be real; they simply 
have to seem real to the perpetrator.  
 The second element of the fraud triangle is perceived opportunity.  The 
perpetrator must believe that he or she can commit the fraud and not get caught or that 
if he or she gets caught, nothing serious will happen.  An example of a perceived 
opportunity would be a CEO or CFO manipulating financial numbers and believing 
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that the media and or shareholders will not find out or that the problem will go away 
during the next quarter or year.  Like pressures, opportunities don’t have to be real; 
they must only be perceived as real by the perpetrator.  
 Third, fraud perpetrators need a way to rationalize their actions as acceptable.  
Common rationalizations are “It’s for the good of the company,” “We need to do this 
to get over this financial hump,”  “We have no other option,” or “We owe it to the 
shareholders,” etc. 
 These three elements comprise the fraud triangle. The importance of the fraud 
triangle in explaining fraud has gained popularity in recent years.  In 2002, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants – the leading United States 
accounting professional organization – integrated the fraud triangle into SAS 99, 
Considerations of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, to help better train and 
prepare auditors to detect fraud when conducting financial statement audits.   
 The initial contributor to the fraud triangle was Edwin Sutherland (1949) in 
his book, White Collar Crime. As a result of this book, Edwin Sutherland was 
credited with coining the term white-collar crime.  According to Sutherland, white-
collar crime is very different from street crime.  Sutherland identified white-collar 
crime as an act that often involves violation by a trusted person.  Furthermore, he 
suggested that those who commit white-collar crime are usually in positions of power 
and high status. Sutherland suggested that white-collar crime is usually committed by 
those who do not see themselves as criminals but individuals who perceive 
themselves to be good citizens of the community.   
 Donald Cressey (1953) was also a key contributor to the fraud triangle.  
Cressey, one of Sutherland’s students, wrote the book, Other People’s Money. In 
doing the research upon which his book is based, Cressey conducted interviews 
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averaging 15 hours in length with 133 prison inmates who had been convicted of 
embezzlement. The book published by Cressey ultimately dealt with the social 
psychology of the violation of trust.  Using analytical induction, Cressey developed a 
general statement about embezzlement behavior.  Although not claiming predictive 
power for the theory, he established three conditions, all of which must be present for 
the crime to take place.  The person must have: (1) financial problems defined as non-
sharable, (2) an opportunity to violate trust, (3) rationalization for the act.  
 Later, Albrecht, Romney, Cherrington, Paine, & Roe (1981) introduced 
Sutherland’s and Cressey’s work into the business literature.   After significant 
analysis, they concluded that Cressey’s three factors were accurate and labeled them 
as the fraud triangle.  They further concluded that the three factors worked together 
interactively so that if more of one factor was present, less of the other factors needed 
to exist for fraud to occur.  They also determined that pressures and opportunities 
need not be real, only perceived to be real.  
Collusion between Perpetrators 
 While the fraud triangle helps to explain why one person becomes involved in 
a financial statement fraud, it does not explain how that individual persuades or 
influences other people to become involved in fraudulent acts.  The fraud triangle is 
limited in that it only provides a one-dimensional psychological analysis of the initial 
perpetrator of the fraud.   
 Recent research into financial statement fraud has suggested that nearly all 
financial statements frauds are perpetrated by multiple players within the organization 
working together (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission, 2002).  Research has shown that most financial statement frauds are 
collusive, meaning that the act involves more than one perpetrator (Association of 
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Certified Fraud Examiners, 2006). At a Business Week forum for chief financial 
officers the following was stated: 
 “At that forum, participants were queried about whether or not they had ever 
 been asked to “misrepresent corporate results.”  Of the attendees, 67% of all 
 CFO respondents said they had fought off other executives’ requests to 
 misrepresent corporate results.  Of those who had been asked, 12% admitted 
 they had “yielded to the requests” while 55% said they had “fought off the 
 requests.” (Schuetze, 1998 p. 2) 
 
 This statement, along with recent research on financial statement fraud 
suggests that multiple individuals in management are approached to behave 
unethically when preparing financial statements, which leads us to our first 
proposition:  
 Proposition 1: In order for a financial statement fraud to occur and be 
perpetuated, it is necessary for multiple members of an organization to work together.  
  
 Even with the considerable attention that has been given to ethics in both the 
accounting literature and in practice, there is still a significant gap in knowledge 
regarding the relationship that takes place between the potential conspirator of a 
financial statement fraud and the principle conspirator of a financial statement fraud. 
In others words, we still do not know the processes by which one individual – after he 
or she has become involved in a financial statement fraud –recruits other individuals 
to participate in financial statement fraud schemes.  
 Similarly, the management and ethics communities do not fully understand 
how these same relationships affect the overall organizational culture of an 
organization.  To this end, this paper examines the process of how collusive acts—
particularly those of financial statement fraud—occur in organizations, thereby 
providing insight into the evolutionary process of how entire managements become 
involved in financial statement frauds. 
Organizational Cultures   
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 Organizational cultures have been defined as a set of shared, taken-for-granted 
implicit assumptions that a group holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks 
about, and reacts to various environments (Schein, 1992).  It is the values of 
individuals within an organization that affect the organizational culture as a whole 
(Dolan, 2006). Organizational cultures do not become ethical or unethical by chance.  
Rather, they are influenced and even comprised of the ethical decisions of individuals 
(Jackson & Schuler, 2006).  As individuals lower their ethical standards and as these 
individuals affect the standards of others, the overall culture is lowered.  In this paper, 
it is argued that by looking at how individuals recruit potential co-conspirators into a 
financial statement fraud, it is possible to better understand how individuals - who 
would otherwise make ethical decisions - can become involved in illegal or unethical 
acts. Therefore, the focus of this paper is on how individuals use power to recruit 
others to participate in financial statement frauds. In examining the process by which 
individuals become involved in financial statement fraud, a model is proposed that 
draws upon literature from both the social psychology and the management fields.  
The Concept of Power Revisited 
 The word power in Spanish is “poder”; in French it is “pouvoir”, both words 
meaning, “to be able to.” These translations provide insight into the English word for 
power – to be able to influence another person or outcome. Weber (1947) introduced 
power as the probability that a person can carry out his or her own will despite 
resistance.  It is argued throughout this paper that when a financial statement fraud 
takes place, the conspirator has the desire to carry out his or her will – influencing 
other people to act and do as the perpetrator wishes – regardless of resistance. Most of 
the power literature since Weber’s time has generally agreed with this basic definition 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1980).   
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 In the last 30 years, various theories and taxonomies of power have emerged.  
The most prominent of these approaches are the power-dependence theory (Emerson, 
1962), Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson’s typology of influence tactics (Kipnis, 
Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980), and the French and Raven framework of power 
(French and Raven, 1959). Recent research has suggested that these theories of power 
have become the most commonly referenced frameworks for understanding power in 
the management literature (Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005). 
 Power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962; Blau, 1964) provides a framework 
for conceptualizing relative and total power.  In this framework the, “Power of Person 
A over Person B is equal to and based upon the dependence of B upon A.”  This 
dependence is based on two factors: (1) it is inversely proportional to the availability 
of the outcome through alternative sources, and (2) it is directly proportional to the 
value at stake. Power-dependence theory’s central idea is that A’s power over B is 
directly related to the degree to which B is dependent on A. Alternatively, B’s power 
over A depends on the degree to which A can receive greater benefit from the 
relationships with B than A can get from alternative relationships.  
 The typology of influence tactics by Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980) 
focuses on identifying and categorizing tactics that managers commonly use to try to 
get others to comply with their requests.  This approach provides nine different 
dimensions, including: pressure, legitimization, exchange, coalition, ingratiation, 
rational persuasion, inspirational appeal, consultation, and personal appeal.  These 
nine dimensions show how one’s power relationship with others can influence the 
likelihood that these different influence tactics will be used.  
 French and Raven (1959) proposed that power is comprised of five separate 
variables, each stemming from the different aspects of the relationship between an 
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actor and his or her target of influence. Specifically, French and Raven suggested that 
A’s power over B is determined by (1) A’s ability to provide benefits to B (reward 
power), (2) A’s ability to punish B if B does not comply with A’s wishes (coercive 
power), (3) A’s possession of special knowledge or expertise (expert power), (4) A’s 
legitimate right to prescribe behavior for B (legitimate power), and (5) the extent to 
which B identifies with A (referent power).  
  While power-dependence theory provides a good explanation of power in 
general and provides a basis from which to conceptualize both relative and total 
power, it does not give insight into the valuation of a relationship.  Nor does power-
dependence theory provide a basis for how one’s power is likely to be used. The 
typology of influence tactics by Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980) discusses 
how power is used; however, the framework focuses only on what people do after a 
power relationship has been established and does not take into account antecedent or 
relational determinants.  While the framework by French and Raven is somewhat 
limited in that it does not focus on the implications and tactics used in a power 
relationship, it does provide a solid foundation by providing a basis of how power is 
derived.  This is beneficial when discussing the recruitment of individuals into fraud 
schemes because it provides a framework of how power is derived in the relationship 
between two individuals.  As a result, in this paper, we use the French and Raven 
framework as a basis for analyzing the recruitment of individuals into fraud schemes. 
Most researchers agree that the French and Raven framework of power is beneficial 
under these circumstances (e.g. Dapiran & Hogarth-Scott, 2003). 
 Recent research that treats power as a relational construct has shown that it is 
perceived power, rather than actual power, that affects the desired outcome in a given 
situation (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005).  Regardless of whether A actually has any power 
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over B, if B perceives A to have power, then this becomes real power and A can use 
this power over B in the recruitment process. Hence, these five types of power as 
described by French and Raven (1959) can be classified as perceived reward power, 
perceived coercive power, perceived expert power, perceived legitimate power, and 
perceived referent power.  This line of reasoning is consisstent with  Fishbein and 
Ajzen’s (1975) theory for the role of attitude and intentions in explaining future 
behavior. In this paper, the idea is introduced that, and applied to financial statement 
fraud, that perceived power is used to influence the recruitment of potential co-
conspirators by real conspirators.   
 
Descriptions of Perceived Power 
 Perceived reward power is the ability of the conspirator to convince potential 
co-conspirators that he or she will provide desired benefits through participation in a 
financial statement fraud.  Promises of a large bonus, large rewards from valuable 
stock options, other types of equity payments, or job promotions are all examples of 
perceived reward power.   
 Perceived coercive power is the ability of the conspirator to make the potential 
co-conspirator perceive potential punishment if he or she doesn’t participate in a 
financial statement fraud. This potential punishment is usually based on fear (Politis, 
2005). If the potential co-conspirator perceives that the perpetrator has the ability to 
punish him or her in any way, the perpetrator begins to exercise a form of coercive 
power over that individual. Financial statement fraud is often committed because 
CFOs or other subordinates fear that they may lose their job, receive public 
humiliation, be discriminated against as a whistle-blower, or be punished in other 
ways.  
 44 
 Perceived expert power is the ability of the conspirator to use influence 
through means of expertise or knowledge. An example of a financial statement fraud 
that appears to have been the result of perceived expert power is Enron.  Certain 
members of management claimed to have expert knowledge regarding complicated 
business organizations and arrangements.
2
  Individuals--who would have otherwise 
refused to join the conspiracy based upon personal ethical standards--convinced 
themselves that the conspirators knew more about the complex transactions than they 
did and that those knowledgeable individuals must understand what they were doing.  
When conspirators deceive others into believing that they have more expert 
knowledge or expertise than someone else, they are using perceived expert power.  
 Perceived legitimate power is the ability of Person A to convince Person B 
that A truly does have real power over him or her.  In business settings, individuals 
such as the chief executive officer or other members of management claim to have 
legitimate power to make decisions and direct the organization – even if that direction 
is unethical.  In this way, conspirators assume authoritative roles and convince 
potential co-conspirators that their authority is legitimate.  Individuals with whom this 
power is exerted on often feel tensions between loyalty and ethics. 
 Perceived referent power is the ability of the conspirator to relate to the target 
of influence (co-conspirators). Conspirators using reference power will build 
relationships of confidence with potential co-conspirators.  Perceived reference power 
is the ability of Person A to relate to Person B.  Perpetrators often use perceived 
reference power to gain confidence and participation from potential co-conspirators 
when performing unethical acts.  Many individuals, when persuaded by a trusted 
                                                
2
 While some financial statement frauds involved easily understood transactions (e.g. WorldCom), 
Enron was a very complicated fraud that involved off-balance sheet Special Purpose Entities (SPOs, 
now called Variable Interest Entities), and transactions that occurred between Enron and these various 
off-balance sheet entities. 
 45 
friend to participate in a financial statement fraud, will rationalize the actions as being 
justifiable.  
 While these five types of power represent the various ways that someone can 
have power or “influence” over another person, it is important to realize that Person A 
only has power over Person B to the extent that B allows himself or herself to be 
influenced.  For example, close friends (referent power) are many times able to 
influence individuals in ways that others can’t; however, these friends only have 
power over the individual to the extent that the individual allows them to influence 
him or her.  A person can freely choose to defy the person exerting power if they so 
choose to do so.   
  
The Recruitment Process  
 Senior management of public companies are often under tremendous financial 
pressures.  These pressures may come from Wall Street expectations, personal 
expectations, a competitive environment, or other factors (Albrecht, Albrecht & 
Albrecht, 2004).  Chief executive officers may, in response to these pressures, be 
unethical for various reasons, including executive compensation incentives 
(Matsumura & Shin, 2005), a lack of an effective code of conduct (Stevens, 
Steensma, Harrison & Cochran, 2005), short-term behavior (Fassin, 2005), ethical 
leadership (Knights & O’Leary, 2005), and ethical preferences (Das, 2005).  Frauds 
such as Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing reveal a common pattern.  This 
pattern usually involves the CEO exerting substantial pressure on subordinates, such 
as the CFO, to meet short-term financial goals.  When these pressures cannot be met, 
the CFO and others sometimes use aggressive accounting –a grey area between 
earnings manipulation and outright fraud (Leavitt, 1998), or when aggressive 
accounting is not enough, they use illegal accounting practices to meet expectations 
(Powell, Jubb, Lange & Longfield-Smith, 2005). 
 Since the stakeholders of public companies expect financial results to improve 
quarter after quarter, management sometimes rationalizes the accounting gimmicks as 
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temporary and being done only “to get over an immediate financial hump.”  However, 
because financial statement manipulation in one period compounds the amount of loss 
in subsequent periods--especially when financial results do not improve--the financial 
manipulations usually get larger and larger until they are so egregious they are 
detected or crumble from within (Wells, 2005).  While most financial statement 
frauds are intended to be short-term, most eventually become large financial 
statement frauds, with nearly as much fraud committed in the last periods of the fraud 
as in the fraud’s entire history (Albrecht et al., 2006).  
 Prior studies have shown that most financial statement frauds involve some 
combination of the chief executive officer, chief operations officer, chief financial 
officer, controller, other vice presidents, board of director members, and lower-level 
accounting personnel (The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission, 2002). In order to better understand the relationship between these 
various players, we evaluate the recruitment process that takes place between the 
initial conspirator (such as the CEO) and potential co-conspirators (such as the CFO), 
and then the relationship between the potential co-conspirators (such as the CFO) and 
various other players (CFO Subordinates).  We evaluate these relationships after the 
co-conspirator has been recruited into the fraudulent activities.   
 We propose that a person in a position of power (Person A), such as a CEO—
as a result of various factors such as outside or personal pressure—uses at least one of 
the five types of power to influence a subordinate (Person B), such as a CFO to 
participate in the financial statement fraud. This process is described below: 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
 Whether or not the individual (person B) is recruited into the financial 
statement fraud depends upon various factors such as the desire of this individual 
 47 
(Person B) for a reward or benefit, the individual’s fear of punishment, the 
individual’s perceived level of personal knowledge, the individual’s level of 
obedience to authority, and the individual’s personal relationship needs.  The model 
displayed is interactive meaning that these five variables or power types work 
together. Thus, we propose the following: 
Accordingly, we propose the following: 
 Proposition 2: In a financial statement fraud, individuals in the organization 
 will recruit other members of the organization to participate in the act 
 through the use of various types of perceived power.  
  
Proposition 3: The success of Person A to influence Person B is positively related to 
B’s susceptibility to the various types of power.  
 
 For example, if reward power were being used to influence another person, 
and the individual in position B had a specific need for a reward or benefit, then the 
perceived reward or benefit that A must provide doesn’t have to be as significant as if 
B were not in need of such a reward or benefit.  In this sense, when a successful 
recruitment has taken place, there is a balance between B’s susceptibility of power 
and A’s exertion of power.   
 Once the potential co-conspirator (position B) becomes involved in the 
unethical scheme, it is proposed that this person often switches to position A, 
becoming another conspirator. Along this same line of reasoning, we propose: 
 Proposition 4: There is a positive relationship between the likelihood of a 
person’s recruitment  into a fraud scheme and the probability  that person will recruit 
others to participate in the fraud scheme. 
 
 Using his or her own perceived power with his or her subordinates, this person 
now recruits others to participate in the unethical acts.  This spillover effect continues 
until an individual either blows the whistle or until the scheme(s) becomes so large 
and egregious that it is discovered.   This process is shown in figure 3 below. 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
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The Influence of Organizational Culture 
  The subject of culture, especially national culture, has attracted significant 
analysis in recent years. Culture has been explained as, “the collective programming 
of the mind that manifests itself not only in values, but also in superficial ways, 
including symbols, heroes, and rituals” (Hofstede, 2001, p.1). Schwartz (2005) has 
provided a typology that derives value dimensions for comparing cultures by 
considering three of the critical issues that confront all societies.  However, neither 
the Hofstede nor the Schwartz typologies of cultural dimensions focus on specific 
cultural dimensions within an organization. This focus can be found in Schein’s 
(1996) work on the three cultures of management.  These three groups include the 
“operators”, the “engineers”, and the “executives”.  The difference between these 
three groups represents different levels of power within the organization.  This theory 
bridges the gap between power theory and cultural change by analyzing change 
within an organization.  The “operators” include those individuals in the organization 
who are physically involved with either producing or making the goods or services 
that fulfill the organization’s mission.  Operators include the line employees.  
Individuals in this group do not usually make changes within the organization, nor do 
they create organizational learning programs.  Rather, these individuals are typically 
those with whom these types of plans are implemented.  These individuals almost 
always work at the ground level of an organization.  
 The “engineers” is in an organization are the core designers of any functional 
group.  These individuals are those who create programs, whether financial, technical, 
research, or other.  There is a core technology that is the base for what any 
organization does.  The engineers are those who design and monitor this technology 
for the organization.  These individuals typically propose solutions that don’t involve 
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people.  Engineers prefer to have systems, machines, routines, and rules that are 
completely and totally reliable and automatic.  The engineers have a tendency to rule 
out the “human needs” that are involved in the organization.  
 The “executives” typically share a common belief centered on the financial 
status of the organization for which they are responsible.  The most important part of 
their role in an organization is the financial responsibility of the organization to the 
shareholders. The executives’ biggest concern is keeping the stock price and 
dividends as high as possible (Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983) so as to maximize 
shareholder return. To an executive, the world is an increasingly competitive and 
complex place. Therefore, in the mind of the executive, compromises must be made 
and chances have to be taken in order to be successful.  Furthermore, to the executive, 
financial criteria is treated as paramount (Schein, 1996).  
 These three groups are important because, in the beginning, it is the executives 
who are typically involved in financial statement frauds.  However, as the fraud 
continues, and as more and more individuals become involved in financial statement 
frauds, both individuals from the operator and the engineer group may become 
involved. It has been suggested that spoiled organizational images may transfer to 
many organizational members (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Therefore, the once ethical 
organization, with no members involved in financial statement fraud or other 
unethical acts, gradually transforms itself into an organization that fosters unethical 
behavior, with various individuals now involved in committing financial statement 
fraud or involved in other corrupt practices. In the process, individuals, as a result of 
socialization (Anand et al., 2004), begin to understand and accept the scheme and 
rationalize their acts as justifiable. This process  has a direct negative effect upon the 
culture of the organization.  
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 During this process, the organization’s culture not only suffers as a result of 
more individuals being recruited into the financial statement fraud, but also because 
other unethical acts—as a result of improper modeling, inadequate or missing 
labeling, and lack of personal integrity by the members of the executives group—
become justifiable.  
 Proposition 5: There is a positive relationship between the number of 
 individuals within an organization involved in a financial statement fraud 
 scheme and the ethical behavior of the organization as a whole.  
 
 Taking into account the cultures of management it is possible to see how 
executives, through the various types of power, can encourage a complete change 
within the organization as the cycle of recruitment continues to be perpetrated.   
Discussion and Opportunities For Future Research 
 The greatest challenge of researching the roles power and other organizational 
issues play in financial statement fraud is that these issues are still in their infancy, 
especially from an organizational perspective.  In order to advance this knowledge, 
some basic questions must be addressed with regards to this key issue.  Questions 
such as the nature, causes, and consequences of financial statement fraud need to be 
evaluated empirically.  
 Auerbah and Dolan (1997) suggest that understanding the various types of 
power does not tell us how power is used to influence others.  Rather, they explain 
that it is important to understand the strategies that are employed by individuals – in 
the case of this research – the strategies used to influence others to participate in 
financial statement fraud.  Specifically, research must address the exact schemes that 
Person A uses to influence Person B.  Further research must also address how these 
schemes vary from organization to organization. 
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 With financial statement frauds being perpetrated throughout all parts of the 
world, there is a need to address the international aspects of power.  We must better 
understand how a country’s culture affects the schemes that are employed by 
individuals to influence others. This research must address issues such as whether one 
type of power is more dominate than the other types of power regardless of the 
culture. In recent years, several excellent frameworks for studying cultural values 
have emerged including Hofstede (1980), Schwartz (1992, 1994), Trompenaars 
(1993) and recently the framework provided by House, et al (2004).  An interesting 
line of research would attempt to see how different cultural values affect the different 
types of power in recruiting individuals to participate in fraudulent behavior.”  
 Similarly, it is important to understand if one type of power always plays a 
dominant role in organizational corruption or is the type of power that is most 
effective situational.   Along this same line of reasoning, research must address if 
individuals may be inherently susceptible to certain types of power.  We must 
examine how differences in personalities and backgrounds affect responses to power, 
especially the way that different personalities respond when coupled with the 
influence to participate in financial statement fraud and other forms of organizational 
corruption.  
 In this paper, the framework provided by Schein (1996) was used to illustrate 
the affect organizational cultures play in recruitment schemes. In particular, this paper 
illustrated how operators, engineers, and executives function within and react to the 
power framework.  However, there are various other frameworks that could be used 
as a reference point for organizational cultures.  For example, Sackmann (1997) 
provides an excellent framework with which to evaluate the various players, including 
their various roles.  Further research must take into account these alternative 
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frameworks, and evaluate how power is used within each.  Similarly, research must 
address whether power is used differently in each of the frameworks.  
 Some basic descriptive studies might address the range of criteria that 
individuals use to define the relationships they have with those who are in positions to 
exert power.  This area must address how the various types of powers are defined. 
Furthermore, various constructs such as the desire for a reward or benefit, the fear of 
punishment, the lack of knowledge, the level of obedience, and relationship needs 
must be understood more fully.  Understanding the emotions surrounding these 
constructs may help us understand why some people become involved in 
organizational corruption while others do not.  There is a lack of knowledge 
concerning how emotions play into the power scheme.  Specifically, research needs to 
be conducted that will assess whether the emotions of individuals, including both the 
recruiter and those recruited, may play in the success of these schemes.  
 This paper is limited in that the model proposed has attempted only to show 
that the use of power is a part of the process that takes place in financial statement 
frauds.  However if, after further testing, the model proves valid, it may be possible to 
infer the model to the process that takes place, not only in the recruitment of financial 
statement fraud participants, but also in the recruitment of other types of unethical 
acts.  
Conclusion 
 This paper has proposed a dyad reciprocal model to explain the process by 
which individuals recruit other individuals to participate in financial statement frauds.  
The paper has postulated that French and Raven power framework provides an 
explanation into the ways in which individuals influence others to participate.  
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 Previous research has suggested that a key element of fraud prevention is 
educating employees and others about the serious of fraud and informing them what 
to do if fraud is suspected (Albrecht et al., 2006). Educating employees about fraud 
and providing fraud awareness training helps ensure that frauds that do occur are 
detected at early stages, thus limiting financial exposure to the corporation and 
minimizing the negative impact of fraud on the work environment.  Education 
includes instructing employees, vendors, customers, and other stakeholders of what 
the organization’s expectations are. If the model presented in this paper proves 
accurate with further testing; then shareholders will have a valuable tool to assist them 
in educating employees and others about fraud.  This education should help to deter 
fraud and other forms of corruption within organizations.   
 We believe this is the first paper that has examined the process by which 
individuals are recruited into fraudulent acts.  As such, this paper fills an important 
void in the organizational literature.  The practical application of this knowledge 
should have a positive effect upon the business community.  For many years, the 
fraud triangle, although it has a limited predictive ability, has provided the accounting 
and criminology fields with a basis as to why individuals participate in fraudulent 
behavior.  The fraud triangle has been used to further educational, research, and 
practical agendas.  As such, it has provided a framework to reference when 
establishing safeguards and other controls to protect businesses from fraud.  It has 
allowed the scientific community to better understand what makes an individual 
became involved in financial statement fraud.  As a result, it has provided guidance 
that has helped structure both preventive and detective controls to protect and limit 
the susceptibility of businesses to financial statement fraud and other forms of 
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corruption.  Unfortunately, the fraud triangle only helps explain how the initial 
perpetrators get involved in fraudulent acts. 
 The model described in this paper provides a valuable corollary to the fraud 
triangle.  Used together, we can not only understand why individuals get involved in 
fraud in the first place but also how they recruit others to participate with them.  If the 
model described in this paper is used by organizations in their fraud prevention 
programs, employees should be better able to identify various types of power that can 
be used to recruit them to participate in financial statement fraud schemes.  For 
example, if an employee is asked by a colleague to do something that the employee 
feels may be unethical for one reason or another, yet that employee is going to do the 
act simply because he or she feels that the colleague has more knowledge about the 
project or assignment, the employee will recognize that expert power is involved and 
will be motivated to find out more information about what exactly is going on before 
doing what is asked.   Similarly, if an individual is approached by his or her boss to 
do something that person may feel is unethical, he or she should be able to identify 
the type of power (legitimate) that is being used and be able to make an informed 
decision about participating in the act or not.  Similar examples could be given for 
each type of power.  The practical application of the model is the empowerment of 
knowledge to potential recruits into financial fraud schemes so that these individuals 
can make informed decisions about the influence and power that are being exerted 
upon them by other individuals.   
 The model proposed in this paper, based upon the French and Raven 
framework of power, has created another tool, in addition to the fraud triangle, for 
individuals to use in the fight against fraud and corruption within organizations.  
Instead of simply explaining how one individual becomes involved in fraud, such as 
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is the case with the fraud triangle, the model presented provides an explanation of 
how many individuals become involved in financial statement fraud.  The model 
further explains how fraud is perpetrated throughout the various levels of the 
organization, giving insight into the important phenomenon of how entire 
organizations become involved in financial statement fraud. If this model can be 
validated through further analysis, the practical application of the model will provide 
a foundation for further research.  Furthermore, practitioners will have a valuable tool 
with which to assist them in the deterrence of fraud. The model will provide a 
background from which to create schemes and actions to limit organizations’ 





Figure 1: The Fraud Triangle 
 
 






















Figure 4: Organization that Encourages Ethical Behavior Converts to an 
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'*'70).&+7 7.66')7'? (&4 4'7'+0/>* (70- I; 9&0')&'0 7.62(&+'- .) +&4+,+4>(*- 
FL(D')? "XX"GB 
9&0')&'0 /)(>4 2')2'0)(0.)- 'A')0 7.&-+4')(I*' '//.)0 +& .)4') 0. +&/*>'&7' (&4 
=(+& 2.3') .,') 01'+) /(7'*'-- ,+70+6-B  %& +&4+,+4>(* +& ( 9&0')&'0 71(0 )..6 
31. 7*(+6- 0. 1(,' 2)+,(0' +&/.)6(0+.& (I.>0 ( 2>I*+7 7.62(&;? 7+0+\'&- ./ 
_+=')+( 31. 7*(+6 0. 1(,' (77'-- 0. ->I-0(&0+(* />&4-? .) +**'=+0+6(0' 
7.62(&+'- 31. 7.& 7.&->6')- +&0. 2).,+4+&= 2')-.&(* /+&(&7+(* +&/.)6(0+.& 
()' (** 'A(62*'- ./ 2')2'0)(0.)-b (00'620- 0. =(+& 2.3') .,') >&3(); ,+70+6-B  
E+,'& 01' '&.)6.>- 7.-0- ./ /)(>4 (&4 01' =).3+&= 2)',(*'&7' ./ 9&0')&'0 
/)(>4? 01' =.(* ./ 01+- )'-'()71 +- 0. (4,(&7' 01'.)'0+7(* >&4')-0(&4+&= ./ 01' 
2.3') 01(0 2')2'0)(0.)- >-' 31'& +&/*>'&7+&= ,+70+6- ,+( 01' 9&0')&'0B  
:2'7+/+7(**;? 01' )'-'()71 2).2.-'- (& +&0')(70+,' 6.4'* 7.6I+&+&= 01' 
4+6'&-+.&- ./ 2.3') (&4 &'=.0+(0+.& /).6 01' 6(&(='6'&0 (&4 2-;71.*.=+7(* 
*+0')(0>)' (&4 (22*;+&= +0 0. 01' /)(>4 2).7'--B C1' ()0+7*' 01'& =.'- .& 0. 
'A2*(+& 01' ).*' ./ 01' 9&0')&'0 (&4 .01') 0'71&.*.=+7(* (4,(&7'- .& /)(>4 >-+&= 
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01+- 6.4'*B  
90 1(- I''& ->=='-0'4 01(0 01')' ()' 03. 2)+6(); 6'01.4- >-'4 0. ='0 -.6'01+&= 
/).6 .01')- +**'=(**;< 21;-+7(* /.)7' (&4 4'7'20+.& F%*I)'710? '0B (*B? "XXcGB 
T)(>4 +- 4'/+&'4 (-< 
% ='&')+7 0')6? (&4 '6I)(7'- (** 01' 6>*0+/()+.>- 6'(&- 31+71 1>6(& 
+&='&>+0; 7(& 4',+-'? 31+71 ()' )'-.)0'4 0. I; .&' +&4+,+4>(*? 0. ='0 (& 
(4,(&0(=' .,') (&.01') I; /(*-' )'2)'-'&0(0+.&B  _. 4'/+&+0' (&4 +&,()+(I*' 
)>*' 7(& I' *(+4 4.3& (- ( ='&')(* 2).2.-+0+.& +& 4'/+&+&= /)(>4? (- +0 
+&7*>4'- ->)2)+-'? 0)+7D');? 7>&&+&= (&4 >&/(+) 3(;- I; 31+71 (&.01') +- 
71'(0'4B  C1' .&*; I.>&4()+'- 4'/+&+&= +0 ()' 01.-'? 31+71 *+6+0 1>6(& 
D&(,'); FQ'I-0')b- _'3 Q.)*4 K+70+.&();? 5#c]GB 
2. EXISTING MODELS OF FRAUD 
8*(--+7 /)(>4 01'.); 'A2*(+&- 01' 6.0+,(0+.&- /.) /)(>4 (- ( 0)+(&=*' ./ 
2')7'+,'4 .22.)0>&+0;? 2')7'+,'4 2)'-->)'? (&4 )(0+.&(*+\(0+.&? (- -1.3& 
I'*.3< 
 
Figure 1. T)(>4 C)+(&=*'  
C1' +&+0+(* 7.&0)+I>0.) 0. 01+- 6.4'* 3(- J43+& :>01')*(&4 +& 1+- 5#]# I..D? 
White Collar Crime? /.) 31+71 1' +- 7)'4+0'4 3+01 7.+&+&= 01' 0')6B  %77.)4+&= 
0. :>01')*(&4? 31+0'^7.**() 7)+6' +- 4+//')'&0 /).6 -0)''0 7)+6' +& 6(&; 3(;-B  
90 +- 7.66+00'4 I; 01.-' ./ 1+=1 -0(0>- (&4 2.3')? +0 ./0'& +&,.*,'- ,+.*(0+.& I; 
( 0)>-0'4 2')-.& +& 2)./'--+.&- ->71 (- 6'4+7+&'? *(3? (77.>&0+&=? I(&D+&= (&4 
I>-+&'--? (&4 +0 +- >->(**; 7.66+00'4 I; +&4+,+4>(*- 31. 4. &.0 -'' 01'6-'*,'- 
(- 7)+6+&(*-B  Q1+0'^7.**() 7)+6' +- I'*+','4 0. .77>) 6.)' /)'d>'&0*; +& *()='? 
)(01') 01(& -6(** I>-+&'--'-? (&4 01' ='&')(* (-->620+.& +- 01(0 2).-'7>0.)- (&4 
U>4='- ()' 6.)' *'&+'&0 .& 31+0'^7.**() 7)+6+&(*- 01(& .& -0)''0^*','* 7)+6+&(*-B   
V&' ./ :>01')*(&4b- 6.-0 /(6.>- -0>4'&0- 3(- K.&(*4 8)'--'; 31. 3).0' 01' 
I..D? Other People’s Money F5#YWGB  9& 01' -0>4+'- .& 31+71 1+- I..D +- I(-'4? 
1' 7.&4>70'4 +&0'),+'3- (,')(=+&= 5Y 1.>)- +& *'&=01 3+01 5WW 2)+-.& +&6(0'- 
31. 1(4 I''& 7.&,+70'4 ./ '6I'\\*'6'&0B  C1+- I..D? 2>I*+-1'4 +& 5#YW? +- (& 
+&,'-0+=(0+.& ./ 01' -.7+(* 2-;71.*.=; ./ 01' ,+.*(0+.& ./ 0)>-0? ( ->IU'70 01(0 
8)'--'; 3(- 7.&7')&'4 3+01 01).>=1.>0 1+- 7()'')B  L; ( 2).7'4>)' D&.3& (- 
(&(*;0+7 +&4>70+.&? 1' 4','*.2'4 ( ='&')(* -0(0'6'&0 (I.>0 '6I'\\*'6'&0 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(4) 
W" 
I'1(,+.)B  %*01.>=1 &.0 7*(+6+&= 2)'4+70+,' 2.3') /.) 01' 01'.);? 1' 
'-0(I*+-1'4 01)'' 7.&4+0+.&-? (** ./ 31+71 6>-0 I' 2)'-'&0 /.) 01' 7)+6' 0. 0(D' 
2*(7'B  C1' 2')-.&- 6>-0 1(,'< F5G /+&(&7+(* 2).I*'6- 4'/+&'4 (- &.&^-1()(I*'? 
F"G (& .22.)0>&+0; 0. ,+.*(0' 0)>-0? FWG )(0+.&(*+\(0+.& ./ 01' (70B  
%*I)'710 '0 (*B F5#e#? 5#f5G +&0).4>7'4 :>01')*(&4b- (&4 8)'--';b- 3.)D +&0. 
01' I>-+&'-- *+0')(0>)'B C1'; 7.&7*>4'4 01(0 8)'--';b- 01)'' /(70.)- 3')' .& 
0()='0 (&4 *(I'*'4 01'6 (- 01' /)(>4 0)+(&=*'B C1'; />)01') 7.&7*>4'4 01(0 01' 
01)'' /(70.)- 3.)D'4 0.='01') +&0')(70+,'*; -. 01(0 +/ 6.)' ./ .&' /(70.) 3')' 
2)'-'&0? *'-- ./ 01' .01') /(70.)- &''4'4 0. 'A+-0 /.) /)(>4 0. .77>)B V&' ./ 01' 
6(+& *+6+0(0+.&- ./ 01+- 6.4'* +- 01(0 +0 .&*; 4'-7)+I'- 01' /(70.)- 01(0 +&/*>'&7' 
01' 2')2'0)(0.)? (&4 4.'- &.0 4+-7>-- 01' )'*(0+.&-1+2 I'03''& 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 
,+70+6B _.) +- 01' /)(>4 0)+(&=*' -2'7+/+7 0. .&*+&' 4'7'20+.&B N(01')? +0 +- (& (**^
'&7.62(--+&= 6.4'* 0. 'A2*(+& 01' ,()+(I*'- +&,.*,'4 31'& -.6'.&' +- 
+&,.*,'4 +& (&; 0;2' ./ /)(>4B   
M&/.)0>&(0'*;? )'-'()71 +&,'-0+=(0+&= .&*+&' 4'7'20+.& +- *+6+0'4 F_+D+0D., (&4 
:0.&'? "XXcGB :.6' ./ 01' 6.-0 7.66.& .&*+&' 4'7'20+.& 0(70+7- ()' I(-'4 .& 
01' L.3;') F5#f"G (&4 L'** g Q1(*'; F5#f"? 5##5G 0(A.&.6; ./ 71'(0+&= (&4 
4'7'20+.&B P.1&-.& '0 (* F"XX5G? (- 3'** (- E)(\+.*+ (&4 P(),'&2(( F"XXX? 
"XXW(? "XXWIG 1(,' (22*+'4 01' 0(A.&.6; 0. 7*(--+/; 01' ,()+.>- 0'71&+d>'- 
'62*.;'4 +& 9&0')&'0 4'7'20+.&B 9& (44+0+.&? )'7'&0 )'-'()71 +&0. .&*+&' 
4'7'20+.& 1(- (44)'--'4 -2'7+/+7 0;2'- ./ /)(>4 ->71 (- (>70+.& /)(>4 F81>( 
(&4 Q()'1(6 "XX]G? -2../+&= FK+&',? "XXcG? (&4 -2(66+&= FZ(&& '0 (*? 
"XXcGB Z.3',')? 6>71 ./ 01+- )'7'&0 )'-'()71 *(7D- (&; 'A2*+7+0 01'.)'0+7(* 
'A2*(&(0+.&? I>0 4'-7)+I'- 01' 21'&.6'&.& .& ( ->)/(7' *','*B %- (& 'A7'20+.&? 
S(,*.> (&4 E'/'& F"XXYG 'A(6+&' 1.3 .&*+&' /)(>4? 7.6I+&'4 3+01 6(&; 
.01') /(70.)- ->71 (- 0)>-0? +&-0+0>0+.&(* -0)>70>)'-? 0)>-0 +& 7.66>&+0; ./ 
-'**')-? (&4 2(-0 I>;+&= 'A2')+'&7' 7(& *'(4 0. 2-;71.*.=+7(* 7.&0)(70 
,+.*(0+.&- I'03''& 01' I>;') (&4 -'**') (&4 01')'I; +&/*>'&7' 2>)71(-+&= 
I'1(,+.)B T+&(**;? -.6' ./ 01' *+0')(0>)' /).6 01' '7.&.6+7- /+'*4 1(- 
+&,'-0+=(0'4 +&7'&0+,'- /.) /)(>4>*'&0 I'1(,+.) (- 3'** (- 2.--+I*' 71(&='- 0. 
*'=(* -0)>70>)'- 01(0 3.>*4 71(&=' 01'-' +&7'&0+,'- F:&;4') "XXX? L;3'** (&4 
V22'&1'+6 "XX5GB   
Q1+*' 2)+.) *+0')(0>)' 1(- (44)'--'4 ,()+.>- (-2'70- ./ .&*+&' /)(>4 ->71 (- 
7.66.& 4'7'20+.& 0'71&+d>'-? 3' .&*; 1(,' ( *+6+0'4 01'.)'0+7(* 
>&4')-0(&4+&= ./ 01' )'*(0+.&-1+2 I'03''& 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 ,+70+6 +& (& .&*+&' 
'&,+).&6'&0B C1' 9&0')&'0 2)'-'&0- ( >&+d>' -'0 ./ 7+)7>6-0(&7'- /.) 
7.&->6')- +& 01(0 +0 4.'- &.0 2).,+4' 01' &.)6(* -.7+(* .) -2(0+(* 7>'- 01(0 01'; 
0;2+7(**; >-' 0. '-0+6(0' 01' )+-D ./ /)(>4B @.)'.,')? .&*+&' /)(>4 +- ( 7.,')0 
7)+6'? (&4 -.7+'0; ./0'& 2*(7'- *'-- '621(-+- .& 01' 2).-'7>0+.& ./ 01'-' 
&.&,+.*'&0 7)+6'-B 9& (44+0+.&? 9&0')&'0 /)(>4- 0'&4 0. I' ./ 6.4')(0' &.6+&(* 
(6.>&0- 0. 6+&+6+\' -7)>0+&;? (&4 ./0'& 7).-- *'=(* U>)+-4+70+.&-? 01')'I; 
)'4>7+&= 01' 6.0+,(0+.& .) (I+*+0; ./ (>01.)+0+'- 0. 2).-'7>0' 01'6 F81>( (&4 
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Q()'1(6? "XX]GB %- ( )'->*0 ./ 01' &(0>)' ./ 01+- )'*(0+,'*; &.,'* 6'4+>6? 3' 
()=>' /.) 01' &''4 /.) ( -2'7+/+7 01'.); 01(0 (44)'--'- 01' )'*(0+.&-1+2- I'03''& 
01' 2.0'&0+(* 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 01' 2.0'&0+(* ,+70+6- ./ /)(>4 (- +0 +- /(7+*+0(0'4 
01).>=1 01' 9&0')&'0B  
V>) 2(2') 2).7''4- I; 2).2.-+&= (& +&0')(70+,' 6.4'*? I(-'4 .& T)'&71 (&4 
N(,'&b- /)(6'3.)D .& 2.3')? 0. 'A2*(+& 01' )'*(0+.&-1+2 01(0 0(D'- 2*(7' 
I'03''& 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 ,+70+6B  V&*+&' 4'7'20+.& +- 4+//')'&0 /).6 .01') 0;2'- 
./ /)(>4 +& 01(0 +0 +- &'7'--(); /.) 01' ,+70+6 0. ->I6+0 0. 01' 3+** ./ 01' 
2')2'0)(0.) +& .)4') /.) ( 2')2'0)(0.) 0. I' ->77'--/>*B  9& 01+- -'&-'? ( 
&'=.0+(0+.& 6>-0 0(D' 2*(7'B  9& 01' /.**.3+&= -'70+.& 3' 4+-7>-- &'=.0+(0+.&? 
+0- 4'/+&+0+.&? (&4 +0- ).*' +& 01' 2).7'-- ./ .&*+&' 4'7'20+.&B 
3. DEFINITION OF NEGOTIATION 
_'=.0+(0+.& 1(- I''& 4'/+&'4 (- h(& +&0')2')-.&(* 4'7+-+.&^6(D+&= 2).7'-- I; 
31+71 03. .) 6.)' 2'.2*' (=)'' 1.3 0. (**.7(0' -7()7' )'-.>)7'-i FC1.62-.&? 
"XXXGB  L.01 )'-'()71')- (&4 2)(70+0+.&')- 1(,' -2'&0 6>71 0+6' (&4 )'-.>)7'- 
0. I'00') >&4')-0(&4 01' &'=.0+(0+.& 2).7'-- FH'3+7D+? '0B (*B? 5###G (&4 +0-b 
,()+.>- +&/*>'&7'-? +&7*>4+&= 01' &'=.0+(0.)-b I()=(+&+&= 1+-0.); (&4 +0-b '//'70- 
.& />0>)' &'=.0+(0+.& 2')/.)6(&7' FVb8.&&') '0B (*B? "XXYGB  Q1'& ( /)(>4 
0(D'- 2*(7'? 01' /)(>4>*'&0 0)(&-(70+.& 7(& I' 4'-7)+I'4 (- ( &'=.0+(0+.&B 9& 01' 
/)(>4 -'00+&=? 01' 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 ,+70+6 6(D' (& +&0')2')-.&(* 4'7+-+.& 0. 
(**.7(0' )'-.>)7'-? 3+01 01' ,+70+6 0)(&-/'))+&= )'-.>)7'- 0. 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 
F./0'& /.) -.6' 2).6+-'4 )'0>)& .) /(*-' )'2)'-'&0(0+.&GB  Q1'& 01' /)(>4 0(D'- 
2*(7'? /).6 I.01 01' 2')2'0)(0.)- (&4 01' ,+70+6-b 2')-2'70+,'-? ( ->77'--/>* 
&'=.0+(0+.& 1(- 0(D'& 2*(7'B  90 >->(**; +-&b0 >&0+* -.6' 0+6' *(0') 01(0 01' 
,+70+6 *'()&- 01(0 1' .) -1' 1(- I''& 4'7'+,'4 +&0. ( /)(>4>*'&0 &'=.0+(0+.&B 
Proposition 1: When a fraud takes place, the victim believes he or she has 
participated in a successful negotiation.  
4. DEFINITION OF POWER 
:+&7' 01' 2).7'-- ./ &'=.0+(0+.& (&4 +0- '//'70 .& +&4+,+4>(*- (&4 0)(&-(70+.&- 
3(- /+)-0 +&0).4>7'4 +&0. 01' 2-;71.*.=; *+0')(0>)'? .&' ./ 01' />&4(6'&0(* 
,()+(I*'- 01(0 1(- I''& -0>4+'4 1(- I''& 01(0 ./ 2.3') F@()3'** '0 (*B? 5#c#GB 
S.3') +- ( 7)+0+7(* /(70.) (&4 />&4(6'&0(* '*'6'&0 /.) ->77'-- +& 01' 
&'=.0+(0+.& 2).7'-- F[+6 '0B (*B? "XXYGB Q'I') F5#]eG +&0).4>7'4 2.3') (- 01' 
2).I(I+*+0; 01(0 ( 2')-.& 7(& 7()); .>0 1+- .) 1') .3& 3+** 4'-2+0' )'-+-0(&7'B 
Q1'& ( /)(>4 0(D'- 2*(7'? 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 1(- 01' 4'-+)' 0. 7()); .>0 1+- .) 1') 
3+** j 0(D+&= (4,(&0(=' ./ 01' ,+70+6 01).>=1 4'7'+0 j )'=()4*'-- ./ )'-+-0(&7'B 
@.-0 ./ 01' 2.3') *+0')(0>)' -+&7' Q'I')b- 0+6' 1(- ->22.)0'4 1+- I(-+7 
4'/+&+0+.& FL(71()(71 g H(3*')? 5#fXGB  9& .)4') 0. >&4')-0(&4 2.3')? T)'&71 
(&4 N(,'& F5#Y#G +&0).4>7'4 ( /)(6'3.)D 01(0 1(-? ()=>(I*;? I'7.6' 01' 6.-0 
7.66.&*; )'/')'&7'4 (22)(+-(* 3+01 )'=()4- 0. 2.3') +& 01' 6(&(='6'&0 
*+0')(0>)' F[+6 '0B (*? "XXYGB   
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Proposition 2: Understanding the relationship between power and 
negotiation in the fraud process can help researchers and practitioners 
understand, research, and evaluate fraudulent transactions more fully.  
T)'&71 (&4 N(,'& F5#Y#G 2).2.-' 01(0 2.3') +- 7.62)+-'4 ./ /+,' -'2()(0' 
,()+(I*'-? '(71 -0'66+&= /).6 01' 4+//')'&0 (-2'70- ./ 01' )'*(0+.&-1+2 I'03''& 
01' (70.) (&4 01' (70.)b- 0()='0 ./ +&/*>'&7'B 90 1(- I''& -(+4 01(0 01'-' /+,' 
2.3') I(-'- 1(,' -0..4 01' 0'-0 ./ 0+6' FK(2+)(& (&4 Z.=()01^:7.00? "XXWGB 
:2'7+/+7(**;? T)'&71 (&4 N(,'& ->=='-0 01(0 %b- 2.3') .,') L +- 4'0')6+&'4 I; 
F5G %b- (I+*+0; 0. 2).,+4' I'&'/+0- 0. L F)'3()4 2.3')G? F"G %b- (I+*+0; 0. 
2>&+-1 L +/ L 4.'- &.0 7.62*; 3+01 %b- 3+-1'- F7.')7+,' 2.3')G? FWG %b- 
2.--'--+.& ./ -2'7+(* D&.3*'4=' .) 'A2')0+-' F'A2')0 2.3')G? F]G %b- *'=+0+6(0' 
)+=10 0. 2)'-7)+I' I'1(,+.) /.) L F*'=+0+6(0' 2.3')G? (&4 FYG 01' 'A0'&0 0. 31+71 
L +4'&0+/+'- 3+01 % F)'/')'&0 2.3')GB  M-+&= 01'-' /+,' 4'/+&+0+.&- +0 +- 2.--+I*' 
0. 4+,+4' 2.3') +&0. ,()+.>- 7(0'=.)+'- (&4 7)'(0' /+,' ->I0;2'- ./ 2.3')B  
T+=>)' " 2)'-'&0- 01' /+,' 0;2'- ./ 2.3')B 
 
Figure 2: T+,' C;2'- ./ S.3') 
C1+- 6.4'* 'A2*(+&- 01' 0;2'- ./ 2.3') 01(0 ()' >-'4 +& 01' )'*(0+.&-1+2 
I'03''& 01' (70.) (&4 01' (70.)b- 0()='0 ./ +&/*>'&7'B Z.3',')? )'7'&0 )'-'()71 
.& 01'-' 0;2'- ./ 2.3') +& 01' &'=.0+(0+.& 2).7'-- 1(- -1.3& 01(0 +0 +- 
2')7'+,'4 2.3')? )(01') 01(& (70>(* 2.3')? 01(0 (//'70- 01' .>07.6' ./ (&; 
=+,'& &'=.0+(0+.& FQ.*/' (&4 @7E+&&? "XXYGB J,'& +/ % 4.'-&b0 (70>(**; 1(,' 
2.3') .,') L? +/ L 2')7'+,'- % 0. 1(,' 2.3')? 01'& +0 +- (- +/ % 0)>*; 1(- 2.3') 
+& 01' &'=.0+(0+.& 2).7'--B Z'&7' 01'-' /+,' 0;2'- ./ 2.3') 7(& I' 7*(--+/+'4 (- 
2')7'+,'4 )'3()4 2.3')? 2')7'+,'4 7.')7+,' 2.3')? 2')7'+,'4 'A2')0 2.3')? 
2')7'+,'4 *'=+0+6(0' 2.3')? (&4 2')7'+,'4 )'/')'&0 2.3')B  9& 01+- 2(2')? 3' 
+&0).4>7' 01' +4'( 01(0? (22*+'4 0. /)(>4? 2')7'+,'4 2.3') +- >-'4 (- ( 6'(&- 0. 
+&/*>'&7' 01' &'=.0+(0+.& I'03''& 01' 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 01' ,+70+6B %- 7(& I' 
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-''& (I.,'? 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 6>-0 4'7'+,' 01' ,+70+6 +&0. &'=.0+(0+&= >-+&= .&' 
./ 01' /+,' 0;2'- ./ 2')7'+,'4 2.3')B  
Proposition 3: To fully comprehend the role of power in fraudulent 
transactions, it is necessary to interpret the five different types of power as 
perceived power.  
S')7'+,'4 )'3()4 2.3') +- 01' (I+*+0; ./ 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 0. 7.&,+&7' 01' ,+70+6 
01(0 1' .) -1' 3+** 2).,+4' 01' 4'-+)'4 I'&'/+0- 01).>=1 ( &'=.0+(0+.&B  C1' 
2).6+-' ./ ( 6.&'0(); )'3()4 /.) 2()0+7+2(0+.& +& ( _+=')+(& 6.&'; -7(6? 01' 
2).6+-' ./ ,(*+4(0+.& ./ 2')-.&(* +&/.)6(0+.& +& ( 21+-1+&= .2')(0+.&? .) 01' 
2).6+-' ./ 1+=1^2(;+&= U.I- (- ( I.=>- 6;-0'); -1.22') ()' (** 'A(62*'- ./ 
)'3()4 2.3')B   
S')7'+,'4 7.')7+,' 2.3') +- 01' (I+*+0; ./ 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 0. 6(D' 01' ,+70+6 
2')7'+,' 2.0'&0+(* 2>&+-16'&0 +/ 1' .) -1' 4.'-&b0 2()0+7+2(0' +& 01' 
&'=.0+(0+.&B C1+- 2.0'&0+(* 2>&+-16'&0 +- >->(**; I(-'4 .& /'() FS.*+0+-? "XXYGB 
9/ 01' ,+70+6 2')7'+,'- 01(0 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 1(- 01' (I+*+0; 0. 2>&+-1 1+6 .) 1') 
+& (&; 3(; 01' 2')2'0)(0.) I'=+&- 0. 'A')7+-' ( /.)6 ./ 7.')7+,' 2.3') .,') 
01(0 +&4+,+4>(*B S')7'+,'4 7.')7+,' 2.3') +- ( 0..* ./0'& >-'4 I; 8JV-? 8TV-? 
(&4 .01') 'A'7>0+,'- 31'& ( /+&(&7+(* -0(0'6'&0 /)(>4 0(D'- 2*(7'B  JA'7>0+,'- 
3+** ./0'& >-' 7.')7+,' 2.3') 0. +&/*>'&7' '62*.;''- (&4 .01')- 0. 2()0+7+2(0' 
+& 01' /)(>4B  C1'-' +&4+,+4>(*- /'() 01'; 6(; *.-' 01'+) U.I-? .) I' 
4+-7)+6+&(0'4 +/ 01'; 4. &.0 2()0+7+2(0'B S')2'0)(0.)- 7(& >-' 7.')7+,' 2.3')? 
,+( 01' 9&0')&'0? +& (0 *'(-0 /.>) 3(;- F5G I; =(+&+&= 2')-.&(* +&/.)6(0+.& (I.>0 
01' ,+70+6 01).>=1 -2../+&=? -&+//+&=? .) 4(0( 01'/0? F"G 01).>=1 2).7'--'- ->71 
(- 7*+7D 01).>=1 /)(>4- .) .01') 21;-+7(* /)(>4>*'&0 6'(&-? FWG 4'7'+,+&= 01' 
,+70+6 0. I'*+',' 01(0 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 7(& 4. 21;-+7(* 1()6 0. 01'6? (&4 F]G 
2')->(4+&= 01' ,+70+6 01(0 +/ 01'; 4. &.0 (70 &.3 01' .22.)0>&+0; 3+** I' *.-0B    
S')7'+,'4 'A2')0 2.3') +- 01' (I+*+0; ./ 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 0. >-' +&/*>'&7' 01).>=1 
6'(&- ./ 'A2')0+-' .) D&.3*'4='B JA(62*'- ./ /)(>4- 01(0 +&,.*,' 2')7'+,'4 
'A2')0 2.3') +&7*>4' 2')2'0)(0.)- 31. 7*(+6 0. 1(,' (77'-- 0. &.&^2>I*+7 .) 
.01') -'&-+0+,' +&/.)6(0+.& .) 2')2'0)(0.)- 31. 7*(+6 0. 1(,' ( -2'7+(* 
D&.3*'4=' ./ ( =+,'& (70+,+0;B K'7'+,+&= ( ,+70+6 +&0. I'*+',+&= 01(0 ( 
2')2'0)(0.) 1(- 'A2')0 D&.3*'4=' .) 'A2')0+-' +- >-+&= 'A2')0 2.3') 0. 
+&/*>'&7' ( ,+70+6B 9& .&' ./ 01' 6.-0 3'** D&.3& /)(>4- ./ (** 0+6'? 81()*'- 
S.&\+ 7.&&'4 ,+70+6- +&0. I'*+',+&= 01(0 1' 1(4 'A2')0 D&.3*'4=' +& /.)'+=& 
2.-0(* 7.>2.&-B  81()*'- S.&\+ 7*(+6'4 01(0 1' 7.>*4 6(D' -+=&+/+7(&0 2)./+0 
/.) +&,'-0.)- I; 2>)71(-+&= -0(62- +& :2(+& /.) (I.>0 5 7'&0 F_BRB C+6'-? 
5#"XG (&4 -'**+&= 01'6 +& %6')+7( /.) -+A 7'&0-B M-+&= 01+- h'A2')0 
D&.3*'4='i 1' 4'7'+,'4 +&4+,+4>(*- .>0 ./ 6+**+.&- ./ 4.**()- (&4 =(,' I+)01 0. 
01' 2.2>*() 21)(-' hS.&\+ :71'6'Bi  
S')7'+,'4 *'=+0+6(0' 2.3') +- 01' (I+*+0; ./ ( 2')2'0)(0.) 0. 7.&,+&7' ,+70+6- 
01(0 1' .) -1' 1(- -.6' /.)6 ./ )'(* 2.3') .,') 01'6B  V/0'&? 01+- 0;2' ./ /)(>4 
+&,.*,'- +&4+,+4>(*- 7*(+6+&= 0. )'2)'-'&0 01' +&4+,+4>(*b- 71>)71? 7.66>&+0;? 
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.) .)=(&+\(0+.&B  C1' 2')2'0)(0.) (-->6'- -.6' /.)6 ./ (>01.)+0(0+,' ).*' (&4 
7.&,+&7'- 01' ,+70+6 01(0 ->71 (>01.)+0; +- *'=+0+6(0'B %& 'A(62*' ./ 01+- 0;2' 
./ /)(>4 +- 01' hE)'(0') @+&+-0)+'-i /)(>4B  9&4+,+4>(*- 3')' 0.*4 0. +&,'-0 
6.&'; +&0. 2).=)(6- ->71 (- 01' hK.>I*' R.>) @.&';i 2).=)(6 (&4 01' 
hT(+01 S).6+-'- S).=)(6Bi  @'6I')- ./ 01' 7.&=)'=(0+.& 3')' 2).6+-'4 01(0 
01'; 3.>*4 4.>I*' 01'+) 6.&'; +& U>-0 5e 6.&01-B C1' /)(>4 +&,.*,'4 .,') 
5f?XXX +&4+,+4>(*- 31. *.-0 6.)' 01(& `]]f 6+**+.&B  9& "XX5? /+,' *'(4')- ./ 
01' E)'(0') @+&+-0)+'- 9&0')&(0+.&(* 81>)71 3')' 7.&,+70'4 +& M&+0'4 :0(0'- 
/'4')(* 7.>)0 .& ( 0.0(* ./ e" 7.>&0- ./ 7.&-2+)(7;? 3+)' (&4 6(+* /)(>4? (&4 
6.&'; *(>&4')+&= FE+I'*6(& (&4 E'*6(&? "XXWGB  
S')7'+,'4 )'/')'&7' 2.3') +- 01' (I+*+0; ./ 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 0. )'*(0' 0. 01' 0()='0 
./ +&/*>'&7'B S')2'0)(0.)- 3+** I>+*4 )'*(0+.&-1+2- ./ 7.&/+4'&7' 3+01 ( ,+70+6 
,+( (& 9&0')&'0 71(0 )..6 .) .01') 6'4+(B S')2'0)(0.)- ./0'& >-' 2')7'+,'4 
)'/')'&7' 2.3') 0. =(+& 7.&/+4'&7' /).6 ,+70+6- (&4 4'7'+,' 01'6 +&0. /)(>4B  
S')7'+,'4 )'/')'&7' 2.3') +- 2.--+I*' I'7(>-' 2')2'0)(0.)- 71()(70')+-0+7-? 
>&*+D' .01') 7)+6+&(*-? ()' ,'); -+6+*() 0. 01' ='&')(* 2.2>*(0+.&b- 
71()(70')+-0+7- FN.6&';? 5#fXGB Q1'& /)(>4 4.'- .77>)? .&' ./ 01' 6.-0 
7.66.& )'(70+.&- I; 01.-' ().>&4 01' /)(>4 +- 4'&+(*B  k+70+6- 7(&b0 I'*+',' 
01(0 1' .) -1'? ( 0)>-0'4 /)+'&4? 3.>*4 4'7'+,' 01'6 (&4 I'1(,' 4+-1.&'-0*; 
F%*I)'710? "XXcGB 
5. DECEPTION 
C1')' ()' 6(&; 7(-'- 31')' 4'7'20+.& 1(- I''& >-'4 +& 01' &'=.0+(0+.& 2).7'-- 
F:713'+0\')? 5##eGB _.0 .&*; +- 4'7'20+.& ( 2()0 ./ 6(&; &'=.0+(0+.&-? I>0 +0 
1(- (*-. I''& ->=='-0'4 01(0 4'7'20+.& +&7)'(-'- (- 01' +&7'&0+,'- /.) 
2')/.)6(&7' +&7)'(-' FC'&I)>&-(*? 5##fGB K'7'+0/>* &'=.0+(0+.& 1(- I''& >-'4 
0. /)(>4>*'&0*; 6(&+2>*(0' +&4+,+4>(*- 01).>=1.>0 1+-0.);B  9& 01' &'=.0+(0+.& 
2).7'-- +0 +- 4'7'20+.& 01(0 (**.3- 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 0. /(*-'*; 'A')7+-' 2.3') .,') 
01' ,+70+6B C1' 01'.); ./ 4'7'20+.& +4'&0+/+'- -','& .2')(0+.&(* 0(70+7- 
'62*.;'4 0. 4'7'+,' ( ,+70+6 FE)(\+.*+ (&4 P(),'&2(( "XXWIa P.1&-.& '0 (*B 
"XX5GB %- ( 2)+6()+*; 0(70+7(* 6.4'*? +0 7.62*+6'&0- .>) 6.4'* ./ 2.3') 0;2'-? 
->=='-0+&= 01' -2'7+/+7 6'71(&+-6- 01(0 01' 7.& ()0+-0 6(; '62*.; 0. )'(*+\' 
-2'7+/+7 2.3') /.)6- .,') 01' ,+70+6B  
T.) 'A(62*'? )'-'()71 ->=='-0- 01(0 7.&^()0+-0- 2)'0'&4+&= 0. I' I>-+&'--'- 
2)'/') 6(-D+&=? (&4 )'*(I'*+&=? 01')'I; (71+',+&= 'A2')0 (&4 *'=+0+6(0' 2.3') 
FE)(\+.*+ (&4 P(),'&2((? "XXW(GB :2'7+/+7(**; /.7>-'4 .& 01' 9&0')&'0? E)(\+.*+ 
(&4 P(),'&2(( F"XXXG -0>4+'4 01' '//'70+,'&'-- ./ 4(\\*+&=? +&,'&0+&=? (&4 
)'*(I'*+&= /.) 4+-=>+-+&= /)(>4>*'&0 3'I -+0'-? ./0'& >-'4 0. (71+',' )'3()4? 
'A2')0 (&4 )'/')'&0 2.3')B  
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Table 1. %,(+*(I*' C(70+7- +& 01' C1'.); ./ K'7'20+.&  
FE)(\+.*+ (&4 P(),'&2(( "XXWIG 
C(70+7 K'/+&+0+.& 
@(-D+&= Z+4+&= .) 4'-0).;+&= 7)+0+7(* +&/.)6(0+.& 
K(\\*+&= K+-=>+-+&= 7)+0+7(* +&/.)6(0+.& 
K'7.;+&= K+-0)(70+&= 01' ,+70+6b- (00'&0+.& (3(; /).6 7)+0+7(* 
+&/.)6(0+.&B 
@+6+7D+&= %-->6+&= -.6'.&' '*-'b- +4'&0+0;? .) +62')-.&(0+&= -.6'.&' 
'*-'B 
9&,'&0+&= @(D+&= >2 +&/.)6(0+.&B 
N'*(I'*+&= S)'-'&0+&= +&/.)6(0+.& +& ( 6+-*'(4+&= 3(;B 
K.>I*' 2*(; :>=='-0+&= 0. 01' ,+70+6 01(0 01' ,+70+6 +- 0(D+&= (4,(&0(=' ./ 
01' 4'7'+,')B 
 
6. POWER AND DECEPTION ON THE INTERNET 
%*.&= 3+01 01' 4','*.26'&0- +& 01' 9&0')&'0? .22.)0>&+0+'- 0. 7.66+0 /)(>4 (&4 
>&'01+7(* (70- 1(,' I'7.6' 6.)' (,(+*(I*'B C1' 9&0')&'0 1(- 7)'(0'4 
.22.)0>&+0+'- 0. 'A')0 2')7'+,'4 2.3') (&4 &'=.0+(0+.& -D+**- 01(0 3')' >&1'()4 
./ "X ;'()- (=.B %&4 (- 0'71&.*.=; 7.&0+&>'- 0. (4,(&7'? 2')2'0)(0.)- /+&4 &'3 
6'(&- (&4 3(;- 0. 4'7'+,' +&4+,+4>(*- (&4 7.66+0 /)(>4B   
Proposition 4: The Internet has become a significant, new instrument in 
the negotiation process between perpetrators and victims. 
%77.)4+&= 0. MB:B T'4')(* L>)'(> ./ 9&,'-0+=(0+.& -0(0+-0+7- F"XX]G? 01' 
6(U.)+0; ./ 2')2'0)(0.)- ./ 9&0')&'0 /)(>4 6(D' 7.&0(70 3+01 01' ,+70+6 01).>=1 
'^6(+* FcWBYlG .) ( 3'I2(=' F"WBYlGB 9&0')&'0 (>70+.& /)(>4 3(- I; /() 01' 
6.-0 7.66.& Fe5B"lG? I>0 +& 0')6- ./ 01' -+\' ./ 01' *.--'-? 71'7D /)(>4 
F`W?cXXG? _+=')+(& *'00') /)(>4 F`W?XXXG? (&4 7.&/+4'&7' /)(>4 F`5?XXXG 3')' 
01' *()='-0B  
90 1(- I''& ->=='-0'4 01(0 /)(>4 *+D' .01') 7)+6'? 7(& I'-0 I' 'A2*(+&'4 I; 01)'' 
4+-0+&70 /(70.)-< F5G ( ->22*; ./ 6.0+,(0'4 .//'&4')-? F"G 01' (,(+*(I+*+0; ./ 
->+0(I*' 0()='0-? (&4 FWG 01' (I-'&7' ./ 7(2(I*' =>()4+(&- F8.1'& (&4 T'*-.&? 
5#e#a [)(6I+(^[(2()4+-? "XX5GB   
T+)-0? 01' 9&0')&'0 ->22*+'- ( =(01')+&= 2*(7' /.) (& '&4*'-- ->22*; ./ .//'&4')-B  
C1' 7.&&'70+,+0; (&4 =*.I(* )'(71 2).,+4'4 I; 01' 9&0')&'0 6'(&- 01(0 01'-' 
.//'&4')- 7(& I' (&;31')' +& 01' 3.)*4 (&4 01).>=1 01' 9&0')&'0 7(& 
7.66>&+7(0' 3+01 (&;.&'B 8.66>&+7(0+.& 01).>=1 '6(+*? 01' 2)+6(); 6'01.4 
./ 7.&0(70+&= ,+70+6-? +- +&-0(&0(&'.>- (&4 2)(70+7(**; /)'' 4>' 0. *.3 
0)(&-(70+.& 7.-0-B C1' 9&0')&'0 (*-. (**.3- .//'&4')- 01' (I+*+0; 0. '(-+*; 
7>-0.6+\' 01'+) -7(6- 0. +&4+,+4>(* >-')- (&4 01' /*'A+I+*+0; 0. d>+7D*; 71(&=' 
01' -7(6 .&7' +0 +- 4+-7.,')'4B 9& (>70+.&- (*.&'? 81>( (&4 Q()'1(6 F"XX]G 
+4'&0+/+'4 55 4+//')'&0 0;2'- ./ /)(>4? (&4 -0(0' 01(0 h7.& ()0+-0- D&.3 01(0 
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4','*.2+&= -2'7+(*+\'4 /)(>4 -71'6'- +&7)'(-'- 01'+) 2)./+0- 31+*' 6+&+6+\+&= 
01'+) )+-D ./ 7(20>)'i F2B WWGB  
:'7.&4? 01' 9&0')&'0 ->22*+'- &>6').>- ->+0(I*' 0()='0-B  k+70+6- 7(& I' 
(22).(71'4 01).>=1 '^6(+*? 71(0 )..6-? 2.2^>2 (44-? 3'I-+0'- (&4 &>6').>- 
.01') 6'4+( ,+( 01' 9&0')&'0B Q'I -+0'- *+D' 'L(;? 3+01 +0- 5f5 6+**+.& 
)'=+-0')'4 >-')- 3.)*43+4'? 2).,+4' .//'&4')- 3+01 '(-; (77'-- 0. ( *()=' 
&>6I') ./ 2.0'&0+(* ,+70+6-B Z.3',')? (77'-- 0. 2.0'&0+(* ,+70+6- +- &.0 
'A7*>-+,' 0. 01' 9&0')&'0B S')2'0)(0.)- ./ /)(>4 7(& .I0(+& 2')-.&(* +&/.)6(0+.& 
+& ( &>6I') ./ 3(;-? +&7*>4+&=< -0'(*+&= 3(**'0-? 2>)-'- .) 7)'4+0 7()4-a -0'(*+&= 
6(+* .) 01).>=1 -'&4+&= ( /)(>4>*'&0 (44)'-- 71(&=' /.)6a 01).>=1 ,+)>-'- .) 
-2;3()'a .) 01).>=1 >&-.*+7+0'4 '6(+*- .) 0'*'21.&' 7(**-? (&4 +& .,') 1(*/ 01' 
7(-'- 01' .//'&4') 1(- ( 2)+.) )'*(0+.&-1+2 3+01 01' ,+70+6 FK+**')^Z((-? "XX]GB 
C1+)4? 01' 9&0')&'0 2).,+4'- ( 2')/'70 -7'&()+. /.) /)(>4>*'&0 (70+,+0; 3+01 /'3 
.) &. 7(2(I*' =>()4+(&-B  C1' 9&0')&'0 1(- &. I.>&4()+'-a +0 7).--'- 
7.66>&+0+'-? 7>*0>)'-? (&4 7.>&0)+'-B @>71 /)(>4 7).--'- &(0+.&(* (&4 
+&0')&(0+.&(* *'=(* U>)+-4+70+.&-? (&4? 1'&7'? 2')2'0)(0.)- 1(,' *+00*' )+-D ./ 
='00+&= 7(>=10 .) 2>&+-1'4B  T.) 'A(62*'? 31+*' 6(&; -0(0'- 3+01+& 01' M&+0'4 
:0(0'- 1(,' -0(0>0'- )'*(0+&= 0. 7;I')7)+6' ->71 (- 6.&'; *(>&4')+&=? +4'&0+0; 
01'/0? .&*+&' =(6I*+&=? (&4 7;I') -0(*D+&=? 01')' +- &. -0(&4()4 (&4 01' )>*'- 
,(); /).6 -0(0' 0. -0(0' FL)'&&')? "XX5GB  L'7(>-' 6.-0 ./ 01'-' -0(0>0'- 3')' 
3)+00'& I'/.)' 01' 9&0')&'0 'A+-0'4? 01' -0(0>0'- .&*; )'*(0' 0. 2).2')0;? 
7.62>0')? .) .01') 0;2'- ./ +**'=(* (70- (&4 4. &.0 -2'7+/+7(**; (44)'-- 
7;I')7)+6'B T)(>4 +- ( 7.,')0 7)+6'? 6(D+&= 7.**'70+.& ./ ',+4'&7' /.) 
2).-'7>0+.& 4+//+7>*0a +0 +- &.&,+.*'&0 -. +0 )'7'+,'- *'-- ',+4'&7' I; -.7+'0; (&4 
*.3') 2)+.)+0; I; *(3 '&/.)7'6'&0a 6.-0 9&0')&'0 /)(>4- ()' -6(** (&4 01>- 
,+70+6- 1(,' *+00*' +&7'&0+,' 0. 2).-'7>0'a (&4 31'& .//'&4')- ()' 7(>=10 01'; 
./0'& )'7'+,' *+=10 -'&0'&7'- F81>( (&4 Q()'1(6? "XX]GB  
Proposition 5: Fraud is becoming more widespread because the Internet 
supplies a gathering place for an endless supply of offenders, offers 
numerous suitable targets, and provides a scenario for fraudulent activity 
with few or no capable guardians.  
7.  A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL 
C. >&4')-0(&4 01' +&0')(70+.& I'03''& 2.3')? &'=.0+(0+.&? (&4 01' 9&0')&'0? 01' 
/.**.3+&= 6.4'* +- 2)'-'&0'4B  V& 01' *'/0 ()' T)'&71 (&4 N(,'&b- /+,' 0;2'- ./ 
2.3')B C1' .//'&4') 3+** >-' 01' /+,' 0;2'- ./ 2.3') 0. 4'7'+,' 01' ,+70+6 +&0. 
01' &'=.0+(0+.&B C1' 6+44*' I.A )'2)'-'&0- 4'7'20+.&? 31+71 +- '&1(&7'4 
01).>=1 0'71&.*.=+7(* (4,(&7'-? ->71 (- 01' 9&0')&'0? '*'70).&+7 7.66')7'? .) 
(&; .01') 0'71&.*.=+7(* 6'4+( >-'4 /.) 7.66>&+7(0+.&B C1' )+=10 1(&4 I.A 
)'2)'-'&0- 01' ,+70+6? +&7*>4+&= 01' ,+70+6b- '6.0+.&- 01(0 01' 2')2'0)(0.) 3+** 
0); 0. 6(&+2>*(0' (&4 >-' +& 01' 4'7'20+.& 2).7'--B C1' ->77'--/>* &'=.0+(0+.& 
+- 01' /+&(* .>07.6' ./ 01' 2')2'0)(0.) >-+&= 2.3') 0. 4'7'+,'? ,+( 01' 9&0')&'0? 
01' ,+70+6 I; 6(&+2>*(0+&= 01' ,+70+6b- '6.0+.&-B  
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Figure 3. C1' 8;I')7)+6' T)(6'3.)D 
9& (** -7(6-? 01')' +- -.6' 2')7'+,'4 )'3()4 01(0 +- &',') />**; )'(*+\'4? .) +- 
6+-)'2)'-'&0'4 +& -.6' 3(;? 31'01') +& 01' /.)6 ./ 6.&';? 31+71 &',') 
())+,'-? .) =..4- .) -'),+7'-? 31+71 ()' &.0 2).,+4'4 .) ()' -.6'1.3 *'-- 01(& 
01(0 31+71 3(- 2).6+-'4B  C1' D'; 0. 31'01') 01' &'=.0+(0+.& +- ->77'--/>* .) 
&.0 1+&='- .& 01' 2')7'20+.& .& 01' 2()0 ./ 01' ,+70+6 (- 0. 01' -+\' ./ 01' 
)'3()4 (- 3'** (- 01' ,+70+6b- 2')7'20+.& 01(0 01' .//'&4') +- *'=+0+6(0'B C1' 
2')7'+,'4 'A2')0 2.3') 1(- ( 2.-+0+,' )'*(0+.&-1+2 3+01 2')7'+,'4 *'=+0+6(0' 
2.3')B T>)01')6.)'? 01' 2')7'+,'4 )'/')'&0 2.3') +- +&7)'(-'4 01).>=1 
)'2'(0'4 +&0')(70+.&- I'03''& .//'&4') (&4 ,+70+6? (&4 (*-. 1(- ( 2.-+0+,' 
)'*(0+.&-1+2 3+01 2')7'+,'4 *'=+0+6(0' 2.3')B 8.')7+,' 2.3') +- ='&')(**; >-'4 
0. 7)'(0' 01' +62)'--+.& 01(0 01' .//') +- >&+d>' (&4 /.) ( *+6+0'4 0+6'? (&4 7(& 
7)'(0' ( -'&-' ./ >)='&7; +& 01' &'=.0+(0+.&B    
C. +**>-0)(0' 01+- 6.4'*? 3' 2)'-'&0 01' 0.2 0'& 9&0')&'0 -7(6- ./ "XXY +& C(I*' 
" F9&0')&'0 T)(>4 Q(071? "XXYGB 9& 01' 0(I*'? 3' 2.-+0 1.3 '(71 0;2' ./ /)(>4 
(22'(*- 0. ( -2'7+/+7 0;2' ./ 2.3')? (- 3'** (- 01' 2)'4.6+&(&0 4'7'+0 0(70+7- 
'62*.;'4 0. 'A')7+-' '(71 2.3')B 
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S')7'+,'4 )'3()4 +& (>70+.&- 7(& I' 6(&+2>*(0'4 01).>=1 ,()+.>- 6'(&-B C1' 
-'**') 7(& '&=(=' +& -1+**+&= .) I+4 -1+'*4+&=? 31')' 01' 2)+7' ./ 01' =..4- +- 
()0+/+7+(**; 4)+,'& >2 01).>=1 -.6' I'1(,+.) .& 01' 2()0 ./ 01' -'**')B C1+- 
7)'(0'- 01' +62)'--+.& 01(0 01' =..4- ()' 6.)' +& 4'6(&4 01(& 01'; (70>(**; 
()'? )'->*0+&= +& 1+=1') I+4- /).6 h*'=+0+6(0'i I>;')-B  C1' =..4- 7(& (*-. I' 
6+-)'2)'-'&0'4? 31')' 01' -'**') 4'-7)+I'- (& +0'6 +&7.))'70*; (&4 01>- 01' 
(70>(* )'3()4 +- *'-- 01(& 31(0 +- 2')7'+,'4B %>70+.&- (*-. 1(,' ( 7.')7+,' 
&(0>)'? 31')' 01' I>;')- /''* 01(0 01'; 6>-0 (70 +66'4+(0'*; .) *.-' ( >&+d>' 
.22.)0>&+0;B  
S')7'+,'4 'A2')0 2.3') 7(& I' 'A')7+-'4 +& (>70+.&-? /.) 'A(62*'? +& 01' 7(-' 
./ =..4- 31+71 ()' ->22.-'4*; (&0+d>'- .) .&'^./^(^D+&4? (&4 01' -'**') 2.-'- 
(- ( D&.3*'4='(I*' 7.**'70.)B  
S')7'+,'4 *'=+0+6(0' 2.3') 7(& I' 7)'(0'4 01).>=1 01' )'2>0(0+.& -7.)'- 31+71 
()' 6(+&0(+&'4 .& (>70+.& -+0'- I(-'4 .& 01' &>6I') ./ -+0>(0+.&- 31')' 01' 
I>;') +- -(0+-/+'4 .) 4+--(0+-/+'4B C1'-' -7.)'- 7(& I' 6(&+2>*(0'4 01).>=1 
h21(&0.6i 0)(4'- 31')' 01' -'**') 2.-'- (- ( I>;') .& ,()+.>- 0)(4'- (&4 =+,'- 
1+6 .) 1')-'*/ 2.-+0+,' )(0+&=-? 01>- ()0+/+7+(**; '*',(0+&= 1+- .) 1') )'2>0(0+.& 
-7.)'B  
T+&(**;? 2')7'+,'4 )'/')'&0 2.3') 7(& I' .I0(+&'4 01).>=1 )'2>0(0+.& -7.)'- (- 
3'** (- .01') 7.66>&+0; /.)>6- .& 01' (>70+.& -+0'-? 31')' I>;')- (&4 -'**')- 
7(& +&0')(70 (&4 2')2'0)(0.)- 7(& =(+& 01' 7.&/+4'&7' ./ 01'+) 2.0'&0+(* ,+70+6-B  
T.) '(71 2.3') /.)6? 3' 'A2*.)' 1.3 01' 9&0')&'0 '&(I*'- -2'7+/+7 0(70+7- ->71 
(- 6+6+7D+&=? +&,'&0+&=? (&4 )'*(I'*+&=B C1' +&7)'(-'4 (&.&;6+0;? =*.I(* 
)'(71 (&4 *.3 I())+')- 0. '&0); ./ 01' 9&0')&'0 '&(I*' /)(>4>*'&0 (70+,+0; /).6 
(** 2()0- ./ 01' 3.)*4B 
 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(4) 
]" 
8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF ON-LINE 
FRAUD 
C1' 6.4'* 01(0 1(- I''& 2)'-'&0'4 6(; 2).,' 0. I' ./ =)'(0 ,(*>' 0. 
2)(70+0+.&')-? )'=>*(0.)-? (&4 (7(4'6+7-B  J,'& 6.)' +62.)0(&0*;? 01+- 6.4'* 
6(; I' ./ =)'(0 1'*2 +& 2).0'70+&= 01' 7.66.& +&4+,+4>(* .) 7.&->6') /).6 
I'+&= 4'/)(>4'4 .&*+&'B  %- 4+-7>--'4 '()*+')? 2')2'0)(0.)- ./ /)(>4 0;2+7(**; 
2)'; >2.& 01' ->-7'20+I*' j 01' '*4')*;? +66+=)(&0-? >&'4>7(0'4? .) 01.-' 31. 
/+&4 01'6-'*,'- +& ( 4'-2')(0' -+0>(0+.&B   
Q1+*' 01' 6.4'* ->77'--/>**; 4'-7)+I'- 7>))'&0 3'**^D&.3& /)(>4 0;2'-? +0 7(& 
(*-. I' >-'4 0. ='&')(0' ='&')(*+\'4 2)'4+7(0+,' -0(0'6'&0- 7.&7')&+&= />0>)' 
/)(>4 /.)6-B T.) 'A(62*'? (** ./ 01' 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 ,+70+6 71()(70')+-0+7- 1(,' 
( 2.-+0+,' )'*(0+.&-1+2 0. 01' 2.--+I*' .77>))'&7' ./ /)(>4B Z.3',')? 01')' ()' ( 
&>6I') ./ 2.3') 0;2'- (&4 4'7'20+.& 6'01.4- 01(0 ()' 2()0+7>*()*; -(*+'&0 0. 
9&0')&'0 /)(>4B Q1+*' (&; 4+-7>--+.& ./ />0>)' /)(>4 /.)6- +- 7*'()*; 
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( ,()+(&0 ./ +4'&0+0; 01'/0 01(0 1(- I''& 2)(70+7'4 /.) ;'()-a 01' 9&0')&'0 -+62*; 
2')6+0- ( /() 6.)' '//+7+'&0 'A'7>0+.&B %77.)4+&=*;? 0(I*' W .>0*+&'- ( &>6I') 
./ ='&')(*+\'4 /)(>4 0;2'-? 01'+) ,+70+6 (&4 2')2'0)(0.) 71()(70')+-0+7-? 2)+6(); 
4'7'20+.& 6'71(&+-6- (- 3'** (- 01'+) (*+=&6'&0 0.3()4- ->77'--/>* 'A'7>0+.& 
.& 01' 9&0')&'0B Q1+*' 01+- (&(*;-+- +- ( -+62*+/+7(0+.&? .>) (-->620+.& +- 01(0 
/>0>)' .&*+&' /)(>4- 3+** *+D'*; I' &.,'* ,()+(&0- ./ 0)(4+0+.&(* /.)6-B %- ->71? 
3' 1+=1*+=10 /)(>4 /.)6- 01(0 1(,' ( 1+=1 2).7*+,+0; 3+01 01' 9&0')&'0? (&4 
01')'I; 1(,' ( 1+=1') *+D'*+1..4 ./ .77>))+&= +& />0>)' /.)6-B 
V22.)0>&+0+'- /.) '(-; 6.&'; .) )'3()4- 3+** *+D'*; 7.&0+&>' 0. .77>) +& ( 
,()+'0; ./ /.)6- .& 01' 9&0')&'0B C1' 9&0')&'0 2')6+0- ( &>6I') ./ 0'71&+d>'- 
/.) 6(&+2>*(0+&= .) /(*-+/;+&= +&/.)6(0+.& 0. '&0+7' ,+70+6- 0. -'&4 6.&'; +& 
01' 1.2'- ./ />0>)' =(+&B @.)'.,')? 01' ,(-0 )'(71 ./ 01' 9&0')&'0 (**.3- 
2')2'0)(0.)- 0. I).(47(-0 01'+) *>)'- 0. ( I).(4 (>4+'&7'? (&4 '//+7+'&0*; +4'&0+/; 
(&4 7.66>&+7(0' 3+01 ,+70+6- 3+01 ( 2).2'&-+0; 0. /(** /.) 01' 0'620(0+.& ./ 
'(-; 6.&';B 
H+D'3+-'? 01' )'*(0+,' '(-' 3+01 31+71 4+=+0(* 0'71&.*.=; 7(& )'2*+7(0' (&4 
6(&+2>*(0' &.&^'A+-0'&0? -0.*'& .) 7.>&0')/'+0 2).4>70- ->=='-0- 01(0 7)+6+&(*- 
3+** 7.&0+&>' 0. '62*.; 01'-' 0'71&+d>'- +& ( ,()+'0; ./ 3(;-B 9& ( -+6+*() ,'+&? 
4+=+0(* 0'71&.*.=; (&4 01' 9&0')&'0 '&(I*' +&-0+0>0+.&(* .) 'A2')0 *'=+0+6(7; 0. 
I' '(-+*; )'2*+7(0'4? 01')'I; 2')6+00+&= 7)+6+&(*- 0. '6>*(0' *'=+0+6(0' 
-7+'&0+/+7? *'=(* .) I>-+&'-- +&-0+0>0+.&- +& ( 2).7'-- ./ -'**+&= I.=>- 
21()6(7'>0+7(*-? .) 6'4+7(*? 2-;71+(0)+7? *'=(* .) I>-+&'-- -'),+7'-B 
Z.3',')? /)(>4- 01(0 *',')(=' 2')-.&(* )'*(0+.&-1+2- 0. ( 1+=1 4'=)'' 3+** I' 
*'-- *+D'*;B 9& 01+- -+0>(0+.&? 3' 7(& 01+&D ./ h01' 2.3') ./ 2')-.&(* 2')->(-+.&i 
31')' 2')2'0)(0.)- *',')(=' 2')-.&(* .) 2)./'--+.&(* )'*(0+.&-1+2- 0. 7.')7' 
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,+70+6-B Q1+*' 3' 4. &.0 '*+6+&(0' 01' 2.--+I+*+0;? 01' >-' ./ )+71 
7.66>&+7(0+.& 6'4+( (&4 .01') -.7+(* 7>'- 0. 6(&+2>*(0' ,+70+6- 6(D'- 01'-' 
0;2'- ./ /)(>4 *'-- *+D'*; 0. .77>) 'A7*>-+,'*; ,+( 01' 9&0')&'0B N(01')? 01' 
2.--+I+*+0; /.) 1;I)+4 /)(>4-? 31')' 01' 9&0')&'0 +- >-'4 /.) +&+0+(* 7.&0(70? (&4 
/>)01') &'=.0+(0+.& .77>)- +& 2')-.&? +- 7')0(+&*; /'(-+I*'B    
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T+&(**;? 0'71&+d>'- /.) 7.**'70+&= 7.&/+4'&0+(* +&/.)6(0+.& .& ,+70+6- 3+** 
*+D'*; 7.&0+&>' +& 0(70 3+01 01' 0'71&.*.=; 01(0 '&->)'- +0- 2)','&0+.&B 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(4) 
]] 
8.62>0') -'7>)+0; 'A2')0- 1(,' *.&= (7D&.3*'4='4 01(0 01' 3'(D'-0 -'7>)+0; 
1.*'- +& (&; -.7+.^0'71&+7(* -;-0'6 ()' &.0 0'71&+7(*? I>0 1>6(&B %- 2)',+.>-*; 
()=>'4? 4+=+0(* 0'71&.*.=; '&(I*'- 01' )'*(0+,'*; '(-; )'2*+7(0+.& ./ 
+&-0+0>0+.&(* *'=+0+6(7;? 01')'I; '&0+7+&= .I'4+'&0 ,+70+6- 0. 4+,>*=' 
7.&/+4'&0+(* +&/.)6(0+.&B 
9& 7.&7*>-+.&? (&; 4+-7>--+.& ./ />0>)' /)(>4 /.)6- .& 01' 9&0')&'0 -1.>*4 
1+=1*+=10 01' -(*+'&0 /'(0>)'- ./ 01' 0'71&.*.=; 01(0 2).,+4' ( 7(0(*;-0 /.) /)(>4B 
C1' 9&0')&'0 1(- ( ,'); I).(4 )'(71? (&4 2')2'0)(0.)- 7(& '//+7+'&0*; 
7.66>&+7(0' 3+01 ( I).(4 =).>2 ./ 2.0'&0+(* ,+70+6- (&4 0)+==') )'-2.&-'- 01(0 
+4'&0+/; 01'6 (- ->-7'20+I*' 0. /)(>4 F'B=B ,+70+6 71()(70')+-0+7-GB :'7.&4*;? 
4+=+0(* 0'71&.*.=; 2')6+0- 2')2'0)(0.)- 0. '(-+*; )'2*+7(0' *'=+0+6(0' 2).4>70-? 
.) -'),+7'- 01(0 ()' +& /(70? &.&^'A+-0'&0 .) 7.>&0')/'+0B C1+- +- />)01') '&(I*'4 
I; ( -+6+*() >-' ./ 0'71&.*.=; 0. '6>*(0' 3'**^D&.3 I>-+&'--'- .) +&-0+0>0+.&- 
0. ->22.)0 7*(+6- ./ *'=+0+6(7; +& ( ,()+'0; ./ /)(>4 /.)6-? I' 01'; /+&(&7+(*? 
7.>&0')/'+0? .) 21+-1+&=m+4'&0+0; 01'/0 /)(>4-B   
9. FUTURE RESEARCH 
V>) 6.4'* +4'&0+/+'- /+,' 0;2'- ./ 2.3')? 01' 2)+6(); 0(70+7- >0+*+\'4 0. )'(*+\' 
01' 2.3')? (&4 01' 7.66.& /)(>4 0;2'- 31')' 01'-' '*'6'&0- ()' 6(&+/'-0B C1' 
&'A0 -0'2 +& 01+- )'-'()71 +- )+=.).>- '62+)+7(* ,(*+4(0+.& 3+01 I.01 (==)'=(0' 
4(0( (&(*;-+- (- 3'** (- 7.&0).**'4 'A2')+6'&0(0+.&B M&4')-0(&4+&= 01' 3(;- +& 
31+71 2')2'0)(0.)- ./ /)(>4 ()' (I*' 0. 'A')0 01'-' /+,' 0;2'- ./ 2.3') (7).-- 
01' 9&0')&'0 +- ( /+)-0 -0'2 0.3()4- 1'*2+&= )'=>*(0.)-? 7.62(&+'- (&4 
+&4+,+4>(*- 4','*.2 I'00') -0)(0'=+'- /.) +0- 7.&0).* (&4 2)','&0+.&B  
C1' -0)'&=01 ./ 01+- 6.4'* *+'- +& 01' /(70 01(0 +0 'A2*(+&- 01' )'*(0+.&-1+2 01(0 
0(D'- 2*(7' I'03''& 2')2'0)(0.) (&4 ,+70+6? -2'7+/+7(**; +& (& .&*+&' 
'&,+).&6'&0B  @.)'.,')? >&4')-0(&4+&= 01' 0'71&+d>'- '62*.;'4? (&4 1.3 
2.0'&0+(* /)(>4 ,+70+6- -'*/^-'*'70 01'6-'*,'- +& )'-2.&-' 0. 01'-' 6'71(&+-6- 
3+** '&(I*' 2.*+7; 6(D')- (&4 7.&->6')- 0. >&4')-0(&4 01' .,')(** 2).7'-- ./ 
.&*+&' 4'7'20+.& (&4 4'7)'(-' 01' .,')(** )+-D ./ 7>))'&0 (&4 />0>)' /)(>4-B   
J4>7(0+.& +- 01' D'; 0. 2)','&0+&= /)(>4B  9/ 01' 6.4'* 2).,'- (77>)(0' 3+01 
/>)01') 0'-0+&=? 7.&->6') 2).0'70+.& (='&7+'- 3+** 1(,' ( ,(*>(I*' 0..* 0. (--+-0 
01'6 +& 01' 4'0'))'&7' ./ /)(>4B  T>)01')6.)'? 7.&->6')- 3+** I' (I*' 0. 
+4'&0+/; 2.0'&0+(* 2')2'0)(0.)- 31. 3.>*4 0); 0. 'A2*.+0 01'6 >-+&= 01' /+,' 
0;2'- ./ 2.3') 4+-7>--'4B  9/ 7.&->6')- 7(& I'7.6' 6.)' (3()' ./ 01'+) 
->-7'20+I+*+0; 0. 01'-' 0;2'- ./ /)(>4-? 01'; 3+** I'7.6' 6.)' (3()' ./ 
2.0'&0+(* -+0>(0+.&- 31')' 01'; ()' ->-7'20+I*' 0. /)(>4B 9& .01') 3.)4-? 01' 
6.4'* 6(; 1'*2 +4'&0+/; ()'(- 31')' 01' 2).I(I+*+0; ./ .&^*+&' /)(>4 .77>))+&= 
+- 1+=1')B 
C1' 2>)2.-' ./ 01+- 2(2') 1(- I''& 0. (4,(&7' 01'.)'0+7(* >&4')-0(&4+&= ./ 01' 
-2'7+/+7 2.3') /.)6- 01(0 2')2'0)(0.)- >-' 31'& +&/*>'&7+&= ,+70+6- +& 
/)(>4>*'&0 0)(&-(70+.&-B C1' 6.4'* 1(- 7.6I+&'4 01' 4+6'&-+.&- ./ 2.3') (&4 
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ABSTRACT This article discusses the basic nature of fraud, including the
major accounting scandals of the last decade. The article also discusses the role
of auditors and if auditors should be held liable for not detecting financial
statement fraud. The article examines recent standards, rules, and acts put in
place after the major frauds of the 1990s and early 2000s, including Sarbanes-
Oxley, new rules by the NYSE and NASDAQ, and SAS 92. Finally, the article
discusses whether these new standards, rules, and acts will have an impact to
deter financial statement frauds from occurring in the future.
KEYWORDS fraud, forensic accounting, fraud audits, fraud detection, financial
statement fraud, fraud examination
INTRODUCTION
Executives and employees of most organizations conduct business with
integrity. Their financial statements are transparent and represent the financial
state of the organization. However, some succumb to pressures and opportu-
nities to make their companies look better than they really are. These individ-
uals often seek to unduly enrich themselves in their stewardship roles, increase
their financial status, or gain the respect of others through a dishonest image.
While it may seem that fraud is centered in certain industries, this small
minority of dishonest people exists in every profession and industry.
Society has long held that the protector—the “public watchdog (United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 1984)”—against this dishonest minority in public com-
panies is the financial statement auditor. In the United States, Arthur Levitt,
former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
explained an auditor’s role this way: “America’s auditors were given a franchise
by the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 to provide the public with accurate
audited statements of companies . . . And their mission, the reason for all of
that, was to protect the public investor from financial fraud (PBS, 2002)1.”
Over the last decade, there have been numerous frauds discovered in com-
panies throughout the world. These frauds include Enron, WorldCom, Cen-
dant, Adelphia, Parmalat, Royal Ahold, Vivendi, and SK Global. In most
cases, it was alleged that the auditors should have detected the frauds and, as a
result, they were sued for performing negligent audits. In order to determine
whether auditors should be held liable for fraud, it is important to review why
these large scale frauds occurred and the legislation and rules that have been
instituted since their occurrence. In this article, we discuss the role of a finan-
cial statement audit and whether or not auditors should be held responsible
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for financial statement fraud. We describe why fraud
occurs and the “perfect storm” that led to the large-scale
accounting scandals of the past decade. We review U.S.
fraud standards and regulations, new exchange rules by
both the NYSE and NASDAQ, and new regulations
under the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation. Finally, we evalu-
ate whether these new standards, rules, and acts are suf-
ficient to reduce fraud in the future.
WHY FRAUD OCCURS
Fraud researchers have found three elements com-
mon to all frauds. These three elements of the fraud
triangle are (1) perceived pressure, (2) perceived oppor-
tunity, and (3) some way to rationalize the fraud as
acceptable and consistent with one’s personal code of
ethics (Albrecht et al., 2006a). Whether the dishonest
act involves fraud against a company, such as employee
embezzlement, or fraud on behalf of a company, such as
management fraud, these three elements are always
present. Figure 1 illustrates the fraud triangle.
Every fraud perpetrator faces some kind of perceived
pressure. Most pressures involve a financial need,
although nonfinancial pressures such as the need to
report results better than actual performance, frustra-
tion with work, or even a challenge to beat the system,
can also motivate fraud. Note that this element is per-
ceived pressure, not necessarily real pressure. Pressures
perceived by one individual, such as a gambling addic-
tion, may not be pressures to another individual.
Examples of perceived financial pressures that can
motivate fraud on behalf of a company (i.e., financial
statement fraud) are financial losses, falling sales, fail-
ure to meet Wall Street’s earnings expectations, or the
inability to compete with other companies.
Fraud perpetrators must also have a perceived oppor-
tunity that allows the fraud act. Even with intense
perceived pressures, executives who believe they will
be caught and punished rarely commit fraud (Albrecht
et al., 2006b). Executives who believe they have an
opportunity to commit and/or conceal fraud often give
in to their perceived pressures. Perceived opportunities to
commit management fraud include factors such as a
weak board of directors or inadequate internal controls.
Finally, fraud perpetrators must have some way to
rationalize their actions as acceptable. For corporate
executives, rationalizations to commit fraud might
include thoughts such as “we need to keep the stock
price high,” “all companies use aggressive accounting
practices,” or “it is for the good of the company.”
These three elements of the fraud triangle are interac-
tive. With fraud, the greater the perceived opportunity
or the more intense the pressure, the less rationalization
it takes for someone to commit fraud. Likewise, the
more dishonest a perpetrator is and the easier it is for
him or her to rationalize deviant behavior, the less
opportunity and/or pressure it takes to motivate fraud.
REASON RECENT LARGE-SCALE 
FRAUDS OCCURRED
The fraud triangle provides insight into why recent
financial statement frauds occurred. In addition to the
factors that motivate a person to commit fraud, there
were several specific elements that led to the large-
scale frauds of the past decade (Albrecht et al., 2004).
These elements contributed to a perfect storm that led
to the massive frauds of the last few years.
The first element of this perfect storm was the
masking of many existing problems and unethical
actions by the expanding economies of the 1990s and
early 2000s. During this time, most businesses
appeared to be highly profitable, including many new
“dot-com” companies that were testing new and
unproven (and many times unprofitable) business
models. The economy was booming, and investment
was high. In this period of perceived success, people
made nonsensical investment and other decisions.2
The advent of investing over the Internet for a few
dollars per trade brought many new, inexperienced
people to the stock market. It is now clear that many
of the frauds revealed since 2002 were actually being
committed during the boom years, but that the appar-
ent booming economy hid the fraudulent behavior.3
The booming economy also caused executives, board
members, and stockholders to believe that their com-
panies were more successful than they actually were
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result of good management. In addition, research has
shown that extended periods of prosperity can reduce
a firm’s motivation to comprehend the causes of suc-
cess, raising the likelihood of faulty attributions
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003).
The second element of the perfect storm was the
moral decay that had been occurring in the United
States and around the world. Political correctness did
many good things for society, but it also veiled dis-
honesty in new language that allowed some to ratio-
nalize fraudulent behavior. Many role models in
sports, politics, and movies were no longer examples
of honesty and integrity. While some may argue that
role models have been dishonest or immoral through-
out history, the significantly increased access in recent
decades to their behavior through widespread media
coverage, Internet sites, blogs, and general transpar-
ency affected the existing workforce and the young
alike. Whatever measure of integrity one uses, dishon-
esty appears to be increasing.
The third element of the perfect storm was mis-
placed executive incentives. For example, agency the-
ory’s solution of aligning executive pay with company
performance was practiced to the extreme in many
cases ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Executives of
many fraudulent companies were endowed with hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in stock options and/or
restricted stock that placed more pressure on keeping
the stock price rising than on reporting financial
results accurately. In many cases, this stock-based
compensation far exceeded executives’ salary-based
compensation. The attention of many CEOs shifted
from managing the firm to managing the stock price.
At the cost of countless billions of dollars, managing
the stock price all too often turned into fraudulently
managing the financials.
The fourth element of the perfect storm—and one
closely related to the last—was the often unachievable
expectations of Wall Street analysts that primarily tar-
geted short-term behavior. Company boards and man-
agement, generally lacking alternative performance
metrics, used comparisons with the stock price of
“similar” firms and attainment of analyst expectations
as important defacto performance measures. These
stock-based incentives compounded the pressure
induced by analyst expectations. Each quarter, ana-
lysts, often coached by the companies themselves,
forecasted each company’s earnings per share (EPS).
The forecasts alone drove price movements of the
shares, embedding the expectations in the price of a
company’s stock. Executives knew that the penalty for
missing the Street estimate was severe—even falling
short of expectations by a small amount, despite oth-
erwise strong performance, might drop the company’s
stock price by a considerable amount.
The fifth element in the perfect storm was the large
amounts of debt and leverage held by each of these
fraudulent companies. This debt placed tremendous
financial pressure on executives to not only have high
earnings to offset high interest costs but also to report
high earnings to meet debt and other covenants. For
example, Enron’s derivatives-related liabilities increased
from $1.8 billion to $10.5 billion during 2000 alone.
Similarly, WorldCom had more than $100 billion in
debt when it filed history’s largest bankruptcy. During
2002 alone, 186 public companies, including World-
Com, Enron, Adelphia, and Global Crossing,
recorded $368 billion in debt filed for bankruptcy
(Portland Business Journal, 2003).
The sixth element of the perfect storm was the
nature of U.S. accounting rules. In contrast to
accounting practices in other countries such as the
United Kingdom and Australia, U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are much
more rule-based than principles-based.4 If a client
chose a particular questionable method of accounting
that was not specifically prohibited by GAAP, it was
hard for auditors or others to argue that the client
couldn’t use that accounting method. The existing
general principles already contained within GAAP
notwithstanding, when auditors and other advisors
sought to create competitive advantages by identifying
and exploiting possible loopholes, it became harder to
make a convincing case that a particular accounting
treatment was prohibited when it “wasn’t against the
rules.” Professional judgment lapsed as the general
principles already contained within GAAP and SEC
regulations were ignored or minimized. The result was
that rather than deferring to existing, more general
rules, specific rules (or the lack of specific rules) were
exploited for new, often complex financial arrange-
ments, as justification to decide what was or was not
an acceptable accounting practice.
Consider the case of Enron. Even if Andersen had
argued that Enron’s Special Purpose Entities (SPEs)
weren’t appropriate, it would have been impossible for
Andersen to make the case that they were against any
specific rules. Some have suggested that one of the
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reasons it took so long to get plea bargains or indict-
ments in the Enron case was because it wasn’t immedi-
ately clear whether GAAP or any laws had actually
been broken.
A seventh element of the perfect fraud storm was
the opportunistic behavior of some CPA firms. In
some cases, accounting firms used audits as loss lead-
ers to establish relationships with companies so they
could sell more lucrative consulting services. The
rapid growth of the consulting practices of the Big 5
accounting firms, which was much higher than the
growth of other consulting firms, attested to the fact
that it is much easier to sell consulting services to
existing audit clients than to new clients. In many
cases, audit fees were much smaller than consulting
fees for the same clients, and accounting firms felt
little conflict between independence and opportuni-
ties for increased profits. In particular, these alterna-
tive services allowed some auditors to lose their focus
and become business advisors rather than auditors.
This is especially true of Andersen; it had spent con-
siderable energy building its consulting practice only
to see that practice split off into a separate firm (now
called Accenture). Privately, several Andersen partners
admitted that the surviving Andersen firm and some
of its partners had vowed to “out consult” the firm
that separated from them.
The eighth element of the perfect storm was greed
by executives, investment banks, commercial banks,
and investors. Each of these groups benefited from the
strong economy, the high level of lucrative transac-
tions, and the apparently high profits of companies.
None of them wanted to accept bad news. As a result,
they sometimes ignored negative news and entered
into unwise transactions.5 For example, in the Enron
case, various commercial and investment banks made
hundreds of millions from Enron’s lucrative invest-
ment banking transactions, on top of the tens of mil-
lions in loan interest and fees. None of these firms
alerted investors about derivative or other underwriting
problems at Enron. Similarly, in October 2001, after
several executives had abandoned Enron and negative
news about Enron was reaching the public, 16 of 17
security analysts covering Enron still rated the company
a “strong buy” or “buy” (http:// fitzgerald.senate.gov/
legislation/stkanalyst/analystmain.htm http://www.cfo.
com/article.cfm/3015411/2/c_3046616). Enron’s out-
side law firms were also making high profits from
Enron’s transactions. These firms also failed to correct
or disclose any problems related to the derivatives and
special purpose entities, but in fact helped draft the
requisite associated legal documentation. Finally, the
three major credit rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard &
Poor’s and Fitch/IBC—who all received substantial
fees from Enron— also did nothing to alert investors of
pending problems. Amazingly, just weeks prior to
Enron’s bankruptcy filing—after most of the negative
news was out and Enron’s stock was trading for $3 per
share—all three agencies still gave investment grade rat-
ings to Enron’s debt (http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/press.
nsf/pages/275).
Finally, the ninth element of the perfect storm was
three types of educator failures. First, educators had
not provided sufficient ethics training to students. By
not forcing students to face realistic ethical dilemmas
in the classroom, graduates were ill-equipped to deal
with the real ethical dilemmas they faced in the busi-
ness world. In one allegedly fraudulent scheme, for
example, participants included virtually the entire
senior management of the company, including but
not limited to its former chairman and chief executive
officer, its former president, two former chief financial
officers, and various other senior accounting and busi-
ness personnel. In total, there were more than 20
individuals involved in the earnings overstatement
schemes. Such a large number of participants points
to a generally failed ethical compass for the group.
Consider another case of a chief accountant. A chief
financial officer instructed the chief accountant to
increase earnings by an amount somewhat over $100
million. The chief accountant was skeptical about the
purpose of these instructions but did not challenge
them. Instead, the chief accountant followed direc-
tions and allegedly created a spreadsheet containing
seven pages of improper journal entries—105 in total—
that he determined were necessary to carry out the
CFO’s instructions. Such fraud was not unusual. In
many of the cases, the individuals involved had no
prior records of dishonesty—and yet when they were
asked to participate in fraudulent accounting, they did
so quietly of their own free will.
A second educator failure was not teaching students
about fraud. One author of this paper has taught a
fraud course to business students for several years. It is
his experience that most business school graduates
would not recognize a fraud if it hit them between the
eyes. The large majority of business students don’t
understand the elements of fraud, perceived pressures
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and opportunities, the process of rationalization, or
red flags that indicate the possible presence of dishonest
behavior. When they do see something that doesn’t
look right, their first reaction is to deny a colleague
could be committing dishonest acts.
The third educator failure has been to neglect
exploration of possible relationships between various
theories of management behavior and fraudulent
activity. Stewardship theory and agency theory are
among many theoretical models that have implica-
tions in fraud acts.
Figure 2 shows how these nine perfect storm ele-
ments fit into the fraud model.
U.S. FRAUD STANDARDS 
AND REGULATIONS
With respect to auditing standards in the United
States, prior to the disclosure of the major frauds of
the past decade, the relevant fraud-auditing standard
was SAS 82. On October 16, 2002, the Auditing Stan-
dards Board (ASB) approved a new standard, State-
ment on Auditing Standard No. 99: Considerations of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. This new standard
gave U.S. auditors expanded guidance for detecting
material fraud.
Statement on Auditing Standard No. 99 established
standards and provided guidance to auditors in fulfill-
ing their responsibility as it relates to fraud in an audit
of financial statements conducted in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). SAS 99
did not change the auditor’s responsibility to plan and
perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the financial statements are free of
material misstatement, whether caused by error or
fraud (as described in AU sec. 110.01). However, it did
establish standards and provide guidance to auditors
in fulfilling their responsibility, as it relates to fraud.
SAS 99 required, as part of planning the audit, that
there be a brainstorming session among the audit
team members to consider the susceptibility of the
entity to material misstatement due to fraud and to
reinforce the importance of adopting an appropriate
mindset of professional skepticism. SAS 99 also
required auditors to gather the information necessary
to identify the risk of material misstatement due to
fraud, by doing the following:
• Making inquiries of management and others within
the entity.
• Considering the results of the analytical procedures
performed in planning the audit (the proposed state-
ment also requires that the auditor perform analyti-
cal procedures relating to revenue).
• Considering fraud risk factors.
• Considering certain other information.
SAS 99 also required auditors to evaluate the
entity’s programs and controls that address the identi-
fied risks of material misstatement due to fraud, and to
assess those risks after taking into account this evalua-
tion. It also required auditors to respond to the results
of the risk assessment. SAS 99 did not change an audi-
tor’s responsibility to detect material fraud in financial
statement audits, nor did it change management’s
responsibility to establish controls to prevent and
detect fraud. SAS 99 did, however, require an auditor
to gather and consider much more information in
assessing fraud risks and provided guidance on how
FIGURE 2 Fraud Model.
Element of the Fraud Triangle Element of the Perfect Fraud Storm
Perceived Pressures 3. Misplaced executive incentives
4. Unrealistic Wall Street expectations
5. Large amounts of debt
8. Greed
Perceived Opportunities 1. Good economy was masking many problems
6. Selective interpretation of rules-based accounting standards
7. Behavior of CPA firms
Rationalization 2. Moral decay in society
9. Educator failures
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management can establish anti-fraud programs and
controls. SAS 99 required that fraud be considered
throughout the entire audit process and encouraged
auditors to use non-predictable audit procedures when
performing audits.
NEW EXCHANGE RULES
After the major frauds of the past decade, both the
NYSE and NASDAQ issued broad new rules for listed
companies. These rules required that boards of direc-
tors assign responsibility for oversight of the financial
reporting process to an audit committee, composed of
a subgroup of the board and required that all listed
companies have audit committees made up entirely of
outside directors.
In response to high-profile corporate failures, Harvey
Pitt, the former chairman of the SEC, requested
NYSE and NASDAQ to review their listing standards
with an emphasis on all matters of corporate gover-
nance. Based on that request, both the NYSE and
NASDAQ conducted extensive reviews of their listing
standards for corporate governance and filed corpo-
rate governance reform proposals with the SEC in
2002. In April 2003, the SEC issued Rule 10A-3,
which directs all stock exchanges to prohibit listing of
any security of an issuer that is not in compliance
with the audit committee requirements specified in
Rule 10A-3. On November 4, 2003, the SEC
approved, with certain modifications, the corporate
governance reforms proposed by NYSE and NAS-
DAQ. These new corporate governance reforms were
meant to provide more scrutiny of corporate financial
reports, the auditing process, and the integrity of
management. Basically, the reforms required that
audit committee (and most board) members be
independent, that the audit committee retained and
dealt with the external auditors, that nominating pro-
cedures for new board members were in place, and
that independent directors met separately from man-
agement and were involved more in the governance
of companies.
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed into law
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Officially the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protec-
tion Act of 2002, also referred to in practice as Sar-
banes, Sarbox, or SOX). The Act, which applies in
general to publicly held companies and their audit
firms, dramatically affected the accounting profession
and impacts not just the largest accounting firms but
any CPA actively working as an auditor of, or for, a
publicly traded company. The basic implications of
the Act as they relate to auditors and fraud are summa-
rized below.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act had board implications
for both auditors and companies. In an effort to
better oversee auditors and their responsibilities to
detect fraud, the Act established of the Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Its
stated purpose is to “protect the interests of investors
and further the public interest in the preparation of
informative, fair, and independent audit reports.”
Although a private entity, the PCAOB has many
government-like regulatory functions, making it in
some ways similar to the private Self Regulatory
Organizations (SROs) that regulate stock markets
and other aspects of the financial markets in the
United States. Under Section 101 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, the PCAOB has the power to:
• Register public accounting firms that prepare audit
reports for issuers;
• Set auditing, quality control, ethics, independence,
and other standards relating to the preparation of
audit reports by issuers;
• Conduct inspections of registered public accounting
firms; and
• Conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings
concerning and impose appropriate sanctions where
justified upon, registered public accounting firms
and associated persons of such firms (including fines
of up to $100,000 against individual auditors, and
$2 million against audit firms).
Since the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, the PCAOB has shown that it will be active in its
role of oversight. In an exclusive interview published in
the August 2004 CFO Magazine, William McDonough,
the PCAOB’s first chairman said, “The best way for
accountants to win back the confidence of the Ameri-
can people is to do it voluntarily. But if they won’t do
it voluntarily we will make them do it. That’s the
tough part of tough love.” Speaking about accounting
firms, he further said, “Our capabilities [range] from
quiet advice to putting them out of business.” In a
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2005 interview, McDonough was asked the following
question: “How do you respond to auditors’ insis-
tence that it isn’t their job to detect fraud?” He
answered, “We have a very clear view that it is their
job. If we see fraud that wasn’t detected and should
have been, we will be very big on the tough and not so
[big] on the love.” McDonough further stated, “With
relatively few exceptions, they [the auditors] should
find it.” (http://www.cfo.com/article. cfm/3015411/2/
c_3046616)
Sarbanes-Oxley also required that several changes
be made to company boards of directors, including
the following:
• Auditors report to audit committee. Now, auditors will
report to and be overseen by a company’s audit
committee, not management. Audit committees
must approve all auditor services and the auditor
must report any new information to the audit com-
mittee, including disagreements with management.
The kinds of services auditors can provide were also
limited dramatically in an effort to curtail auditor
conflicts of interest.
• Audit partner rotation. The lead audit partner and
audit review partner must be rotated every five years
on public company engagements.
• Employment implications. An accounting firm will not
be able to provide audit services to a public com-
pany if one of that company’s top officials (CEO,
controller, CFO, chief accounting officer, etc.) was
employed by the firm and worked on the company’s
audit during the previous year.
• Whistleblower protection. The audit committee is
responsible to establish procedures for receiving the
dealing with complaints and anonymous employee
tips regarding accounting, control, and/or auditing
irregularities (i.e., a hotline).
• Independence of board. Each member of the audit
committee must be a member of the board of direc-
tors and must be “independent” in that they only
receive compensation for their service on the board.
They cannot be paid by the company for any other
consulting or advisory work.
Sarbanes-Oxley also required that issuers of
public stock and their auditors must follow new
rules and procedures in connection with the finan-
cial reporting and auditing process, including the
following.
• Second partner review and approval of audit reports. The
new regulatory board will issue or adopt standards
requiring auditors to have a thorough second part-
ner review and approval of every public company
audit report.
• Management assessment of internal controls. Manage-
ment must now assess and make representations
about the effectiveness of the internal control struc-
ture and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting.
• Audit reports must contain description of internal con-
trols testing. Sabanes-Oxley required every audit
report to independently attest to the company’s
internal control structures, including a specific
notation about any significant defects or material
noncompliance found on the basis of such
testing.
Have Standards, Rules, and Acts Been 
Sufficient to Reduce Fraud?
New compliance and fraud detection changes can
only be successful if they either (1) eliminate the
factors that contribute to fraud or (2) help auditors to
be more effective in detecting fraud. The fraud trian-
gle provides insight into their effectiveness because it
provides a framework for evaluating how these acts
reduce or eliminate fraud pressures, opportunities, and
rationalizations. Table 1 combines the elements of the
fraud triangle and perfect storm. It further gives
insight into how the new standards address these
elements.
In considering whether the new standards have
helped auditors better detect or prevent fraud, the
answer is a qualified and limited ‘yes.’ Auditors have
been more proactive in brainstorming possible
frauds, working with audit committees and manage-
ment to assess fraud risks, and have developed addi-
tional tests to search for fraud indicators. However,
regardless of how vigilant their audits are, it will
never be possible to prevent or detect all frauds
because of the massive nature of accounting records
and the need to perform limited sampling and sub-
stantive testing, the nature of fraud, reluctance of
people to come forward with fraud information and
the nature of fraud detection. GAAS (Generally
Accepted Auditing Standards) auditors are not
trained in determining when people are telling the
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truth or are being deceptive, when documents are
real or forged, whether collusion is taking place, or
whether fictitious documents have been created. The
best GAAS auditors can do is to provide “reasonable
assurance” that most material financial statement
frauds are detected.
POSSIBLE SOLUTION: FRAUD AUDITS
To provide more than reasonable assurance that
financial statement fraud is not being committed,
fraud audits rather than GAAS audits need to be
performed. To illustrate the differences between
fraud and GAAS audits, consider a case where one
of the authors was an expert witness. In this com-
pany, it was discovered that management had been
intentionally overstating revenues and assets,
resulting in materially misstated financial state-
ments. The GAAS auditors were sued by the share-
holders for failure to detect the fraud earlier (the
fraud had been going on for three years during
which time clean audit opinions were issued). Once
there was suspected fraud (called predication of
fraud), the company’s audit committee retained
special counsel to investigate. The retained special
counsel hired a different Big 4 CPA firm to con-
duct a fraud audit. The fraud audit provided
evidence that, in fact, fraud had occurred and dis-
covered its extent and how it was committed and
concealed. These fraud determinations were made
after the special counsel and the CPA firm it
engaged had spent over 50 times as much time as
the GAAS audit had taken and charged a fee 70
times higher than the GAAS auditor’s fee6. The
fraud auditors physically confiscated all computers
of suspected perpetrators, interviewed hundreds of
individuals (some multiple times and who, by the
time of the fraud audit, were cooperating) and
audited 100% of the transactions in the suspected
accounts. The nonfraudulent accounts that had
been examined by the GAAS auditors were not
examined by the fraud auditors.
Another difference between fraud and GAAS audits
is in sampling methodology. Since the early days of
auditing, statistical sampling has been used to limit
audit work to a relatively few number of records. This
TABLE 1 Analysis of New Fraud Standards Against Fraud Triangle
Element of the Fraud Triangle Element of the Perfect Fraud Storm
Have the Standards Sufficiently 
Addressed These Issues?
Perceived Pressures 3. Misplaced executive incentives None of the new standards or rules has addressed 
perceived pressures. Executive incentives 
(equity compensation, etc.) have not been dealt 
with, the role of analysts in providing earnings 
guidance and setting expectations hasn’t been 
eliminated, firms have increased amounts of 
debt and, with the higher and higher amounts 
of executive pay, it doesn’t seem that greed has 
been eliminated.
4. Unrealistic Wall Street expectations
5. Large amounts of debt
8. Greed
Perceived Opportunities 1. Good economy was masking many 
problems
The new standards and rules go a long way in 
addressing perceived opportunities. By 
strengthening the roles of auditors, audit 
committees, boards of directors, and 
regulators, we do believe the behavior of both 
CPA firms and boards have changed. The 
economy isn’t as strong but will go through 
cycles; rules-based accounting hasn’t changed.
6. Selective interpretation of rules-
based accounting standards
7. Behavior of CPA firms
Rationalization 2. Moral decay in society None of the new standards or rules has addressed 
the level of moral decay. Studies on integrity 
and related topics (cheating in school) would 
indicate that integrity is decreasing, not getting 
better. Educators must start teaching quality 
ethics and fraud courses, but they are still 
mostly elective and small.
9. Educator failures
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TABLE 2 GAAS vs. Fraud Audit
GAAS Audit Fraud Audit
Purpose Provides reasonable assurance that financial 
statements are prepared in accordance with 
GAAP.
Detects and investigates suspicions of fraud. If 
extensive enough, could provide absolute 
assurance that material financial statement 
fraud isn’t occurring.
Scope GAAS auditors are not looking for specific 
problems with the company, but rather are 
engaged to look at and issue an opinion on the 
overall financial statements.
Fraud audits investigate suspected fraud, often 
targeting only a handful of accounts. There is 
always predication and sometimes individuals 
have already confessed to fraud and provided 
insights into where to look. If fraud audit 
approaches were done on the entire financial 
statements, the cost would be exorbitant.
Method GAAS auditors must rely on sampling which 
introduces sampling error.
Fraud auditors analyze all transactions that are 
within the scope of the audit, completely 
eliminating sampling error.
Procedures Reperformance, analytics, documentation, 
confirmation, observation, physical 
examination, and inquiry, all performed with as 
little disruption as possible
GAAS audit procedures plus surveillance, extensive 
interviews, seizing of computers and other 
items, and confiscation of records, all performed 
without forewarning and without regard to 
disruption of business.
Timing Occur in a predictable and consistent manner 
with the majority of the audit happening close 
to or shortly after year end.
Occur when there is predication--an allegation or 
suspicion of fraud, and can occur at any time 
during the year, without notice or warning. 




GAAS auditors test internal controls to see if they 
work and to establish the scope of their audit. 
They also examine controls as required by 404.
Fraud auditors test controls to see where there is a 
potential for fraud and then look to see if 
control weaknesses have been abused to commit 




There is not the time or the economic resources to 
corroborate all information provided by 
management. GAAS auditors must often rely 
on management representations because it is 
economically infeasible not to do so. They 
neither assume that management is honest or 
dishonest.
Fraud auditors rarely, if ever, rely on management 
representations because they already have the 
suspicion that management cannot be trusted 
and is committing fraud—that is the reason they 
were engaged.
Training GAAS audits are performed by Certified Public 
Accountants, individuals trained in GAAS and 
GAAP. Becoming a CPA requires little specific 
fraud training beyond a basic audit course. 
CPAs are trained to provide a vast array of 
financial services.
Fraud audits are usually conducted by Certified 
Fraud Examiners (CFEs), or other similarly trained 
professionals. CFEs understand auditing and 
accounting, and are also required to have 
significant skills in forgery identification, 
detection and investigation methods, 
interviewing, criminal profiling, and how 
perpetrators use conspiracy, lying, deceit, and 




GAAS auditors are rarely exposed to fraud as 
most of their clients do not commit financial 
statement fraud. With 17,000 public companies, 
and only a handful being investigated for 
fraud, a GAAS auditor may go an entire career 
without ever seeing a financial statement 
fraud. Fraud is the exception in a GAAS audit.
Fraud auditors live on a constant diet of fraud. 
Detecting and investigating fraud is what they 
do, and most clients they are engaged by have a 
high suspicion of fraud. Investigation is the 
expectation in a fraud audit.
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was necessary because it was cost-prohibitive to audit
the entire population. This approach works well for
traditional audit purposes: the detection of routine
anomalies in the system. Routine anomalies are
caused by weak controls or unintentional errors in
accounting systems. These anomalies occur at regular
points throughout a transaction set because they are
routine. Samples that are taken using good statistical
theory are representative of the entire population, thus
allowing generalization from the sample to an entire
transaction set.
In contrast, frauds are not representative, routine,
or regular. They are the result of an (or several) intelli-
gent human being intentionally circumventing con-
trols and hiding his or her tracks. Red flags indicative
of fraud are lumpy; they might exist in a few transac-
tions or in just one part of a data set. If an auditor
samples 5% of the data during an audit, he or she is
effectively taking a 95% risk that the few fraudulent
transactions will be missed.
Table 2 identifies some of the major differences
between a GAAS audit and a fraud audit.
We realize that fraud audits are more expensive
(both in time and money) than traditional GAAS
audits. It is not possible to conduct fraud audits on all
financial statement audit engagements. However,
some aspects of fraud audits could be introduced into
auditor training and engagement practices. For exam-
ple, today’s transaction sets are almost always elec-
tronic in nature and allow increased use of full-
population analysis. Sampling can be reduced or even
eliminated in many areas if auditors were trained in
using computers to automate analyses. This change
would require training in relational databases, queries,
and macros/scripting.
Another aspect of fraud audits that could be incor-
porated is a better understanding of fraud schemes
and their indicators or red flags. SAS 99 requires
auditors brainstorm and “consider” the possibilities
of fraud during audits, but significant progress could
be made on using proactive fraud techniques to
actively search for potential frauds during audit
performance.
As the audit profession continues to move forward,
litigation against auditors probably provides one of
the strongest incentives to ensure that auditors remain
vigilant in their application of SAS 99 and in their
efforts to detect fraud. The most productive steps that
could be taken to reduce fraud would be for regulators
and organizations to reduce some of the incentives
and pressures that encourage fraudulent behavior.
For example, eliminating the providing of earnings
guidance and Wall Street’s setting of earnings expecta-
tions may be one way to reduce pressure on individu-
als in management.
Recent rulings, especially Sarbanes-Oxley, has
temporarily appeased the public and reinstated some
level of trust in auditors and audit opinions. We are
concerned that additional frauds—which will inevita-
bly occur despite recent rulings—may reduce or even
shatter this fragile trust. Long-term reductions in fraud
will only occur when the three fundamental areas of
the fraud triangle are confronted, addressed, and ulti-
mately reduced.
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NOTES
1. Likewise, Douglas R. Carmichael, the first chief auditor and direc-
tor of professional standards for the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, stated that “auditors should recognize that
detection of fraud is clearly an important objective of an audit.
That has been true for over 60 years, but the literature of the pro-
fession ha[s] not forthrightly acknowledged that objective. It is
important that auditors take SAS 99 seriously and conduct audits
in a manner that makes it probable fraud will be detected
(Carmichael, 2003).
2. A common joke among academics during this period was that
the way to value a dot-com company was to multiply its loss by
a “–1” to get a positive number (since they were all losing
money). You then multiplied that number by 100. If the stock
price was lower than that number, you bought the stock. If the
stock price was higher than that number, you bought the stock
anyway.
3. One apparent fraud was already ongoing in 1997 when a senior
financial manager at the firm suggested that the financial statement
manipulation be discontinued. His suggestion was ignored and the
fraud was discovered in 2003.
4. In 2003, the SEC acknowledged that U.S. GAAP may be too “rule-
based” and wrote a position paper arguing for more “principles-“
or “objectives-based” accounting standards.
5. A March 5, 2001, Fortune article included the following warning
about Enron: “To skeptics, the lack of clarity raises a red flag
about Enron’s pricey stock. . . the inability to get behind the num-
bers combined with ever higher expectations for the company
may increase the chance of a nasty surprise. Enron is an earnings-
at-risk story. . .” (http://www.fortune.com/fortune/print/0,15935,
369278,00.html)
6. This serves as a good example of what was stated in the first cod-
ified auditing standard, (now superseded), Statement on Auditing
Procedure (SAP) No. 1, Extensions of Auditing Procedure (1939),
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where it stated, “To exhaust the possibility of all cases of dishon-
esty or fraud, the independent auditor would have to examine in
detail all transactions. This would entail a prohibitive cost to the
great majority of business enterprises—a cost which would pass
all bounds of reasonable expectation of benefit or safeguard
there from, and place an undue burden on industry.”
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The authors propose a fraud model to explain the various factors 
that may influence an executive to commit financial statement 
fraud. The model builds upon classic fraud theory.  
In recent years, it has been nearly impossible to open any business newspaper or 
magazine without seeing headlines relating to various types of corruption. One type of 
corruption—fraudulent financial statements—has been especially prevalent. Although 
Europe has experienced several financial statement frauds, by companies such as 
Parmalat (Italy), Royal Ahold (Netherlands), and Vivendi (France), these frauds have not 
been nearly as devastating as frauds in the United States, by companies such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Fannie Mae, Waste Management, Sunbeam, Qwest, Xerox, Adelphia, and 
Tyco.  
In this article, we explain how the United States is attempting to curb financial statement 
fraud and what Europe can do to learn from the US's mistakes. We begin with a 
discussion of the significant cost of fraud and corruption to companies and the economy 
as a whole. We then present our own expanded model of classic fraud theory and explain 
how the model can help European firms.  
The cost of all frauds—especially financial statement frauds—is extremely high. For 
example, when a company manipulates its financial statements, the market value of that 
company's stock usually drops considerably, sometimes by as much as 500 times the 
amount of the fraud.  
Exhibit 1 lists the ten largest corporate bankruptcies in US history. The four companies 
whose names are in bold font—WorldCom, Enron, Global Crossing, and Adelphia—were 
companies associated with massive financial statement frauds. Also note that six of the 
top ten bankruptcies in US history occurred in 2002. When a company like WorldCom 
declares a $102 billion bankruptcy, nearly every person who has a pension or owns 
 2 
mutual fund shares is hurt financially. Indeed, the cost of these financial statement 
frauds was borne by the entire US.  
Exhibit 1.  
Ten Largest Bankruptcies in US History, with Bankruptcies due to Financial 
Statement Fraud Bolded 
 
 
Company  Assets (Billions)  When Filed  
 
 
1. WorldCom  $101.9  July, 2002  
 
 
2. Enron  $63.4  Dec., 2001  
 
 
3. Texaco  $35.9  April, 1987  
 
 
4. Financial Corp of America  $33.9  Sept., 1988  
 
 
5. Global Crossing  $25.5  Jan., 2002  
 
 
6. Adelphia  $24.4  June, 2002  
 
 
7. United Airlines  $22.7  Dec., 2002  
 
 
8. PG&E  $21.5  June, 2002  
 
 
9. MCorp.  $20.2  March, 1989  
 
 
10. Kmart  $17.0  Jan., 2002  
 
 
   
 3 
Why do people commit fraud? 
Classic fraud theory explains the motivations for fraud as a triangle of perceived 
opportunity, perceived pressure, and rationalization. Every fraud perpetrator faces some 
kind of pressure, which is the first element of fraud. Most often the pressure involves a 
financial need, although nonfinancial pressures—such as the need to report results that 
are better than actual performance, frustration with work, or even a challenge to beat the 
system—can also motivate fraud. Research has shown that these pressures don't have to 
be real; they simply have to seem real to the perpetrator.  
The second element of the fraud triangle is perceived opportunity. The perpetrator must 
believe that he or she can commit the fraud and not get caught (or, that if he or she does 
get caught, nothing serious will happen). Like pressures, opportunities don't have to be 
real; they only must be perceived as real by the perpetrator.  
Third, fraud perpetrators need a way to rationalize their actions as acceptable. Following 
are some common rationalizations: It's for the good of the company; the scheme is only 
temporary; we have no other option; we are not hurting anyone; it's for a good purpose.  
Perceived pressure, perceived opportunity, and rationalizations are essential to every 
fraud. Whether the fraud is one that benefits the perpetrator directly or one that benefits 
a perpetrator's organization, the three elements are always present. In the case of 
financial statement fraud, for example, the pressure could be the need to meet analysts' 
expectations or debt covenants, the opportunity could be a weak audit committee or poor 
internal controls, and the rationalization could be that you are only getting over a 
temporary slump in business.  
To understand better what motivates individuals to become involved in financial 
statement fraud, consider two hypothetical firms: Firm A, which overall increases its 
income over time but with several dips along the way; and Firm B, which increases its 
income to an extent similar to Firm A, but does so consistently over time. Since Firm B's 
earnings are more predictable and since stock prices and market values are a function of 
both risk and return, Firm A's more risky income stream will result in its stock price being 
significantly lower.  
Corporate executives understand this risk/return tradeoff. They also understand the high 
punishment that is levied on firms with earnings trajectories similar to Firm A. 
Accordingly, when Firm A's earnings reach a temporary apex and appear to be decreasing 
for the next period, there may be tremendous pressures to cook the books.  
At this point, many executives rationalize that they cannot report a lower income and 
have the company's stock price punished. Therefore, they adjust the numbers to be more 
in line with analysts' expectations.  
Proposed fraud model 
Exhibit 2 builds upon classical fraud theory. In proposing this model, we have maintained 
the traditional triangle of the original fraud model (of pressure, rationalization, and 
opportunity) and have added various factors that contribute to it. We will now discuss 
each of these contributing factors in greater detail.  
Exhibit 2.  
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Perceived pressures. The traditional fraud model states that increased pressure 
(whether perceived or real) increases the likelihood that a person will commit fraud. 
Corporate and personal position, compensation-plan structures, and external 
expectations are three factors that significantly contribute to the element of pressure.  
Corporate position. A company's financial position is largely a result of its past 
performance and the level of growth it is attempting to achieve. Most of the companies 
that committed financial statement fraud in the last few years had a large amount of debt 
and leverage. This debt placed tremendous financial pressure on executives not only to 
have high earnings but also to report high earnings to meet debt and other covenants. 
For example, during 2000, Enron's derivatives-related liabilities increased from $1.8 
billion to $10.5 billion. Similarly, WorldCom had over $100 billion in debt when it filed 
history's largest bankruptcy. During 2002 alone, 186 public companies with $368 billion 
in assets filed for bankruptcy. 2  
In the 1990s and early 2000s, many companies' financial problems were masked by the 
good economy. During this time, most businesses appeared to be highly profitable, 
including many “dot-com” companies that were testing new (and many times 
unprofitable) business models. The economy was booming, and investment was high. 
During this period of perceived success, people often made nonsensical investment 
decisions. The advent of investing over the Internet for a few dollars per trade brought 
many inexperienced people into the stock market. Several frauds that were revealed 
after 2002 were actually being committed during the boom years, but the booming 
economy hid the fraudulent behavior. 3 The booming economy also caused executives to 
believe that companies were more successful than they were and that companies' 
success was primarily a result of good management actions. Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
for example, posit that extended periods of prosperity may reduce a firm's motivation to 
comprehend the causes of success, raising the likelihood of faulty attributions. 4 In other 
words, during boom periods many firms do not correctly identify the reasons behind their 
successes. Management usually takes credit for good company performance. When 
company performance degrades, boards often expect results similar to those in the past 
without new management styles or actions. But since management often does not 
correctly understand the reasons for success in the past, it may incorrectly assume that 
past management methods would continue to work. In addition, many CEOs feel 
increased pressure when the economy is bad. In some cases, this pressure contributes to 
fraudulent financial reporting and other dishonest acts.  
Personal position. Individuals can feel significant pressure when their personal financial 
status is in jeopardy. The traditional fraud model focuses on an individual's personal 
position as the primary definition of pressure. As can be imagined, the fear of losing one's 
job as a result of financial performance has contributed to various frauds throughout the 
last decade.  
Compensation plan structure. A CEO (or any other employee) can feel significant 
pressure when company success is directly linked to his or her compensation plan. 
Indeed, many of the recent frauds exhibited signs of misplaced executive incentives. For 
example, aligning executive pay with company performance was practiced to the extreme 
in many cases. Executives of several fraudulent companies were endowed with hundreds 
of millions of dollars in stock options and/or restricted stock that made it far more 
important to keep the stock price rising than to report financial results accurately. In 
many cases, this stock-based compensation far exceeded executives' salary-based 
compensation. For example Bernie Ebbers, the CEO of WorldCom, had a cash-based 
salary of $935,000 in 1997. Yet, during that same period, he was able to exercise 
hundreds of thousands of stock options receive corporate loans totaling $409 million for 
purchase of stock and other purposes. 5 The attention of many CEOs shifted from 
 6 
managing the firm to managing the stock price. At the cost of countless billions of dollars, 
managing the stock price all too often turned into fraudulently managing the financials. 
The compensation plan structure is one of the most prominent motivations for financial 
statement fraud.  
Externally imposed expectations. Externally imposed expectations include any 
performance expectation placed on an individual or company by those outside the 
immediate environment. Those who oversee individuals—such as bosses or boards of 
directors—set the majority of compensation plans. However, external expectations, such 
as those placed upon individuals by financial analysts or the competition, also contributed 
to recent financial scandals.  
During the last decade, unachievable expectations by Wall Street analysts who targeted 
only short-term behavior also contributed to recent scandals. Company boards and 
management, generally lacking alternative performance metrics, used comparisons with 
the stock price of “similar” firms as important de facto performance measures. These 
stock-based incentives compounded the pressure induced by analysts' expectations. Each 
quarter, the analysts, often coached by companies themselves, forecasted what each 
company's earnings per share (EPS) would be. These forecasts alone drove shares' price 
movements, imbedding the expectations in the price of a company's stock. Executives 
knew that the penalty for missing Wall Street's estimates was severe—even falling short 
of expectations by a small amount would drop the company's stock price.  
Consider the following example of a fraud that occurred recently. In this company, Wall 
Street made EPS estimates for three consecutive quarters. 6 These estimates are shown 
in Exhibit 3 .  
Exhibit 3.  
Wall Street EPS Estimates 
 
 
Firm  1st Qtr  2nd Qtr  3rd Qtr  
 
 
Morgan Stanley  $0.17  $0.23   
 
 
Smith Barney  0.17  0.21  0.23  
 
 
Robertson Stephens  0.17  0.25  0.24  
 
 
Cowen & Co.  0.18  0.21   
 
 




Paine Webber  0.21  0.28   
 
 
Goldman Sachs  0.17    
 
 
Furman Selz  0.17  0.21  0.23  
 
 
Hambrecht & Quist  0.17  0.21  0.23  
 
 
    
Based on these data, the consensus estimate was that the company would have EPS of 
$0.17 in the first quarter, $0.22 in the second quarter, and $0.23 in the third quarter. As 
post-fraud investigations have revealed, the company's actual earnings during the three 
quarters were $0.08, $0.13, and $0.16, respectively. In order not to miss Wall Street's 
estimates, management committed a fraud of $62 million or $.09 per share in the first 
and second quarter and a fraud of $0.07 per share in the third quarter. The management 
improperly inflated the company's operating income by more than $500 million before 
taxes, which was more than one third of the reported total operating income.  
Perceived opportunities. Increased opportunities provide an increased propensity to 
commit fraud. Our model ( Exhibit 2 ) includes the opportunities of external oversight and 
monitoring, internal monitoring and control, environmental complexity and the existence 
of related parties, and the lack of knowledge or education.  
External oversight and monitoring. External oversight and monitoring includes 
external audit firms, government agencies, or any other external monitoring a firm or 
individual may have. Among some CPA firms there was a prevalent lack of monitoring 
opportunistic behavior over the past decade within the United States. Accounting firms 
sometimes used audits to establish relationships with companies in order to sell more 
lucrative consulting services. The rapid growth of the consulting practices of the “Big 5” 
accounting firms attested to the fact that it was much easier to sell consulting services to 
existing audit clients than to new clients. Audit fees were often much smaller than 
consulting fees for the same clients, and accounting firms felt little conflict between 
independence and increased profits. In particular, these alternative services allowed 
some auditors to lose their focus and become business advisors rather than auditors. This 
was especially true of Arthur Andersen, which spent considerable energy building its 
consulting practice only to see that practice split off into a separate firm called Accenture. 
Privately, several Andersen partners have admitted that the surviving Andersen firm and 
some of its partners had vowed to “out-consult” the firm that separated from them.  
Internal monitoring and control. Internal monitoring and control includes the internal 
control environment, internal control activities, and the level of monitoring and oversight 
by boards, audit committees, and compensation committees. One of the purposes of 
boards of directors is to oversee the high-level policymakers of a company. The board is 
an important element of corporate control and is often perceived as the final control for 
shareholders. A board that fails to accept this responsibility dooms the corporate control 
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process by letting executives operate without proper feedback. Inactive board members 
become a “rubber stamp” that fails to detect wrongdoing or critique corporate processes. 
Within the board, the audit and compensation committees assume vital control 
responsibilities. The audit committee oversees the work of the external and internal 
auditors and the risk assessment function within the corporation. The compensation 
committee oversees executive cash and equity compensation, loans, and other forms of 
remuneration. Unfortunately, many of the companies that were involved in corporate 
wrongdoing had aggressive executives who ran roughshod over their boards, audit 
committees, and nominating committees. As a result, an important oversight control was 
missing and the control environment was decayed. Recently, the board members of 
WorldCom and Enron agreed to accept personally some responsibility for their companies' 
wrongdoing and to make personal payments to victims.  
Environmental complexity and related parties. The perceived opportunity to commit 
fraud is affected by the environmental complexity individuals work within and the related 
entities they deal with. Increased levels of complexity make it more difficult for auditors, 
boards, and external bodies to understand the exact financial state of a company. 
Complex companies or divisions within companies provide CEOs and employees with the 
opportunity of hiding fraudulent activities. Related parties make it possible to hide 
fraudulent transactions.  
Enron is an example of fraud in which environmental complexity and related parties made 
the dishonest acts possible. Enron had a very complex company structure resulting from 
mergers and fast growth. Enron's management also used special entities (related parties) 
to hide fraud and losses while keeping up the appearance that the company was 
successful. Lincoln Savings and Loan was another company that used relationships to 
commit fraud. In Lincoln's case, it structured sham transactions with certain straw buyers 
(related parties) to make its negative performance appear profitable. Related-party 
relationships are problematic because they allow for transactions other than arm's-
length. The management of ESM Government Securities, for example, hid a $400 million 
financial statement fraud by creating a large receivable from a nonconsolidated related 
entity.  
Relationships with all parties should be examined to determine if they present fraud 
opportunities or exposures. Relationships with financial institutions and bondholders are 
particularly important because they provide an indication of the extent to which the 
company is leveraged.  
Lack of knowledge or education. Sometimes people become fraud victims because 
perpetrators know that such individuals may not have the capacity or the knowledge to 
detect their illegal acts. Such vulnerable people are easy to deceive. For example, 
perpetrators often target older, less educated, or non-native-speaking people because 
they find them to be easier victims. When perpetrators believe that auditors and other 
monitoring bodies are not likely to catch them, perceived opportunity increases.  
Rationalizations. Rationalizations are measures of the ability people have to defend, 
explain, or make excuses for their actions. An increased ability to rationalize increases 
the probability that people will commit fraud. When one is honest, there is no need to 
rationalize or make excuses. Regarding fraud, researchers have found that fraud can be 
greatly reduced by hiring honest people.  
Level of personal ethics. A less ethical person will have greater propensity to commit 
fraud, given a constant level of opportunity and pressure. A mediating factor in personal 
ethics is the level of greed an individual has. Greed can decrease a person's ethics and 
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make fraud easier to rationalize. In the frauds researched for this article, there was a 
significant amount of greed by executives, investment banks, commercial banks, and 
investors. Each of these groups benefited from the strong economy, the high level of 
lucrative transactions, and apparently high profits. None of them wanted to accept bad 
news. As a result, they sometimes ignored negative news and entered into bad 
transactions. For example, in the Enron case, various commercial and investment banks 
made hundreds of millions from Enron's lucrative investment banking transactions, in 
addition to tens of millions in loan interest and fees. 7 None of these firms alerted 
investors about derivatives or other underwriting problems at Enron. Similarly, in October 
2001, after several executives had abandoned Enron and negative news about Enron 
began reaching the public, sixteen of seventeen security analysts covering Enron still 
rated the company a “strong buy” or “buy.” Enron's outside law firms were also making 
high profits from its transactions. These firms also failed to correct or disclose any 
problem related to the derivatives and special-purpose entities but rather helped draft 
the requisite associated legal documentation. Finally, the three major credit rating 
agencies, Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch/IBC—each of which received substantial 
fees from Enron—did nothing to alert investors of impending problems. Amazingly, just 
weeks prior to Enron's bankruptcy filing—after most of the negative news became public 
and Enron's stock was trading for $3 per share—all three agencies still gave investment-
grade ratings to Enron's debt. 8  
Environmental ethics. Although some individuals may be honest or dishonest 
regardless of the circumstances, most people are influenced by the ethical values of their 
coworkers and organizations. Companies with strong codes of ethics that are supported 
by policies, ethical modeling at the top, and anonymous feedback measures provide 
strong ethical environments for their employees. 9  
Need to succeed. Psychology and behavioral research hold that people have different 
achievement needs. Researchers have found that people with higher achievement needs 
set higher goals and perform better than those with lower achievement needs. 10 People 
who have a greater need to achieve consider their contribution and participation in 
success to be important 11 and find it enjoyable to work hard, be compared to a standard, 
and be challenged. 12 They feel the need to establish themselves as experts and excel 
above others. 13  
Individuals with a higher need to succeed will have greater ability to rationalize fraud if 
given adequate opportunity and overpowering pressure. These types of individuals 
rationalize cheating on exams more easily than others because they feel significant 
pressure to achieve high scores. In the financial world, individuals with a high need to 
succeed may rationalize fraud to make financial success appear possible.  
Rule-based accounting standards. Rule-based accounting standards lead to financial 
statement fraud rationalizations. In contrast to principle-based accounting practices in 
Europe, US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are much more rule-based. 
14 One of the effects of rule-based standards is that if a client chooses a particular 
questionable method of accounting that is not specifically prohibited by GAAP, it is hard 
for auditors or others to argue that the client can't use that method of accounting. When 
management teams and other advisors seek to create competitive advantages by 
identifying and exploiting possible loopholes, it is difficult to make a convincing case that 
a particular accounting treatment is prohibited when it technically isn't against the rules. 
The result is that rather than deferring to existing general rules, specific rules (or the lack 
of specific rules) can be exploited for new, often complex financial arrangements. For 
example, even if Andersen had argued that the accounting for Enron's special purpose 
entities wasn't appropriate, it would have been impossible for them to make the case that 
their accounting violated specific rules. This lack of specific rules has been seen as one of 
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the reasons it took so long to get plea bargains or indictments in the Enron case, since it 
wasn't immediately clear whether any laws had actually been violated.  
In many ways, having rule-specific accounting methods makes it easier for accountants 
to rationalize fraud because they can argue that what they are doing is not wrong. In 
Europe, this issue does not have to be dealt with.  
Concluding comments 
Fraud and corruption are cancers that eat away at society's productivity. Their occurrence 
reduces the effectiveness and efficiency of countries' economies and costs individuals and 
corporations tremendous amounts of money. The proposed model provides insight into 
why financial statement fraud occurs, and it is a useful way for shareholders, board 
members, and others to think about incentive planning. By better understanding what 
caused such major ethical lapses to occur in the United States, Europe can prepare itself 
to avoid similar ethical breakdowns. In the end, we can learn from the mistakes of the 
United States, instead of follow in the footsteps of its errors.  
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 Koerber and Neck (2006) have argued that the adoption of religion in the 
workplace can create an environment that leads to a greater possibility of financial 
fraud.  This logic flows from the proposition that a culture embedded in religion 
allows the fraud triangle to develop by creating a greater opportunity for fraud to 
occur.  Koerber and Neck have raised some interesting points. However, in the 
following commentary, I challenge their proposition that religion in the workplace 
will increase an organizations overall susceptibility to fraud.  I base this proposition 
on two key elements of the fraud triangle—pressure and rationalization.  In the 
following commentary, I propose that, by examining the entire fraud triangle—not 
just one element of the fraud triangle—organizations embedded in religion may have 
an overall minimized risk of financial fraud.   
 
Keywords:  Religion, Fraud, Fraud Triangle, Culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the article, “Religion in the Workplace: Implications for Financial Fraud 
and Organizational Decision Making” by Koerber and Neck (2006), it is argued that 
the likelihood of financial fraud increases in organizations that are embedded in a 
culture of religion.   Koerber and Neck base their arguments upon the fraud triangle.  
The fraud triangle is composed of three basic elements—pressure, rationalization, and 
opportunity (Wells, 2001, Albrecht, 1981).  The fraud triangle has gained 
considerable popularity in recent years and, in 2002, formed the basis for SAS 99, 
Considerations of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, which became the fraud 
auditing standard of the accounting profession within the United States (American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2002).    
 In their article, Koerber and Neck specifically focus on one dimension of the 
fraud triangle—that of opportunity.  They assert that organizations embedded in 
religion will have a greater susceptibility to fraud as a result of two factors.  These 
two factors include: (1) an increased overall forgiveness within the organization, and 
(2) an increased trust to members of the organization. Based on this assertion, 
Koerber and Neck argue that an organizational culture that places trust in its members 
will have fewer internal controls to prevent and/or detect theft and other forms of 
fraud and abuse, creating a greater opportunity for fraud to occur.  Koerber and Neck 
present this idea from both the organizational and individual level.  They also argue 
that workplaces embedded in religion will be more forgiving to members of the 
organization.  Thus, when a member is found guilty of dishonesty, an organization 
embedded in religion will be more forgiving of that individual than those 
organizations that are not embedded in religion.  As a result of these two factors, 
Koerber and Neck conclude that organizations embedded in religion are more likely 
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to be susceptible to fraud than organizations that are not embedded in religion.  In the 
following commentary, it is proposed that—when the fraud triangle is viewed in its 
totality—organizations that are embedded in religion may have an overall minimized 
risk for financial fraud when compared to organizations that are not embedded in 
religion. 
THE FRAUD TRIANGLE 
 As discussed earlier, the fraud triangle is comprised of three elements:  
opportunity, pressure, and rationalization. These three elements are common to all 
frauds (Wells, 2001). A perceived opportunity to commit fraud, conceal it, and to 
avoid being punished is the first element of the fraud triangle.  The Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations (2002) identified five elements of an organization’s internal 
control framework that must be taken into consideration in order to avoid fraudulent 
opportunities. These include the control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, information and communication, and monitoring.  The second element of 
the fraud triangle is pressure. These pressures don’t have to be real, they only have to 
seem real to the perpetrator. Pressures usually involves a financial need—such as 
substantial debt, although non-financial pressures, such as the need to report results 
better than actual performance, work frustration, or even a challenge to beat the 
system can motivate fraud. The third element of the fraud triangle is rationalization. 
Perpetrators of fraud must find ways to rationalize their illegal acts as being 
acceptable and, in the process, rationalize away the dishonesty of their acts (Albrecht, 
Albrecht, & Albrecht, 2006). The fraud triangle is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Fraud Triangle 
 
  
The fraud triangle is often compared to the fire triangle.  In order for fire to occur 
three elements are necessary—heat, fuel, and oxygen.  When all three of these 
elements are present, fire occurs.  When one factor is eliminated the fire goes out.  
Fire fighters are smart and know they can fight fires by working on any one of the 
three elements.  Fires are extinguished by taking away oxygen (smothering, 
chemicals, etc.), by eliminating heat (water, etc.) and by eliminating fuel (turning off 
the gas, constructing fire breaks, etc.)  Further, the more pure the oxygen, the less fuel 
and heat it takes to have a fire.  The fire triangle is presented in Figure 2.  





Koerber and Neck have argued that organizations with a religious culture may 
be more susceptible to the opportunity element of the fraud triangle.  I agree with this 
proposition. Koerber and Neck (2006) have provided various examples to illustrate 
this point including the famous “Praise the Lord” scandal.  
However, before making an assertion that an organization embedded in 
religion is at a higher overall risk for fraud abuse, it necessary to take into account all 
three elements of the fraud triangle.  Once the fraud triangle is viewed in its totality, it 
is possible to see that organizations embedded in religion may be at less risk for 
fraudulent behavior than organizations that are not embedded in religion. By 
considering the effects of religion on the elements of pressure and rationalization in 
addition to the element of opportunity, it is possible to do an accurate assessment of 
the effect that religion may have on organizations.  In the following paragraphs, I 
discuss some of the positive effects that religion in the workplace will have on both 
the pressure and rationalization elements of the fraud triangle.   
Research has suggested that religion is negatively related to values that 
emphasize self-indulgence (Schwartze & Huismans, 1995). Since, fraud is a self-
induging behavior, individuals with higher values are going to be less likely to 
participate in fraud than those who are not value oriented.  Furthermore, individuals 
with values will find it harder to rationalize their illegal acts as acceptable.   
Most people who commit fraud do so as a result of a financial pressure.  
However, once perpetrators meet their own financial needs, they often continue to 
steal, using the stolen funds to improve their lifestyle.  Few, if any perpetrators, save 
what they steal.  Many perpetrators buy new cars, take expensive vacations, buy new 
homes, buy expensive jewelry and spend the money in other extravagant ways 
(Albrecht & Albrecht, 2004).  One of the best-known examples of this type of 
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behavior is that of Mickey Monus in the famous Phar-Mor case, who took extravagant 
trips to Las Vegas in a private jet, financed the world basketball league, and truly 
lived a lifestyle well beyond his means.  This type of behavior, portrayed by many 
fraud perpetrators, is the near opposite of what research on spirituality suggest.  
Research on spirituality has suggested that spiritual and religious individuals are 
“…well adjusted and exhibit a sense of inner harmony.  They have positive energy, 
are conscientious, and tend to be open to possibilities.  Compassionate and altruistic, 
persons with spirit at work are self-transcendent and spiritually inclined.  These 
spiritually inclined individuals seek deeper meaning and a purpose beyond self and, as 
such, see work as an act of service.  They are filled with gratitude and harmony” 
(Kinjerski & Skrypnek, 2006, p. 234).   
   People who are truly religious generally adhere or believe in the golden rule.  
This rule, which encourages us to “do unto others as you would want others to do 
unto you,” is found in most religions. Those individuals who believe in treating others 
as they would want to be treated will be less likely to harm others through fraudulent 
or other abusive behavior. Below are a few examples of religious teachings 
throughout the world to support this statement: 
 
! Judaism: You shall love your neighbor as yourself (Bible, Leviticus, 19 – 18. 
! Christianity: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you (Luke 6: 29 
– 38). 
! Islam: Not one of you is a believer until he loves for his brother what he 
loves for himself (Forty Hadith of a-Nawawi 13). 
! Jainism: A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself 
would be treated (Sutrakritanga 1.11.33). 
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! Confucianism: Try your best to treat others as you would wish to be treated 
yourself, and you will find that this is the shortest way to benevolence 
(Mencius VII.A.4). 
! Hinduism: One should not behave towards others in a way that is 
disagreeable to oneself.  This is the essence of morality.  All other activities 
are due to selfish desire (Mahabharata, Anusana Parva 113.8). 
 
Furthermore, since individuals with stronger values are more altruistic, 
managements of organizations embedded in religion will be less greedy than those of 
organizations that are not embedded in religion. It has been suggested that individuals 
who are less greedy will not have the same pressures to commit and/or be conned by 
fraud as greedy individuals (Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001).  Along this same line of 
reasoning, is the fact that, many individuals who practice religion have an increased 
ethical foundation to help guide them to make good decisions.  
The act of labeling and modeling by management and others also has a 
tremendous influence on organizations.  I assert that individuals with religious 
convictions will not only label good ethical behavior but will also “practice what they 
preach”.  In other words, organizations embedded in religion will have individuals 
who both label and model good behavior.  This in turn will have a positive influence 
on the organization as a whole and reduce the likely hood that individuals will be able 
to rationalize their illegal actions as justifiable. 
Scholars have suggested that the fraud triangle is interactive, meaning that the 
three elements of the fraud triangle work together (Albrecht, Albrecht, & Albrecht, 
2006). If more of one factor is present, less of the other factors need to exist for fraud 
to occur.  In other words, the greater the perceived opportunity or the more intense the 
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pressure, the less rationalization it takes to motivate someone to commit fraud.  
Likewise, the more dishonest a perpetrator is, the less opportunity or pressure it takes 
to motivate fraud.  This point is illustrated in figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: The Fraud Scale 
 
Hence, while it may be that organizations embedded in religion may have 
increased opportunities for fraud, the benefits of a culture embedded in religion on 
both rationalization and pressure may compensate and even outweigh this increased 
opportunity.  The table below outlines the susceptibility of fraud to organizations 
embedded in religion compared to those organizations not embedded in religion. 
 
Table 1: Susceptibility to Fraud of Organizations embedded with Religion compared 
to Organizations not embedded in Religion. 
 












Higher Lower Lower 
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CONCLUSION 
 While Koerber and Neck have discussed the effects of religion in the 
workplace on one dimension of the fraud triangle, I have examined the effect of 
religion on all three aspects of the fraud triangle.  Koerber and Neck have done a good 
job of identifying the possible increased risk on the dimension of opportunity as a 
result of a culture embedded with religion.  However, when all three dimensions of 
the fraud triangle are taken into account, I suggest that the increased risk of fraud for 
organizations embedded in religion will generally be offset by the decrease in 
potential rationalization and pressure of fraud perpetrators. In the process, I have 
presented the fraud triangle and the fraud scale.  I have also presented a table to show 
how all three dimensions of the fraud triangle—pressure, rationalization, and 
opportunity—are effected by organizations that are embedded with religion compared 
to organizations that are not embedded with religion.  
 If managers and executives understand the potential risks and benefits that are 
associated with religion in the workplace, they will better be able to prevent fraud and 
other forms of abuse from occurring within their respective organizations.   This in 
turn, will create a positive effect on the organization as a whole. Our knowledge with 
regards to the relationship between fraud and religion is still in its infancy. As 
Koerber and Neck have stated, “Additional research is needed to empirically test the 
relationships between religion in the workplace and financial fraud (Koerber and 
Neck, 2006, p. 315).  This additional research must include both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies.  
 
I would like to thank Koerber and Neck for their article and for bringing 
attention to the relationships between fraud and religion in the workplace.  
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Furthermore, I would like to thank Koerber and Neck for bringing attention to the 
idea that organizations embedded in religion will have different challenges when 
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-,*,.-5(! <,5/2,*! 2/-,! 3-,+/2)&.&'! )&! 2.)&*'-,.2! 2.&.9,2,&'! 6),:+*0! 4,!
<,:),1,!'(.'!'()*!-,*,.-5(!4)::!(.1,!.&!,1,&!9-,.',-!)23.5'!4)'()&!'(,!.5.+,2)5!
5/227&)'8;!!
! H,! (.1,! -,5,&':8! :,.-&,+! '(.'! '(,! ,+)'/-! /6! !"#$%"&'( )*+,#,"-.( .! 3,,-!
-,1),4! 37<:)5.')/&! <8! I(/2*/&0! 4/7:+! :)>,! '/! -,J37<:)*(! /7-! .-')5:,! '(.'!
/-)9)&.::8! .33,.-,+! )&! /0%10%&#$( 2,"&"3$( 4$5,$6;! @55/-+)&9! '/! '(,! ,+)'/-! /6!
!"#$%"&'( )*+,#,"-0! '(,! .-')5:,!4.*! */!4,::! -,5,)1,+! <8! '(,! .55/7&')&9! 6),:+! '(.'!
'(,8! 4/7:+! :)>,! '/! 37<:)*(! )'! /&,! 2/-,! ')2,! '/! 9)1,! '(,! .-')5:,! ,1,&! 2/-,!
,K3/*7-,;!!!"#$%"&'()*+,#,"-!)*!.!3-/6,**)/&.:!L/7-&.:!'(.'!)*!&/4!)&!)'*!#M-+!8,.-;!!






L/7-&.:! .&+! '(,! <.*)5! )+,.! /6! ,.5(! /6! '(,! .-')5:,*! 5/&'.)&,+! 4)'()&! '(,!
+)**,-'.')/&;!%&!'(,!6/::/4)&9!3.-.9-.3(*0!%!4)::!'.>,!'()*!.!*',3!67-'(,-0!<8!9/)&9!




.-')5:,! )*! '(,! 6.5'! '(.'!4(,&! .! 6-.7+! /557-*! N! ,1,-8/&,! :/*,*;! ! %&! /'(,-!4/-+*0!
6-.7+!)*!+,*'-75')1,!'/!,1,-8/&,!)&1/:1,+;!!O-.7+!.&+!5/--73')/&!.-,!5.&5,-*!'(.'!
,.'!.4.8!.'!*/5),'),*!3-/+75')1)'8;! !I(,8!-,+75,!'(,!,66,5')1,&,**!.&+!,66)5),&58!
/6! ,5/&/2),*0! .&+! (.1,! 1,-8! ()9(! 5/*'*! 6/-! )&+)1)+7.:*! .&+! 5/23.&),*!
'(-/79(/7'! '(,!4/-:+;! %&! '(,! 3.3,-0!4,! 3-/3/*,! .!2/+,:! '(.'! 3-/1)+,*! )&*)9('!
)&'/!4(8!6)&.&5).:!*'.',2,&'!6-.7+!/557-*0!.&+!)'!)*!.!7*,67:!4.8!6/-!*(.-,(/:+,-*0!




4-,13) 5?7) @A,%"3(#B) .01) 21$3&(.+1#.) "/) *#9(C(9&-%') (#.") 8(#-#$(-%)
D.-.1+1#.)83-&9)D$01+1')
! I(,!2.)&!37-3/*,!/6!'()*!3.3,-!(.*!<,,&!'/!3-/3/*,!.!2/+,:!'(.'!,K3:.)&*!
'(,! 3-/5,**! <8! 4()5(! )&+)1)+7.:*! -,5-7)'! /'(,-! )&+)1)+7.:*! '/! 3.-')5)3.',! )&!
7&,'()5.:!.5'*;!!H,!+/!'()*!<8!+,2/&*'-.')&9!(/4!)&+)1)+7.:*!2.8!7*,!3/4,-!'/!
,K,-'! )&6:7,&5,! 73/&! .&/'(,-! 3,-*/&;! ! S-,1)/7*! -,*,.-5(! *(/4*! '(.'! .! >,8!




,&*7-,! '(.'! 6-.7+*! '(.'! +/! /557-! .-,! +,',5',+! .'! ,.-:8! *'.',*0! '(7*! :)2)')&9!
6)&.&5).:! ,K3/*7-,! '/! '(,! 5/-3/-.')/&! .&+! 2)&)2)=)&9! '(,! &,9.')1,! )23.5'! /6!
6-.7+!/&!'(,!4/->!,&1)-/&2,&';!!




3-/1)+,*!.&!,K3:.&.')/&!/6!(/4!2.&8! )&+)1)+7.:*!<,5/2,! )&1/:1,+! )&! 6)&.&5).:!
*'.',2,&'! 6-.7+;! ! I(,! 2/+,:! 67-'(,-! ,K3:.)&*! (/4! 6-.7+! )*! 3,-3,'-.',+!
'(-/79(/7'! '(,! 1.-)/7*! :,1,:*! /6! '(,! /-9.&)=.')/&0! 9)1)&9! )&*)9('! )&'/! '(,!
)23/-'.&'!3(,&/2,&/&!/6!(/4!,&')-,!/-9.&)=.')/&*!<,5/2,!)&1/:1,+!)&!6)&.&5).:!
*'.',2,&'! 6-.7+;! ! %'! )*! /7-! (/3,! '(.'! '(,! 2/+,:! 3-/1)+,+! )&! '()*! 3.3,-0! 4)::!
3-/1)+,! .! <.5>9-/7&+! 6-/2! 4()5(! '/! 5-,.',! *5(,2,*! .&+! .5')/&*! '/! :)2)'!
/-9.&)=.')/&*T! *7*5,3')<):)'8! '/! 6)&.&5).:! *'.',2,&'! 6-.7+! .*! 4,::! .*! /'(,-!
3/**)<:,!6/-2*!/6!/-9.&)=.')/&.:!5/--73')/&;!!
4-,13)5E7):01)2"%1)"/)4"<13)-#9)F1B".(-.("#)(#)G#%(#1)H1$1,.("#)
! I(,!37-3/*,!/6! '()*!3.3,-!4.*! '/! ,K3:.)&!3/4,-! .*!4,::! .*! '(,!3-)2.-8!
'.5')5*! 7'):)=,+! '/! -,.:)=,! 3/4,-!4)'()&! '(,! /&:)&,! *,'')&9;! ! I(,! *'-,&9'(! /6! '(,!
3.3,-! )*! '(.'! )'! ,K3:.)&*! '(,! -,:.')/&*()3! '(.'! '.>,*! 3:.5,! <,'4,,&! 3,-3,'-.'/-!
.&+! 1)5')20! *3,5)6)5.::8! )&! .&! /&:)&,! ,&1)-/&2,&';! ! P8! 7&+,-*'.&+)&9! '(,!
',5(&)?7,*!,23:/8,+0!.&+!(/4!3/',&').:! 6-.7+!1)5')2*!*,:6J*,:,5'!'(,2*,:1,*! )&!




! %'! )*! /7-! (/3,! '(.'! '()*! 3.3,-! (.*! <,,&! .<:,! '/! .+1.&5,! '(,/-,')5.:!
7&+,-*'.&+)&9! /6! '(,! *3,5)6)5! 3/4,-! 6/-2*! '(.'! 3,-3,'-.'/-*! 7*,! 4(,&!
)&6:7,&5)&9! 1)5')2*! )&! 6-.7+7:,&'! '-.&*.5')/&*;! ! I(,! 2/+,:! 5/2<)&,*! '(,!
+)2,&*)/&*!/6! 3/4,-! .&+!&,9/').')/&! 6-/2! '(,!2.&.9,2,&'! .&+!3*85(/:/9)5.:!
:)',-.'7-,!.*!4,::!.*!%&',-&,'!6-.7+!-,*,.-5(!6-/2!'(,!%&6/-2.')/&!B8*',2*!6),:+;!!
I(,! 3.3,-! 67-'(,-! ,K.2)&,*! '(,! 2/+,-.')&9! ,66,5'*! /6! '(,! %&',-&,'! /&!
5/227&)5.')/&!.&+!6-.7+!3-/5,**,*!<,'4,,&!3,-3,'-.'/-!.&+!1)5')20!.*!4,::!.*!







I(,! .-')5:,! 67-'(,-! *(,+*! :)9('! /&! '(,! +)*57**)/&! /6! 4(,'(,-! /-! &/'! .7+)'/-*!
*(/7:+!<,!(,:+! :).<:,! 6/-!+,',5')&9! 6)&.&5).:! *'.',2,&'! 6-.7+;! !I(,!.-')5:,!(,:3*!
.7+)'/-*! .&+! -,97:.'/-*! .:)>,! '/! <,'',-! 7&+,-*'.&+! '(,! -,*7:'! /6! '(,! -,5,&'!








.'',23')&9! '/! 57-<! 6)&.&5).:! *'.',2,&'! 6-.7+! .&+!4(.'!R7-/3,! 5.&!+/! '/! :,.-&!
6-/2! '(,!QBT*!2)*'.>,*;! ! I(,!.-')5:,! .:*/!+)*57**,*! '(,! *)9&)6)5.&'! 5/*'! /6! 6-.7+!
.&+! 5/--73')/&! '/! 5/23.&),*! .&+! '(,! ,5/&/28!.*! .!4(/:,;! ! O)&.::80! '(,! .-')5:,!
5/&'-)<7',*!'/!'(,!,K)*')&9!:)',-.'7-,!<8!3-,*,&')&9!/7-!/4&!,K3.&+,+!2/+,:!/6!
5:.**)5!6-.7+!'(,/-8!.&+!,K3:.)&)&9!(/4!'(,!2/+,:!5.&!(,:3!R7-/3,.&!6)-2*;!!
4-,13) 5P7) Q) !"++1#.) "#) R"13S13) -#9) F1$MT') U?VVPW) X21%(B("#) (#) .01)
="3M,%-$17) *+,%($-.("#') /"3) 8(#-#$(-%) 83-&9) -#9)G3B-#(Y-.("#-%) H1$('("#)
L-M(#B)
! I()*! .-')5:,T*! )23:)5.')/&! .&+! 5/&'-)<7')/&*! '/! '(,! 6),:+! )&5:7+,! .++,+!
)&*)9('! )&'/! '(,! +,<.',! /&! 6-.7+! )&! '(,! 4/->3:.5,;! ! H():,! W/,-<,-! .&+! X,5>!
+)*57**! '(,! ,66,5'*! /6! -,:)9)/&! )&! '(,!4/->3:.5,! /&! /&,! +)2,&*)/&! /6! '(,! 6-.7+!
'-).&9:,0! '()*! .-')5:,! ,K.2)&,*! '(,! ,66,5'! /6! -,:)9)/&! /&! .::! '(-,,! .*3,5'*! /6! '(,!
6-.7+!'-).&9:,;!!O7-'(,-2/-,0!)&!'(,!5/22,&'.-80!%!*799,*'!'(.'!'(,!)&5-,.*,+!-)*>!
/6! 6-.7+! 6/-! /-9.&)=.')/&*! ,2<,++,+! )&! -,:)9)/&!4)::! 9,&,-.::8! <,! /66*,'! <8! '(,!
+,5-,.*,!)&!3/',&').:!-.')/&.:)=.')/&!.&+!3-,**7-,!/6!6-.7+!3,-3,'-.'/-*;! ! %&!'(,!
3-/5,**0! %! (.1,! 3-,*,&',+! '(,! 6-.7+! '-).&9:,! .&+! '(,! 6-.7+! *5.:,;! ! %! (.1,! .:*/!
3-,*,&',+! .! '.<:,! '/! *(/4! (/4! .::! '(-,,! +)2,&*)/&*! /6! '(,! 6-.7+! '-).&9:,! N!
3-,**7-,0! -.')/&.:)=.')/&0! .&+! /33/-'7&)'8! N! .-,! ,66,5',+! <8! /-9.&)=.')/&*! '(.'!
.-,!,2<,++,+!4)'(! -,:)9)/&!5/23.-,+! '/!/-9.&)=.')/&*! '(.'!.-,!&/'!,2<,++,+!
4)'(!-,:)9)/&;!!
! I(,! .-')5:,! *'.',*! '(.'! )6! 2.&.9,-*! .&+! ,K,57')1,*! 7&+,-*'.&+! '(,!






! I(,! *'7+8! /6! 6-.7+! )*! .&! )23/-'.&'! .*3,5'! /6! <7*)&,**;! ! Q&6/-'7&.',:80!
2.)&*'-,.2!2.&.9,2,&'! (.*! )9&/-,+!2.&8! .*3,5'*! /6! 6-.7+! ,K.2)&.')/&;! ! %&!
'()*!+)**,-'.')/&0!%!(.1,!.'',23',+!'/!<-)&9!2/-,!.'',&')/&!'/!'(,!'/3)5!/6!6-.7+!
<8!37<:)*()&9!-,*,.-5(! )&!</'(!.5.+,2)5!.&+!3-/6,**)/&.:! L/7-&.:*;! ! %!(.1,!.:*/!
.'',23',+!'/!*37-!2/-,!.'',&')/&!.&+!+,<.',!'/!'(,!*'7+8!/6!6-.7+!<8!.'',&+)&9!
.&+! 3-,*,&')&9! -,*,.-5(! .'! 1.-)/7*! .5.+,2)5! 5/&6,-,&5,*;! ! %&! 6.5'0! 4():,! .!
+/5'/-.:!*'7+,&'0!'(,!-,*,.-5(!'(.'!28!5/::,.97,*!.&+!%!(.1,!+/&,!/&!6-.7+!(.*!
<,,&! 3-,*,&',+! .'! 5/&6,-,&5,*! )&! '(,! Q&)',+! B'.',*0! B3.)&0! Z),&&.0! S.-)*0!
B:/1,&).0!V,K)5/0! .&+!X/-4.8;! ! ! P,5.7*,! /6!28! )&',-,*'! )&! 6-.7+0! B)2/&![/:.&!
.*>,+! 2,! '/! *7<2)'! .! *3,5).:! '-.5>! 3-/3/*.:! /&! %&',-&.')/&.:! O-.7+! .&+!
\/--73')/&!.'!'(,!#$$F!R7-/3,.&!@5.+,28!/6!V.&.9,2,&'!(,:+!)&!B:/1,&).;!!I(,!
'-.5>!4.*!.55,3',+!.&+!(.*!-,*7:',+!)&!2.&8!+)66,-,&'!3.3,-*!/&!'(,!*7<L,5'!/6!
)&',-&.')/&.:! 6-.7+! )&! '(,! 2.&.9,2,&'! 6),:+;! ! B)2/&! [/:.&! .&+! 28*,:6! .-,!
57--,&':8!5/J5(.)-)&9!'()*!*3,5).:!'-.5>!/&!)&',-&.')/&.:!6-.7+!.&+!5/--73')/&;!!
! %'! )*!28!(/3,!'(.'!'(,!-,*,.-5(!3-,*,&',+!)&!'()*!+)**,-'.')/&!4)::!(.1,!.!
3-.5')5.:! )23:)5.')/&!/&!<7*)&,**,*! '/+.8;! !H():,!275(!/6! '(,! 6-.7+! -,*,.-5(! %!




'/! '(,!-,:.')/&*()3!<,'4,,&!.55/7&')&90!.*!.&! )&*')'7')/&0!.&+!5/--73')/&;! ![.'.!
7*,+!)&!/7-!.&.:8*)*!(.*!5/2,!6-/2!/1,-!U$!+)66,-,&'!5/7&'-),*;!!@&/'(,-!3-/L,5'!
%! .2! 57--,&':8! 4/->)&9! /&! (.*! 5/::,5',+! +.'.! 6-/2! /1,-! #Y$! <7*)&,**! ,'()5*!
! "#D!
.5.+,2)5!3-/6,**/-*;! !I(,*,!3-/6,**/-*!(.1,!-,3/-',+!/&! '(,! '/3!,'()5.:! )**7,*!
'(.'!/7-!6),:+!4)::!6.5,!)&!'(,!5/2)&9!+,5.+,;!I()*!*.2,!3-/L,5'!(.*!3-/1)+,+!+.'.!
'(.'!4)::!(,:3!7*!'/!<,'',-!7&+,-*'.&+!'(,!,'()5.:!1.:7,*!/6!5/::,9,!*'7+,&'*!'/+.8;!!
O)&.::80! .! '()-+! 3-/L,5'! /&! 6-.7+! +,.:*! 4)'(! '(,! -,:.')/&*()3! <,'4,,&! B/7'(!
W/-,.&! 5(.,</:*! .&+! 6-.7+;! ! I()*! :.*'! .-')5:,! (.*! -,*7:',+! )&! .! 3.3,-! '(.'! )*!




6-/2! 6-.7+;! ! ]&5,! .! 6-.7+! (.*! <,,&! 5/22)'',+0! '(,-,! .-,! &/! 4)&&,-*;!!
S,-3,'-.'/-*! :/*,! <,5.7*,! '(,8! .-,! 7*7.::8! 6)-*'J')2,! /66,&+,-*! 4(/! *766,-!
(72):).')/&! .&+! ,2<.--.**2,&'! .*! 4,::! .*! :,9.:! 5/&*,?7,&5,*;! ! I(,8! 7*7.::8!
27*'!2.>,!'.K!.&+!-,*')'7')/&!3.82,&'*0!.&+!'(,-,!.-,!/6',&!6)&.&5).:!3,&.:'),*!
.&+! /'(,-! 5/&*,?7,&5,*;! ! Z)5')2*! :/*,! <,5.7*,! &/'! /&:8! .-,! .**,'*! *'/:,&0! <7'!
'(,8! .:*/! )&57-! :,9.:! 6,,*0! :/*'! ')2,0! &,9.')1,! 37<:)5)'80! .&+! /'(,-! .+1,-*,!
5/&*,?7,&5,*;!!O7-'(,-0!)6!/-9.&)=.')/&*!+/&T'!+,.:!(.-*(:8!4)'(!'(,!3,-3,'-.'/-*0!
.! *)9&.:! )*! *,&'! '/! /'(,-*! )&! '(,! /-9.&)=.')/&! '(.'! &/'()&9! *,-)/7*! (.33,&*! '/!
6-.7+! 3,-3,'-.'/-*! )&! '()*! /-9.&)=.')/&0! 2.>)&9! 6-.7+! <8! /'(,-*! 2/-,! :)>,:8;!!
]-9.&)=.')/&*! .&+! )&+)1)+7.:*! '(.'! (.1,! 3-/.5')1,! 6-.7+! 3-,1,&')/&! 2,.*7-,*!
7*7.::8! 6)&+! '(.'! '(,)-!3-,1,&')/&!,66/-'*!3.8!<)9!+)1)+,&+*;!]&! '(,!/'(,-!(.&+0!
'(,!)&1,*')9.')/&!/6!6-.7+!5.&!<,!1,-8!,K3,&*)1,;!!
! I(,! 37-3/*,! /6! '()*! +)**,-'.')/&! (.*! <,,&! '/! *'-,**! '(,! )23/-'.&5,! /6!
6-.7+!3-,1,&')/&;! ! B3,5)6)5.::80! '(-/79(/7'! '(,!+)**,-'.')/&0! %! (.1,! *'-,**,+! '(,!
)23/-'.&5,! /6! 6-.7+! ,+75.')/&! .*! .! 2,.&*! '/! 3-,1,&'! 6-.7+;! ! %6! 6-.7+! 5.&! <,!
,:)2)&.',+0! /-! .'! :,.*'! -,+75,+0! /-9.&)=.')/&*! .&+! */5),'),*!4)::! <,!275(!2/-,!
! "#`!
3-/+75')1,!.&+!,66)5),&';! !I/!(,:3!.)+! )&! '(,!,+75.')/&!.&+!3-,1,&')/&!/6! 6-.7+0!
'(,!+)**,-'.')/&!(.*!3-,*,&',+!6)1,!3,,-!-,1),4!3.3,-*!.&+!.!*)K'(!3.3,-!'(.'!)*!
57--,&':8!7&+,-!-,1),4;! !R.5(!/6!'(,*,!3.3,-*!(.*!.)+,+!)&!6-.7+!3-,1,&')/&!<8!
(,:3)&9! 2.&.9,-*0! 3-.5')')/&,-*0! -,97:.'/-*0! .&+! .5.+,2)5*! 7&+,-*'.&+! '(,!
&.'7-,!/6!6-.7+!.!:)'':,!<,'',-;!!B,1,-.:!/6!'(,!3.3,-*!(.1,!.:*/!'.:>,+!.</7'!(/4!
)&+)1)+7.:*! 7*,! 3/4,-! '/! -,5-7)'! /'(,-! )&+)1)+7.:*! 4)'()&! .&! /-9.&)=.')/&! '/!
3.-')5)3.',!)&!7&,'()5.:!.5'*!*75(!.*!6-.7+;!!!
! %&! 5/&5:7*)/&0! 6-.7+! )*! .! 5.&5,-! '(.'! ,.'*! .4.8! .'! */5),'8T*! 3-/+75')1)'8;!!
O-.7+! -,+75,*! '(,! ,66,5')1,&,**! .&+! ,66)5),&58! /6! ,5/&/2),*0! .&+! 5-,.',*! 1,-8!




4,! 5.&! <,'',-! 3-,1,&'! 6-.7+! 6-/2! /557--)&9! )&! /7-! /-9.&)=.')/&*! .&+!
5/227&)'),*;!!
! !
!
